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Abstract
Social intelligence in natural and artificial systems is usually measured by the evaluation of associated
traits or tasks that are deemed to represent some facets of social behaviour. The amalgamation of these
traits is then used to configure the intuitive notion of social intelligence. Instead, in this paper we start from
a parametrised definition of social intelligence as the expected performance in a set of environments with
several agents, and we assess and derive tests from it. This definition makes several dependencies explicit: (1)
the definition depends on the choice (and weight) of environments and agents, (2) the definition may include
both competitive and cooperative behaviours depending on how agents and rewards are arranged into teams,
(3) the definition mostly depends on the abilities of other agents, and (4) the actual difference between
social intelligence and general intelligence (or other abilities) depends on these choices. As a result, we
address the problem of converting this definition into a more precise one where some fundamental properties
ensuring social behaviour (such as action and reward dependency and anticipation on competitive/cooperative
behaviours) are met as well as some other more instrumental properties (such as secernment, boundedness,
symmetry, validity, reliability, efficiency), which are convenient to convert the definition into a practical
test. From the definition and the formalised properties, we take a look at several representative multi-agent
environments, tests and games to see whether they meet these properties.
Keywords: social intelligence, artificial intelligence, multi-agent systems, cooperation, competition,
interaction, game theory, teams, rewards, intelligence testing, universal psychometrics.
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1 Introduction
Evaluation tools are crucial in any discipline as a way to assess its progress and creations. Artificial intelligence,
as a discipline, lacks general, well-grounded and universally accepted intelligence measurement tools. In fact,
artificial intelligence is a paradigmatic case of how useful these tools would be and how impeding this lack is.
There are, of course, some tools, benchmarks and contests, aimed at the measurement of humanoid intelligence
or the performance in a particular set of tasks. However, the evolution and state of the art of artificial intelligence
is now more focussed towards social abilities, and here the measuring tools are still rather incipient.
In the past two decades, the notion of agent and the area of multi-agent systems have shifted artificial
intelligence to problems and solutions where ‘social’ intelligence is more relevant. This shift towards a more
social-oriented AI is related to the modern view of human intelligence as highly social, actually one of the most
distinctive features of human intelligence over other kinds of animal intelligence. Some significant questions
that appear here are then whether we are able to properly evaluate social intelligence in general (not only in
AI, but universally) and whether we can develop measurement tools that distinguish between social intelligence
and general intelligence.
In this paper, we address these questions by attempting a formalisation of social intelligence and some of its
associated properties, such as social dependency and anticipation, and the properties a good test should have,
such as discrimination, grading, reliability, boundedness, symmetry, efficiency, validity, etc. These properties
help to: identify the components of social intelligence and its varieties; make clear that the mere appearance of
other agents does not make a context social; pave the way for the analysis of whether many social environments,
games and tests found in the literature are useful for measuring social intelligence. In particular, we will
analyse a representative selection of environments, some usual in game theory, such as matching pennies and
the prisoner’s dilemma, and some more sophisticated (and realistic) social scenarios, such as the predator-prey (a
pursuit game), Pac-Man or RoboCup Soccer. We will see whether they meet the properties a social intelligence
testbed should have.
One side question that we will try to analyse here is whether social intelligence can be fully separated from
general intelligence or, conversely, whether general intelligence can be seen as a special case of social intelligence
where the presence and intelligence of other agents is not so relevant.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the approaches to social intelligence from
several disciplines. Section 3 presents a formal, parametric definition of social intelligence and specifies how a
test can be derived from the definition. Section 4 discusses several properties that are needed (or desirable) for
a good test of social intelligence. Section 5 discusses current social environments and games in AI, and their
suitability to evaluate social intelligence following the definition and the properties. Finally, section 6 closes the
paper with some discussion and future work.
2 Background
Social intelligence (and its true distinction from general intelligence) has been a matter of study for many years.
Many definitions have been proposed such as the “ability to understand and manage men and women, boys
and girls – to act wisely in human relations” [56], the “ability to get along with others” [41], the “facility in
dealing with human beings” [60], or more specific definitions including “[the] ability to get along with people
in general, social technique or ease in society, knowledge of social matters, susceptibility to stimuli from other
members of a group, as well as insight into the temporary moods or the underlying personality traits of friends
and of strangers” [58]. Nonetheless, none of these definitions is sufficiently formal and operational to provide a
clear measurement procedure. In fact, all these definitions require the definition of many other new concepts
that appear in the definition.
Despite the ambiguity of what social intelligence is, many tests have been proposed to measure social
intelligence in humans (see [62] for a survey). Typically there are two kinds of tests: 1) some use paper
and pencil tests to measure social knowledge, and 2) others use more real situation tests (such as viewing
photographies) in order to find out how people react in social situations. Some examples of these tests propose
storylines which must be ordered to make sense, find the best end to a given joke, or select a correct emotion
to a given face. However, there is a third, but unusual way: to measure social intelligence in terms of the
definitions above, by confronting a human against other humans and see whether the subject deals with them
or get along well. Apart from practical reasons that make this approach more difficult for testing, there are
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important questions, such as the selection and role of the other humans in order to make the test objective and
effective.
But social intelligence is not only present in humans. Other animal species have also demonstrated this kind
of intelligence. The evaluation of animals is more difficult, as we cannot ask them to perform a test as we do with
humans, so the third type of tests is more common in this setting. Also, tests include some food as rewards in
order to motivate the animals to perform the tasks. This is the same configuration as in reinforcement learning
(RL) [54], where rewards are provided in order to encourage agents to perform tasks. In social intelligence tests
for animals, especially for those focussing on cooperation, animals must obtain some food or reward that cannot
be obtained by one individual alone, but two or more animals interacting are needed to get their reward. Some
of the capabilities evaluated with those tests are their predisposition to deal with others, and their selfishness
or altruism.
Although these tests measure some aspects of social intelligence, many have been devised to evaluate social
intelligence for a particular species and for very specific tasks. In these tests, it is highly debatable whether the
tasks are representative of a broader view of social intelligence. Also, it is usually very difficult to compare the
results with those of other species. Fortunately, there have been some exceptions to this (species) specialisation,
and they are proliferating in the past decade. For instance, some recent work has shown that social abilities
can be compared in a systematic way between human children and apes [28, 29].
Even in the cases when the tests are generalised, they are still composed of a set of tasks that have been
associated to social cognition indirectly, by observation or correlation, according to decades of experiments in
the comparative cognition literature (see, e.g., [59, 51]). As a result, they cannot directly relate to the common
definitions of social intelligence. For instance, one typical task used in social intelligence is to establish eye
contact or to recognise oneself in a mirror (see, e.g., [52, pp. 452-453]). These tasks do not seem to be derived
from any definition of social intelligence.
In order to elude this gap, many studies in ethology, comparative cognition and psychology just focus
on specific issues, such as competition, cooperation, symbiosis, communication, group/swarm abilities, etc.
However, in these scenarios, the emphasis is usually put on detecting and observing some of these phenomena,
rather than properly evaluating abilities. For instance, prey-predator interaction and behaviour have been
studied from many different points of view (including game theory [43]), but it is not clear how the ability of
each subject can be objectively evaluated, especially because the interaction depends on the cognitive abilities
of both prey and predator. For instance, lions are well prepared to predict zebra’s movements and chase them,
but they may be less able for other kinds of animals.
Despite these difficulties, comparative cognition [59, 51] is more and more concerned about performing tests
that compare the abilities of many different species and also the abilities of individuals of different species. From
this point of view, it should be more natural to provide a single test (with possibly many different customised
interfaces and rewards) to assess every kind of species (or, in other words, a more general, or universal [27, 19, 10],
test). To achieve this, such a test should be able to evaluate any level and spectrum of social intelligence, instead
of focussing on the specific range and particular abilities of a single species.
When thinking about social tests and making them more species-independent, we can take the most general
perspective, which leads us to the consideration of machines as well. However, evaluating social intelligence
in machines has been quite different to the assessment of human and animal social intelligence. Nonetheless,
as occurs with animals, rewards or scores may be used as a measure of their performance and a way of giving
feedback to make them show their abilities. Besides, environments must be presented in such a way that a
machine can process the observations and perform a set of actions. This is done by providing them with sensors
and actuators that interact with our physical world, or provide them with a logical or virtual environment.
The environments used in social tests for machines tend to represent tasks that the agents must perform by
interacting with other agents, so the performance is calculated as their capability to successfully cooperate with
and/or compete against them to achieve some goals (see [3, 38] for two testbeds in multi-agent environments).
In this way, the evaluation is a simulation in a social context, which is more directly linked to the definition of
social intelligence.
In the context of social sciences (stretching from economics to AI), game theory [43] has also studied the
interaction of different agents in formalised structures (called games). For this purpose, game theory uses a
formal approach to define a utility function, and the effort is made for finding the best strategy among all
possible strategies, assuming that the rest of agents also try to obtain their best results following some kind of
rational actions. Although game theory needs the interaction of several agents, the goal is not to evaluate social
intelligence but rather to analyse how the agents (or just policies) behave in these games and whether they
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reach some kind of equilibrium. Several kinds of games try to represent or to analyse a variety of properties:
cooperative or non-cooperative games, simultaneous or sequential games, normal-form or extensive-form games,
zero-sum or general-sum games, and symmetric or asymmetric games [43, 42]. However, games that may have
the most interesting properties or applications are not necessarily useful for testing. For instance, a game where
equilibria are easy may be inappropriate if we want a discriminative test. Similarly, asymmetric games make it
more difficult to assess agent performance, as they depend on the role each agent takes.
One important concept in game theory is the notion of zero-sum vs. non-zero-sum games. Zero-sum games
are a particular set of games where a player’s gains (or losses) are equally balanced by the other players’ losses (or
gains). These kinds of games are known as competitive games, since one’s gains reduces the gains (or increases
the losses) of the other player(s), making the players having opposed interests. When a zero-sum game only has
two players it becomes a pure competitive game. But zero-sum games can also contain cooperation in games
with three or more players. Two players can cooperate in order to compete against a third or more players.
As the number of players increase, cooperation becomes more important. In contrast, general-sum games are
those games where the payoffs sum more or less than zero, and games can be cooperative even for two players.
Finally, another particular feature in game theory is that environments are generally simple (without objects
or spaces) and it is just the continuous interaction between agents that matters.
Multi-agent systems (MAS), on the contrary, present richer and more diverse possibilities, both in compe-
tition [49, 4, 38, 63, 46] and cooperation [3, 55, 50, 47, 67, 44]. Agents are usually evaluated according to their
performance in some tasks interacting with other agents. Environments are usually selected to represent some
particular problems for which techniques are developed and evaluated. However, these evaluations lack some
important features. They do not evaluate social intelligence in a general way, but they are typically designed
to evaluate one kind of task. However, the most important problem is that they usually require very specific
abilities, or when they require many, it is not clear how to disentangle them. For instance, if a MAS setting
requires both competition and cooperation to solve a problem, it is not always easy to select or gauge the
degree of relevance of each one in order to give more relevance to competition over cooperation, or vice versa.
Nonetheless, the major issue is that many capabilities other than social intelligence also contaminate the results,
which makes many MAS scenarios unsuitable if we want to measure social abilities only.
As an alternative1, can we start from a formal definition of an ability and derive tests from it? This approach
has been investigated for machine intelligence evaluation. Formal approaches started in the late 1990s using
notions from Kolmogorov complexity, Solomonoff prediction and the MML principle [8, 23, 16, 17]. Dobrev [7]
suggested that machine intelligence should be measured by evaluating agent performance in a range of worlds,
an idea that was independently developed in [39] under the name “Universal Intelligence”. This definition treats
intelligence as a general notion, calculating it as the performance of the agent in a wide range of environments.
Following this definition, a framework to evaluate intelligence [27] and an environment following the framework
[24] were proposed. In order to show their effectiveness, some experiments were performed [33, 32, 35], but
their results suggested that the framework still has some limitations. One of the possible reasons is that these
environments lacked the richness of interaction. From the formal definition, it is virtually impossible to randomly
generate an environment that contains some kind of social behaviour. Therefore, in order to overcome some
of the limitations of these tests, some other agents need to be included in the environment to generate social
situations. This was the goal in [36], where other agents were directly included in the environment. Some simple
experiments were performed to evaluate machine social behaviour in environments where the agents were forced
to compete and/or cooperate with other agents. The results of these experiments showed the impact on agents’
performance when other agents are directly introduced in a test of general intelligence. These experiments
were performed using the framework in [27], which was originally designed to evaluate general intelligence, by
simply including other agents in the environment. Nonetheless, a general environment such as this one does not
seem enough to evaluate social intelligence, since some abilities other than social intelligence are also evaluated
in these kinds of environments. In order to measure social intelligence in isolation, we need to provide an
appropriate environment class where only social intelligence is needed (or at least, where the degree of social
intelligence needed can be fine tuned).
In this context, the key issue is to determine what kind of agents we must include in the test to interact with
and what their roles are. This boils down to choosing a distribution of agents. However, in order to provide an
environment with some rich social situations, we need first to know the level of social intelligence of the agents
provided by the distribution. This circular problem is turned into a recursive one in [18], where different levels
of distributions are recursively provided by constructing a new distribution of agents from a prior distribution
1Not only as an alternative to MAS scenarios, but also to the Turing Test, CAPTCHAs and IQ tests (see [9] for a discussion).
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by selecting (or increasing the probability of) those agents with higher performance. However, it is not easy to
derive a definition of social intelligence from here or a procedure to create environments that would be the base
for social intelligence tests.
Overall, there are many different approaches for the study and evaluation of social intelligence, but we lack
a comprehensive theory, well-grounded tools and wide comparisons to better understand the problem and find
better measurement devices.
3 Defining Social Intelligence Universally
One way of reaching a universal definition of social intelligence is to consider more specific definitions and
generalising them for any kind of subject. Thorndike’s definition of social intelligence refers to “men, women,
boys and girs” [56]. So this approach would generalise this view with the variety of species in animal cognition,
but also including machines, robots and other artificial systems. This is in the spirit of universal psychometrics
[19], where we must consider any kind of agent (natural or artificial). Any of these systems can, in principle,
be evaluated and can also be subject of interaction with the evaluee.
This can take us to definitions such as “performance of an agent in a wide range of environments while
interacting with other agents” [36]. As a result, we see clearly that social intelligence is a relative property,
where we need to specify these other agents (and the range of environments).
With this approach, we distinguish those traits that have positive consequences on the performance (rewards)
from those that are associated to social intelligence but do not necessarily lead to better performance (such as
being generous, open, extroverted, etc.). In other words, we understand that an agent is socially intelligent if
it has the ability to perform better in a social environment, but not if it is very sociable but showing very poor
performance. In the end, we want an operational definition such that its measurement can be directly linked to
it, and not derived by some other traits that are usually associated to social intelligence in humans and animals.
So we must focus our attention on the specification of the set of environments used for measuring and, most
especially, on the characteristics of other agents. Nonetheless, it is important to determine the role these agents
take in the environment relative to the evaluated agent. For instance, the environment can be populated by
very intelligent agents, but the possibilities of an evaluated agent to achieve its goals will depend on whether
these agents are allies or enemies, or more generally if they are cooperative or competitive. The key issue is to
establish whether the other agents goals and interests are compatible with one’s goals. The concept is complex,
as alliances can be created and broken even if no clear teams are established from the beginning (and this
is an interesting property of social intelligence). Nonetheless we have to consider the notion of role from the
beginning and make it visible at the top, jointly with the kind of environment and the kind of agents.
These roles or alliances determine two major social behaviours: cooperation and competition. These are in
fact linked to the issue that some agents share some goals while some other agents compete or are against other
agents’ goals. If we think of rewards (or any other kind of utility function) as a general way of expressing goals,
interests and even resources they share or compete for, we can distinguish two major kinds of social intelligence:
Definition 1. Competitive social intelligence is the capability to obtain the best performance in an environment
where other agents compete for the same rewards.
Definition 2. Cooperative social intelligence is the capability to obtain the best performance in an environment
where other agents share the same rewards.
Note that both definitions are not exclusive, as there are environments where both competitive and coop-
erative behaviours are possible. This is similar to the several degrees of general-sum games in game theory.
Nonetheless, it would be very useful to have some way to analyse competition and cooperation separately (as
two main facets of social intelligence). How clear-cut this separation can be done is an open question, as both
abilities are occasionally correlated. For instance, the creation of alliances in a purely competitive scenario leads
to temporary or permanent cooperation, where the other agents are seen in an instrumental way.
In what follows, we will see how these informal definitions can be formalised and integrated.
3.1 Multi-agent environments and team rewards
Before addressing a formal integration of definitions 1 and 2, we need to give a definition of (multi-agent)
environment. An environment is a world where an agent can interact through actions, rewards and observations
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as seen in figure 1 (left). This general view of the interaction between an agent and an environment can be
extended to multi-agent systems by letting various agents interact simultaneously with the environment as seen
in figure 1 (right).
Environment
observation
action
reward
Agent
Agent 1 interaction
Agent 2
Agent n
Environment
Figure 1: Left: Interaction between a single agent and an environment. Right: Interaction of multiple agents
in a multi-agent environment.
A multi-agent environment is an interactive scenario with several agents. An environment accepting n agents
defines n parameters (one for each agent) denoted as slots. We use i = 1, . . . , n to denote the agent slots. Ai is
the action set for agent in slot i and a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A1 × · · · ×An is a joint action profile of the n agents in
the available discrete set of actions. Oi is the observation set that the agent in slot i can perceive and Ri ⊆ Q
represents the possible rewards obtained by the agent in slot i. Both joint observation and reward profiles are
denoted as o = (o1, . . . , on) and r = (r1, . . . , rn) respectively, similarly as we did with actions. For each step,
every agent must receive an observation oi ∈ Oi and a reward ri ∈ Ri, and perform an action ai ∈ Ai. We
will use ai,k, ri,k and oi,k to respectively denote the action, reward and observation at step k for the agent in
slot i. We use ak, rk and ok respectively to denote the joint actions, rewards and observations of all the agents
at step k (i.e., a1 = (a1,1, . . . , an,1) represents the joint actions at step k = 1). The order of events is always:
observation, action and reward. For example, a sequence of two steps in a multi-agent environment is then a
string such as o1a1r1o2a2r2 and the string o1,1a1,1r1,1o1,2a1,2r1,2 denotes the sequence of observations, actions
and rewards for the agent in slot 1.
Both the environment and the agents are defined as probabilistic measures. For the agent in slot i, the
term π(ai,k|oi,1ai,1ri,1 . . . oi,k)→ [0, 1] denotes its probability to perform action ai,k after the sequence of events
oi,1ai,1ri,1 . . . oi,k. The observations provided by the environment to the agent in slot i also have a probabilistic
measure ω(oi,k|o1a1r1 . . . ok−1ak−1rk−1)→ [0, 1]. As with observations, rewards are provided to the agent in slot
i depending on observations and actions on previous steps ρ(ri,k|o1a1r1 . . . okak)→ [0, 1]. Note that the rewards
obtained by each agent depend on the joint actions, observations and rewards of all the agents interacting in
the environment, and not only on their own. A random agent (usually denoted by πr) in slot i is an agent that
chooses its actions from Ai using a uniform distribution.
We use A˘Ki (π, µ) to denote the distribution (a probability measure) of strings representing the sequences
of actions that π performs in slot i of µ during K steps. If K is omitted, we assume that K is infinite, i.e.,
infinite sequences of actions for an endless episode. If agents and environment are deterministic (not stochastic)
then this boils down to a probability measure giving probability 1 to one single string, the sequence of actions
performed by π on µ.
Similarly, we use R˘Ki (π, µ) to denote the distribution of reward strings of π in slot i of µ during K steps. If
K is omitted, we assume that K is infinite. Again, if neither agents nor environment are stochastic, this is just
a string. In the general case, we use RKi (π, µ) to denote the expected average reward (or value) with a discount
factor γ. For instance, for K =∞ this is Ri(π, µ) , E( lim
K→∞
∑K
k=1 γ
k−1ri,k∑K
k=1 γ
k−1 ). Unless stated otherwise, we assume
γ = 1.
3.2 Teams
We need to address a characterisation of slots, such that we can specify how agents participate in the envi-
ronment. This actually means that we need to decide how the environment distributes rewards among the
agents. An easy possibility will be to make each agent get its rewards without further constraints over other
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agents’ rewards. With this configuration (e.g., general-sum games), both competition and cooperation may
be completely useless for most environments, as the rewards are not limited or linked to the other agents. In
contrast, if we set that the total set of rewards is limited in some way, we will foster competition, as happens
in zero-sum games. But in any of these two cases cooperation will hardly take place. Alliances could arise
sporadically between at least two agents in order to bother (or defend against) a third agent. However, with
low levels of social intelligence this seems unlikely to happen. For this reason we need to find a way to make
agents cooperate, or at least to make it more likely before any (sophisticated) alliance can emerge on its own.
One possible answer is the use of teams, defined as follows:
Definition 3. Agent slots i and j are in the same team iff ∀k : ri,k = rj,k
which means that all agents in a team receive exactly the same rewards. This differs from alliances, where the
agents could receive different rewards. Note that teams are not alliances as usually understood in game theory.
In fact, teams are fixed and cannot be changed by the agents. Also, we do not use the term alliance as we do
not use any sophisticated mechanism to award rewards, related to the contribution of each agent in the team,
as it is done with the Shapley Value [48]. We just set rewards uniformly.
At this moment, we are ready to define an environment with parametrised agents by only specifying their
slots and their team arrangement.
Definition 4. A multi-agent environment µ accepting N(µ) agents (i.e., the number of slots in µ) is a tuple
⟨A,R,O, ω, ρ, τ⟩, where A, R, O represent the action sets, reward sets and observation sets respectively (i.e.,
A = A1×· · ·×AN(µ), R = R1×· · ·×RN(µ) and O = O1×· · ·×ON(µ)) and ω and ρ are the observation function
and reward function respectively as defined in section 3.1. τ is a partition on the set of slots {1, . . . , N(µ)},
where each set in τ represents a team.
Note that with this definition the agents are not included in the environment. For instance, noughts and
crosses could be defined as an environment µnc with two agents, where the partition set τ is defined as {{1}, {2}},
which represents that this game allows two teams, and one agent in each. Another example is RoboCup Soccer
[38], denoted by µrc, whose τ would be {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {6, 7, 8, 9, 10}}, which represents that there are two teams,
with slots {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in the first team and slots {6, 7, 8, 9, 10} in the second team.
Once environments are defined, without including the agents, now we can define an instantiation for a
particular agent setup. Formally, a team line-up l is a list of agents. For instance, if we have a set of agents
Π = {π1, π2, π3, π4}, a line-up from this set could be l1 = (π2, π3). The use of the same agent twice is allowed,
so l2 = (π1, π1) is also a line-up. We denote by µ[l] the instantiation of an environment µ with a line-up l,
provided that the length of l is greater than or equal to the number of agents allowed by µ (if l has more agents,
the excess is ignored). The slots of the environment are then matched with the corresponding elements of l
following their order. For instance, for the noughts and crosses, an instantiation would be µnc[l1]. Note that
different instantiations over the same environment would normally lead to different results. A line-up pattern
l˙ is a list of agents where one or more elements are not instantiated. We can use instantiation to create more
specific patterns or even to convert a pattern into a line-up. The instantiation of an agent π at position i on
line-up pattern l˙ of length n is denoted by l˙
i← π, which is exactly l˙1:(i−1) · π · l˙(i+1):n, where l · m denotes
the concatenation of lists l and m and lj:k denotes the elements in l from position j to k. This notation can
be extended to instantiate several agents simultaneously using l˙
i,...,j← π1, . . . , πn to represent l˙ i← π1 · · · j← πn.
Once a line-up pattern l˙ has all its elements instantiated becomes a line-up l. Note that environments can only
be instantiated with line-ups, so first we need to instantiate all the elements from a line-up pattern to convert
it to a line-up, and then use it to instantiate an environment. For instance, a line-up pattern for the set of
agents Π could be l˙3 = (π3, ∗), where ∗ represents an element that is not instantiated, and l˙3 2← π4 instantiates
position 2 with agent π4, converting the line-up pattern into the line-up l3 = (π3, π4).
We will use Ln(Π) to specify the set of all the line-ups of length n with agents of Π, and L˙n−i,...,j(Π) to denote
the set of all the line-up patterns of length n with agents of Π where positions i, . . . , j are not instantiated. For
instance, L˙n−i(Π) defines the set of all possible line-up patterns {l˙1:i−1 · ∗ · l˙i+1:n} from the set of agents Π.
We will use line-up patterns with positions i, . . . , j not being instantiated to evaluate agents in these positions,
while the rest of the line-up pattern will be instantiated with the agents they will have to interact with.
wL denotes weights to line-ups formed with agents from a certain set Π, giving weights to the agents in the
line-up and their positions. Similarly wL˙ denotes weights for line-up patterns formed with agents from Π. As
line-ups and line-up patterns are clearly related, we will assume that wL˙ can be derived from wL.
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Assumption 1. The value of wL˙ for line-up patterns with only one element that is not instantiated is derived
from wL as:
∀i, n,Π, l˙ ∈ L˙n−i(Π) : wL˙(l˙) =
∑
π∈Π
wL(l˙
i← π)
and wL˙ for line-up patterns with 2 or more non-instantiated elements is recursively derived as:
∀i, . . . , j, n,Π, l˙ ∈ L˙n−i,...,j(Π) : wL˙(l˙) =
∑
π∈Π
wL˙(l˙
i← π) = · · · =
∑
π∈Π
wL˙(l˙
j← π)
Finally, note that we can calculate the expected average reward for any agent in line-up l in an environment
µ. We will use the notation Ri(µ[l]), which gives us the expected average reward of the ith agent in line-up l for
environment µ (also in slot i). We can extend this notation to distributions as well (i.e. A˘i(µ[l]) for distribution
of action sequences and R˘i(µ[l]) for distribution of reward sequences).
3.3 A formal definition of social intelligence
Having these ideas in mind we can now attempt a first definition of social intelligence. We first fix the line-up
and vary on the possible environments.
Definition 5. We define the ability of an agent π interacting in line-up l which contains π at position i, over a
set of environmentsM accepting at least i agents and at most |l| agents (being | · | the length of a list), weighting
the environments by wM as:
Υi(l,M,wM ) ,
∑
µ∈M
wM (µ)Ri(µ[l1:N(µ)]) (1)
where |M | ≥ 1.
Alternatively, we can think about a definition of the ability of an agent for a varying set of line-ups while
fixing the environment.
Definition 6. We define the ability of an agent π in slot i, interacting in an environment µ accepting at least
i agents, with a set of line-up patterns defined over agent set Π and wL˙ as a weight for line-up patterns for the
environment µ:
Υi(π,Π, wL˙, µ) ,
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−i (Π)
wL˙(l˙, µ)Ri(µ[l˙
i← π]) (2)
where N(µ) ≥ 1 and if N(µ) > 1 then |Π| ≥ 1 otherwise |Π| ≥ 0.
In the definition we have used a weight wL˙ that depends on µ (i.e., wL˙(l˙, µ)). Note that wL˙ applies to l˙,
giving weights to the agents (and their positions) such that the evaluated agent π interacts in the environment
µ when it is located at position i. Note also that now l˙ has always N(µ) elements when instantiated, so now
no upper-restriction exists over the number of slots of µ.
In fact, both wM and wL˙ could be integrated into a single weight for instantiated environments. However,
we want to decouple agents and environments and use both of them as independent parameters. To make the
agents and the environment independent we work with the next assumption.
Assumption 2. If wL(l, µ) and wL˙(l˙, µ), where l ∈ LN(µ)(Π) and l˙ ∈ L˙N(µ)−i (Π), are independent of µ then:
∀l, µ : wL(l, µ) = wL(l)
∀l˙, µ : wL˙(l˙, µ) = wL˙(l˙)
Assumption 2 gives the same weight to any line-up and line-up pattern whatever the environment. In what
follows we will use wL(l) and wL˙(l˙) as a weight for line-up l and line-up pattern l˙ respectively.
Under the assumption 2 we can integrate both equations 1 and 2 as follows:
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Definition 7. The social intelligence of an agent π in slot i, interacting with the class of agents Π with a weight
for line-up patterns wL˙, in a set of environments M with a weight for environments wM is defined as:
Υi(π,Π, wL˙,M,wM ) ,
∑
µ∈M
wM (µ)
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−i (Π)
wL˙(l˙)Ri(µ[l˙
i← π]) (3)
where |M | ≥ 1,∀µ ∈M then N(µ) ≥ 1 and if ∃µ ∈M |N(µ) > 1 then |Π| ≥ 1 otherwise |Π| ≥ 0.
And summing the performance over all possible slots of the environments of M , weighting the slots of each
environment by wS , we have:
Definition 8. The social intelligence of π interacting with the class of agents Π with a weight for line-up
patterns wL˙, in a set of environments M with a weight for environments wM and a weight for slots wS is
defined as:
Υ(π,Π, wL˙,M,wM , wS) ,
∑
µ∈M
wM (µ)
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−i (Π)
wL˙(l˙)Ri(µ[l˙
i← π]) (4)
where |M | ≥ 1,∀µ ∈M then N(µ) ≥ 1 and if ∃µ ∈M |N(µ) > 1 then |Π| ≥ 1 otherwise |Π| ≥ 0.
This equation now removes the lower-restriction of the number of slots on the environments.
Finally the positions of the agents in the line-up patterns can be assumed independent:
Assumption 3. If wΠ(π, i) defines the weight for the agent π appearing at position i in a line-up or line-up
pattern, we assume wΠ(π) to appear in all positions in a line-up or line-up pattern. Formally:
∀π, i : wΠ(π, i) = wΠ(π)
Under the assumption 3, wL and wL˙ can be derived as a function of terms from wΠ. Finally, we assume
that the probability of an agent in a line-up and line-up pattern is independent of its position.
Assumption 4. We calculate wL as a product of agents weights wΠ as:
∀n,Π, l ∈ Ln(Π) : wL(l) =
∏
1≤k≤n
wΠ(lk:k)
and wL˙ is calculated as a product of agent weights wΠ as:
∀i, n,Π, l˙ ∈ L˙n−i(Π) : wL˙(l˙) =
∏
1≤k<i
wΠ(l˙k:k)
∏
i<k≤n
wΠ(l˙k:k) (5)
This assumption is also extended to line-up patterns with 2 or more elements not instantiated as well.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 3 and 4, social intelligence as per equation 4 is also defined as:
Υ(π,Π, wL˙,M,wM , wS) = Υ(π,Π, wΠ,M,wM , wS) =
=
∞∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
∑
l˙∈L˙j−i(Π)
 ∏
1≤k<i
wΠ(l˙k:k)
∏
i<k≤j
wΠ(l˙k:k)
 ∑
µ∈Mj
wM (µ)wS(i, µ)Ri(µ[l˙
i← π])
where M j denotes all the environments in M with j agent slots, |M | ≥ 1, and if ∃µ ∈M |N(µ) > 1 then |Π| ≥ 1
otherwise |Π| ≥ 0.
Proof. Definition 8 ranges over environments, their slots and then over line-up patterns, but we could express
an equivalent equation by ranging over line-up patterns first and environments and their slots next:
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Υ(π,Π, wL˙,M,wM , wS) =
∑
µ∈M
wM (µ)
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−i (Π)
wL˙(l˙)Ri(µ[l˙
i← π]) =
=
∑
µ∈M
wM (µ)
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−i (Π)
 ∏
1≤k<i
wΠ(l˙k:k)
∏
i<k≤N(µ)
wΠ(l˙k:k)
Ri(µ[l˙ i← π]) =
=
∞∑
j=1
∑
µ∈Mj
wM (µ)
j∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)
∑
l˙∈L˙j−i(Π)
 ∏
1≤k<i
wΠ(l˙k:k)
∏
i<k≤j
wΠ(l˙k:k)
Ri(µ[l˙ i← π]) =
= Υ(π,Π, wΠ,M,wM , wS) =
∞∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
∑
l˙∈L˙j−i(Π)
 ∏
1≤k<i
wΠ(l˙k:k)
∏
i<k≤j
wΠ(l˙k:k)
 ∑
µ∈Mj
wM (µ)wS(i, µ)Ri(µ[l˙
i← π])
This shows how we can parametrise the definition in terms of the weight of the other participants (wΠ)
independently of their order in line-up patterns. For instance, the weight for each agent could depend on its
(social) intelligence, provided we are able to estimate this value. The use of a product of weights makes sense
if wΠ is a unit measure.
The interpretation of the above definition is the expected performance of agent π interacting
with all possible line-up patterns generated using the set of agents Π, and in a set of environments
M with π playing at all possible slots in each environment2.
Proposition 1 is not only useful for parametrising the definition in terms of the agents in isolation, but
also because it decouples agents from environments. This makes sense in the context of (social) intelligence
evaluation, as we want to consider other agents that are able to work in different environments, and not very
specific agents that only work in one environment.
Definition 8 and its reformulation by proposition 1 integrates all kinds of social behaviour, as it does not
distinguish between agents appearing in the same team or opponent teams. For instance, if we consider a set Π
with very intelligent agents, some environments (and line-ups) will be easier if many of these agents appear in
the same team, but will be harder if they appear in opponent teams. Also, the aggregation may consider many
other environments where no social behaviour takes place. This means that the above equations are a skeleton
for the definition, but we need to better analyse the pair (Π, wL˙) or (Π, wΠ) and the triplet (M , wM , wS).
3.4 Tests
A definition is not a test, most especially because many definitions range over infinite sets or an infinite number
of steps. A test must be a finite procedure that can be feasibly applicable to an agent. For the moment, we will
focus on non-adaptive tests, which are based on performing just a finite number of finite experiments or trials
(episodes), which are independent of the previous ones.
Consequently, a test is defined using the definition of Υ(π,Π, wL˙,M,wM , wS), where Π is sampled with
some distribution, M is sampled with some distribution and the number of steps for each experiment is limited
in some way. Sampling is understood to be without replacement when there is determinism (it does not make
sense to repeat the same episode if the result is already known) but is understood to be with replacement for
non-deterministic agents or environments. We denote by S ∼n [A]p a sample S of n elements from set A using
probability distribution p for the powerset of A, i.e., for 2A. The use of a distribution over samples instead of
a distribution over exercises gives more flexibility about the conditions that we could establish on the sampling
procedure. For instance, we could define a sample probability such that high diversity is ensured (apart from
high accumulated relevance of the exercises that are chosen) or such that a range of difficulties is covered. Keep
2The above definitions could be simplified if for every environment µ1 and slot i in it, there is always an environment µ2 with
exactly the same behaviour where slot i becomes 1. That means that we could easily get rid of the summation over slots and work
just with slot 1 for agent π. In other words, this would be like considering that the evaluated agent always plays with slot 1. As
we will discuss later on, if the environments are symmetric, this problem also vanishes. Another option is to consider a uniform
distribution for slots.
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in mind that with this definition, the issues of with replacement or without replacement is re-understood as
whether these samples allow repeated values or not. With this notation, we can give the following definition of
test:
Definition 9. A test over Υ (definition 8 in the previous subsection), denoted by Υˆ[pΠ, pM , pS , pK , nE ], is a
sample of nE episodes (or exercises) from all those summed in the definition, using agent distribution pΠ, an
environment distribution pM , a slot distribution pS , and a distribution on the number of steps pK .
Υˆ[pΠ, pM , pS , pK , nE ](π,Π, wL˙,M,wM , wS) , ηE
∑
⟨µ,i,l˙⟩∈E
wM (µ)wS(i, µ)wL˙(l˙)R
K
i (µ[l˙
i← π])
where ηE normalises the formula with ηE = 1∑⟨µ,i,l˙⟩∈E wM (µ)wS(i,µ)wL˙(l˙) , K is chosen using probability distribution
pK and the episodes (or exercises) E are sampled as:
E ∼nE
 ⋃
µ∈M
N(µ)⋃
i=1
{〈
µ, i, l˙
〉
: l˙ ∈ L˙N(µ)−i (Π)
}
pE
with pE being a distribution on the set of triplets
〈
µ, i, l˙
〉
based on pM , pS and pΠ.
Note that we use pΠ for the line-up patterns, which could be the line-up pattern probability derived as the
product of the probabilities of each agent in the line-up pattern following assumption 3, as in equation 5. As
we will see, if the environments are symmetric, we can get rid of pS and wS and just evaluate for slot 1.
It is important not to confuse the probabilities of sampling the line-up patterns, environments, slots and
number of steps (pΠ, pM , pS , pK) with any weight defined on them, in particular, the weights wL˙, wM and
wS defined on line-up patterns, environments and slots respectively. Weights represent the relevance of an
environment, their slots and line-up pattern for the definition (so it determines the abilities, roles and agents
that have higher weight in the formula), while the distributions are just a way of sampling the usually large or
infinite set of environments, slots and line-ups of agents. Weights and distributions might be related (or may be
equal in order to ensure fast convergence to the actual value), but some other considerations may suggest that
a less relevant case (low weight) can be sampled with high probability, as it may be highly representative or
more robust, for instance. Actually, we want that a diversity of cases is sampled, rather than similar cases that
will provide redundant information. This is why we use a distribution on 2A and not on A because otherwise
we would not be able to measure how good (e.g., informative) a set of trials is. We will discuss this issue again
in the following section in the context of reliability and efficiency.
4 Properties about social intelligence testbeds
In order to evaluate social intelligence and distinguish it from general intelligence, we need tests where social
ability has to be used and, also, where we can perceive its consequences. This means that not every environment
is useful for measuring social intelligence and not every subset of agents is also useful. We want tests such that
the evaluated agent must use its social intelligence to understand and/or have influence over other agents’
policies in such a way that this is useful to accomplish the evaluated agent’s goals. We also need situations
where common general intelligence is not enough. In a way, we want to subtract (from the summation of all
environments and line-up patterns) those problems (as defined by classes of environments and agents) where
general intelligence is enough (and social intelligence is useless) and those where intelligence (of any kind, social
or non-social) is useless.
We will investigate some properties that are hence desirable (or necessary) for a testbed of environments3
and agents to actually measure social intelligence. Some other properties are more of a practical nature, such as
the degree of discrimination and grading of the environment, the symmetry of slots, its reliability and efficiency.
Hereinafter, we will differentiate two kinds of set of agents: the set of agents we want to evaluate, denoted
by Πe, and the set of agents we want the environment to be populated with as opponents and team players,
3In what follows, we will explore some properties that can be applied to sets of environments rather than single environments.
A definition or test can be composed of just one environment if M has only one element (as for definition 8 having |M | = 1).
Actually, we will give the definitions for one environment but they are easily extensible to a family or distribution of environments
with a weight function used as a testbed.
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denoted by Πo
4. On many occasions both sets can be set equal, but it will be useful to keep them as separate
sets.
Figure 2 gives a summary of the properties we will introduce in this section. They have different purposes
and will reach different levels of formalisation. Actually, many of the properties (the quantitative ones) will be
of the form Prop(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS), i.e., given these two sets Πe and Πo, and the weights for them (in the
form of agent weight wΠe and line-up weight wL˙ respectively), they give a value for a given environment µ and
slot weight wS .
SOCIAL
INSTRUMENTAL
Social Dependency
Mind Modelling
INTERACTIVITY (AD)
NON-NEUTRALISM (RD, SRD)
COMPETITIVE ANTICIPATION (AComp)
COOPERATIVE ANTICIPATION (ACoop) 
Secernment
Technical
DISCRIMINATION (FD, CD)
GRADING (STG, PG)
BOUNDEDNESS
SYMMETRY
Testing quality
VALIDITY
RELIABILITY
EFFICIENCY
Quantitative
Qualitative
CorrectnessUNIVOCAL
Figure 2: Taxonomy of properties about social intelligence testbeds, grouped in three main categories (social,
instrumental and univocal) and six subcategories (social dependency, mind modelling, secernment, technical,
testing quality and correctness).
Finally, some of the properties below are presented for two slots but they could be extended to three or
more slots as well. Similarly, all the following definitions are introduced for one environment, but they can be
easily extended for a set of environments as well.
Next we will analyse and formalise these properties.
4.1 Boundedness
One property that we need to impose in order to make many of the previous definitions meaningful is that
rewards must be bounded (otherwise, some summations will diverge). Any arbitrary choice of upper and lower
bounds can be scaled to any other choice so, without loss of generality, we can assume that all of them are
bounded between −1 and 1. Formally:
∀i, k : −1 ≤ ri,k ≤ 1
Note that they are bounded for every step. As Ri(·) is an average, then it is bounded as well if the rewards are
bounded.
However, bounded rewards do not ensure that the measurement from definition 8 is bounded. In order to
ensure a bounded result we also need to consider that weights are bounded, i.e., there are constants cM , cS , cL˙
and cΠ such that:
4Instead of using only one set for opponents and team players, it can also be extended by using two different sets; one for
opponent players and another for team players.
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∀M :
∑
µ∈M
wM (µ) = cM (6)
∀µ :
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ) = cS (7)
∀i, n,Πo :
∑
l˙∈L˙n−i(Πo)
wL˙(l˙) = cL˙ (8)
∀Π :
∑
π∈Π
wΠ(π) = cΠ (9)
Equation 8 can also be applied for two or more non-instantiated slots and equation 9 is used when assumption
4 is made.
A convenient choice would be to have cM = cS = cL˙ = cΠ = 1, and these weights would become unit
measures (which should not be confused with the probabilities used in definition 9). The expression of wL˙ in
terms of a product of wΠ make more sense if wΠ is a unit measure. With these conditions Υ and Υˆ are bounded
5
An optional property that might be interesting occasionally is to consider environments whose reward sum
is constant. Without loss of generality, we can take this constant to be zero, which leads to the well-known
notion of zero-sum games in game theory.
Definition 10. An environment µ is zero-sum if and only if:
∀k :
N(µ)∑
i=1
ri,k = 0 (10)
The above definition may be too strict when we have environments with an episode goal at the end, but we
want some positive or negative rewards to be given while agents approach the goal. A more convenient version
follows:
Definition 11. An environment µ is zero-sum in the limit iff:
lim
K→∞
K∑
k=1
N(µ)∑
i=1
ri,k = 0 (11)
Note that if we have teams, the previous definition could be changed in such a way that:
lim
K→∞
K∑
k=1
∑
t∈τ
∑
i∈t
ri,k = 0 (12)
So the sum of the agents’ rewards in a team (or team’s reward) does not need to be zero but the sum of all
teams’ rewards does. For instance, if we have a team with agents {1, 2} and another team with agents {3, 4, 5},
then a reward (in the limit) of 1/4 for agents 1 and 2 will imply −1/6 for each of the agents in the other team.
The zero-sum properties are appropriate for competition between teams. In fact, if teams have only one
agent then we have pure competitive environments. We can have both competition and cooperation by using
teams in a zero-sum game, where agents in a team cooperate and agents in different teams compete. If we want
to evaluate pure cooperation (with one or more teams) then zero-sum games will not be appropriate.
4.2 Interactivity
By interactivity we mean the property that agents’ actions have implications on the actions (and rewards) of the
other agents. This is a key property as the existence of several agents in an environment does not ensure, per se,
any social behaviour. In fact, it is important to realise that the use of several agents and their arrangement into
5Note that we are talking about the measure. For instance, Υ can be a measure that represents the, e.g., sigmoid function of
an unbounded magnitude, easily recovered with a logit or probit function.
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teams does not ensure that some social behaviour can ever take place. Imagine a non-social environment, such
as finding the way out of a maze with no other agents. Rewards depend on the agent finding the way out or
not. While this is clearly non-social, we can use this environment as a building block and create an environment
that takes two agents but makes them play separately on two equal mazes. We can generate rewards in at least
four different ways: (1) we can give rewards separately without any modification on the outputs of the building
blocks, (2) we can normalise them to a constant or a zero-sum (in the spirit of definition 1), (3) we can average
both rewards and give them to both agents (in the spirit of definition 2) or (4) any other combination of the
rewards, including a stochastic (non-deterministic) combination. Note that none of these four options would
contain or foster any kind of social behaviour. In fact, no agent is aware of the other (apart from the effect on
rewards). However, the rewards can get highly correlated (as in ways 2 or 3 above) and do so in a non-additive
or functional way.
The explanation of why there is no social behaviour in this case is that there is no influence between the
actions of both agents. As a result, the big issue about choosing social contexts is how to determine that an
agent has influence on other’s actions. In fact, this is at the roots of definitions of interaction [65, 11, 34, 12], and
the distinction between several kinds of interaction [37]. Some other approaches have looked for some common
information content between the peers. However, as pointed out by [12], “this may originate from a common
source”, so common or mutual information is not sufficient for interaction to have taken place.
So we need a measure of interaction that is not based on correlation or common information content.
However, the degree of influence that other agents may have on the actions of the agent we are evaluating is
difficult to grasp; As environments and agents can be non-deterministic, changes can appear just randomly.
4.2.1 Action Dependency
We need to take a different approach. The key idea defines interaction in terms of sensitivity to other agents or,
in other words, whether the inclusion of different agents in the environment has an effect on what the evaluated
agent does. One formalisation of this idea goes as follows:
Definition 12. The action dependency degree for evaluated agent π playing in slot i in environment µ with a
class of opponents and team players Πo with a weight of line-up patterns wL˙, is given by:
ADi(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) , ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−i (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘i(µ[u˙
i← π]), A˘i(µ[v˙ i← π])) (13)
where ηL˙2 normalises the formula with ηL˙2 =
1∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−i (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)
, ∆S is a divergence function between
string distributions, |Πo| ≥ 2, N(µ) ≥ 2 and ∃u˙, v˙ ∈ L˙N(µ)−i (Πo)|u˙ ̸= v˙, wL˙(u˙) > 0 and wL˙(v˙) > 0.
Note that wL˙ can be written in terms of wΠo if we assume independence for the environment and agent
positions (assumption 2 and 3), as we did in assumption 4. Note also that A˘ returns a distribution of action
sequences if the environment or any of the agents is non-deterministic. If ADi is high, then the proportion of
cases where two team line-up patterns lead to different sequences of actions for π is high. This means that π is
highly sensitive in this environment about who else is in the environment. Conversely, if we have that for many
pairs of line-up patterns the sequences of actions of π are similar, this means that π’s actions are not affected
by other agents.
The previous definition is relative to a distribution of line-up patterns on a population of agents, but it is
given for a particular evaluated agent π. We may have that one evaluated agent can be very insensitive to
line-up pattern changes, but other evaluated agents can be more sensitive in the same environment. If we want
to generalise this for a class of evaluated agents Πe we have:
Definition 13. The action dependency degree for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe
playing in slot i in environment µ with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up
patterns wL˙ is given by:
ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) ,
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)ADi(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) (14)
where |Πe| ≥ 1.
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This definition is given only for slot i. Finally, we need to aggregate the action dependency degree for all
slots:
Definition 14. The action dependency degree for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe
in environment µ with weight of slots wS , a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up
patterns wL˙, is given by:
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) ,
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) (15)
where N(µ) ≥ 1.
It certainly remains to clarify what ∆S can be. For deterministic cases an edit distance can be used. However,
for non-deterministic cases we need to find alignments between the distributions or aggregate strings into some
prototypes and compare them. One simple approach for both the deterministic and non-deterministic cases
could be based on comparing action frequencies (independently of their order) or, alternatively, n-grams. We
will see some specific examples in section 5. Note that different ∆S functions may lead to different interpretations
of action influence. For instance, there can be environments where a first few actions are interactive, but then
no interaction takes places any more. In this case, the strings may be very different, but the degree, or more
precisely, the timespan of interaction is small (like a butterfly effect).
4.3 Non-neutralism
The existence of interaction between agents does not ensure that these interactions are meaningful in terms of
rewards. For instance, two agents can interact, but they may not affect each other’s rewards. This, in ecological
terms, is known as ‘neutralism’. In fact, in ecology, given two species, there are seven possible combinations of
positive, negative or no effect between them, leading to six forms of symbiosis [40]: neutralism (0,0), amensalism
(0,-), commensalism (+,0), competition (-,-), mutualism (+,+), and predation/parasitism (+,-). In our case, as
we want to characterise environments that may contain individuals (possibly more than two), we can simplify
this to neutralism, cooperation (including commensalism and mutualism) and competition (including the rest).
In other words, we want to analyse whether interaction has no effect on rewards, has a positive relation or a
negative one.
4.3.1 Reward Dependency
So, the first thing that we need to determine is whether there is a dependency in rewards. This is very similar
to the action dependency seen above:
Definition 15. The reward dependency degree for evaluated agent π playing in slot i in environment µ with
a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up patterns wL˙, is given by:
RDi(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) , ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−i (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(Ri(µ[u˙
i← π]), Ri(µ[v˙ i← π])) (16)
where ηL˙2 normalises the formula with ηL˙2 =
1∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−i (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)
, ∆Q is a divergence function for
rational numbers, |Πo| ≥ 2, N(µ) ≥ 2 and ∃u˙, v˙ ∈ L˙N(µ)−i (Πo)|u˙ ̸= v˙, wL˙(u˙) > 0 and wL˙(v˙) > 0.
Note that we use expected average rewards instead of a history of rewards. So, here the divergence compares
numbers. For instance, we can use ∆Q(a, b) = 1 − δ(a, b), where δ is the Kronecker delta function (δ(a, b) = 1
if a = b and 0 otherwise). With this choice, the previous function would boil down to the probability that by
taking two team line-up patterns (using a weight or distribution wL˙), after instantiating both with π in slot
i, the expected average rewards of π are different. Another option could be relative absolute difference, i.e.,
∆Q(a, b) =
|a−b|
|a|+|b| .
Now, we can generalise this for a set of evaluated agents Πe:
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Definition 16. The reward dependency degree for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe
playing in slot i in environment µ with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up patterns
wL˙ is given by:
RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) ,
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)RDi(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) (17)
where |Πe| ≥ 1.
So now we measure how dependent the rewards are in general (for any evaluated agent in Πe).
The previous definition may slightly resemble the Shapley Value [48] in cooperative game theory, but here
we are not concerned about how relevant each agent is in a team (whether its contribution is higher than the
contribution of its teammates), but to see whether there is effect on the rewards.
Finally, we aggregate for all slots:
Definition 17. The reward dependency degree for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe
in environment µ with weight of slots wS , a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up
patterns wL˙ is given by:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) ,
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) (18)
where N(µ) ≥ 1.
4.3.2 Slot Reward Dependency
Both definitions 14 and 17 are necessary as we can have reward dependency without action dependency and
action dependency without reward dependency.
Now, we are interested in telling the sign of this dependency, i.e., how much cooperative or competitive this
is.
Definition 18. The slot reward dependency for evaluated agent π playing in slot i with slot j (with i ̸= j) in
environment µ with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up patterns wL˙ is given by:
SRDi,j(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) , corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−i (Πo)[wL˙(l˙)](Ri(µ[l˙
i← π]), Rj(µ[l˙ i← π])) (19)
where corrx∈X [w](a, b) is a weighted (w) correlation function between a and b for the elements generated by X,
|Πo| ≥ 1 and N(µ) ≥ 2.
Any correlation function can be used here (Pearson, Spearman, etc.). Clearly, if two slots are in the same
team, from definition 3, we have that SRD is 1. In the case of a zero-sum game with only two teams, any two
slots of different teams have a SRD of −1 (provided there is at least one ‘match’ which is not a tie). Note that
as usual with correlation measures, if we have that two slots are reward independent, then SRD is 0. However,
having SRD = 0 does not necessarily imply independency. This means that we need to calculate the reward
dependency degree and then ask whether this dependency is positive or negative for pairs of slots.
Now, we can generalise this for a set of evaluated agents Πe:
Definition 19. The slot reward dependency for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe playing
in slot i with slot j (with i ̸= j) in environment µ with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight
of line-up patterns wL˙ is given by:
SRDi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) ,
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRDi,j(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) (20)
where |Πe| ≥ 1.
Finally we aggregate all combinations of pairs of slots:
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Definition 20. The slot reward dependency for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe in
environment µ with weight of slots wS , with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up
patterns wL˙ is given by:
SRD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) , ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)SRDi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)SRDi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 (21)
where ηS21 normalises the formula with ηS21 =
1∑N(µ)
i=1 wS(i,µ)
(∑i−1
j=1 wS(j,µ)+
∑N(µ)
j=i+1 wS(j,µ)
) , N(µ) ≥ 2 and ∃i, j|1 ≤
i ≤ N(µ), 1 ≤ j ≤ N(µ), i ̸= j, wS(i, µ) > 0 and wS(j, µ) > 0.
In practice, in order to evaluate social abilities, we require environments with high RD. Then, depending
on the use of teams and normalisations, we can gauge whether we want to evaluate competition or cooperation,
and have some positive SRD with some slots and some negative SRD with some other slots. This is easily
obtained by using teams.
4.4 Secernment
It is an important characteristic for a test to be able to give different values for different evaluated agents.
Otherwise, if the results are the same (or very similar) for most evaluated agents, we get little information. In
other words, we want tests (i.e., environment and set of agents populating it) to secern, to be discriminative.
Although there are many approaches to the idea of discriminating power (see e.g., [26]), one simple notion that
accounts for this concept quite well is the variance of results.
4.4.1 Fine and Coarse Discrimination
In order to formalise this notion of variance (or number of different values) of the expected average rewards of
the set of evaluated agents, we can just compare pairs of values as follows:
Definition 21. The fine discriminating power for evaluated agents π1 and π2 playing in slot i in environment
µ with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up patterns wL˙ is given by:
FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) ,
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−i (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(Ri(µ[l˙
i← π1]), Ri(µ[l˙ i← π2])) (22)
where ∆Q is a divergence function for rational numbers, N(µ) ≥ 1 and if N(µ) > 1 then |Πo| ≥ 1 otherwise
|Πo| ≥ 0.
This measures the expected average reward divergence of two evaluated agents placed both in slot i in the
same line-up patterns. If ∆Q is some kind of numeric difference (e.g., the absolute difference or the squared
difference), then this measure would be similar to some kind of dispersion of expected average rewards (like
a variance). If ∆Q equals 1 − δ (with δ being the Kronecker delta function) we have that this measures the
number of times two different evaluated agents score differently.
We can generalise this for a set of evaluated agents Πe:
Definition 22. The fine discriminating power for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe
playing in slot i in environment µ with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up
patterns wL˙ is given by:
FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) , ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) (23)
where ηΠ2 normalises the formula with ηΠ2 =
1∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 wΠe (π1)wΠe (π2)
, |Πe| ≥ 2 and ∃π1, π2 ∈ Πe|π1 ̸= π2,
wΠe(π1) > 0 and wΠe(π2) > 0.
Again, we can sum over all slots:
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Definition 23. The fine discriminating power for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe in
environment µ with weight of slots wS , with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up
patterns wL˙ is given by:
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) ,
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) (24)
where N(µ) ≥ 1.
Being able to discriminate in terms of pair of agents for each line-up pattern in an environment can be
generalised with the overall result of a measure Υ by considering the aggregated values on this measure, namely:
Definition 24. The coarse discriminating power for evaluated agents π1 and π2 playing in slot i in environment
µ with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up patterns wL˙ is given by:
CDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) , ∆Q(Υi(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ),Υi(π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)) (25)
where Υi(π,Π, wL˙, µ) is defined in equation 2 and ∆Q is a divergence function for rational numbers.
We generalise this for a set of evaluated agents Πe:
Definition 25. The coarse discriminating power for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe
playing in slot i in environment µ with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up patterns
wL˙ is given by:
CDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) , ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)CDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) (26)
where ηΠ2 normalises the formula with ηΠ2 =
1∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 wΠe (π1)wΠe (π2)
, |Πe| ≥ 2 and ∃π1, π2 ∈ Πe|π1 ̸= π2,
wΠe(π1) > 0 and wΠe(π2) > 0.
And summing over all slots:
Definition 26. The coarse discriminating power for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe in
environment µ with weight of slots wS , with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-ups
pattern wL˙ is given by:
CD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) ,
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)CDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) (27)
where N(µ) ≥ 1.
In both fine and coarse discrimination the goal is to check if two evaluated agents obtain similar results.
The difference resides at the level we analyse their results. While the fine checks the similarities for each line-up
pattern, the coarse is more oriented to seeing the overall similarity.
4.4.2 Strict Total and Partial Grading
An environment and set of agents populating it being discriminative when comparing evaluated agents does not
mean that there is a gradation or order between the results for a set of evaluated agents. For instance, if we
have three agents π1, π2 and π3 that we want to evaluate in a competitive environment with two agent slots
and two teams, and we get that π1 scores better when interacts with π2, π2 scores better when interacts with
π3 and π3 scores better when interacts with π1, then there is no way to establish a gradation for these three
agents. Idealistically, we would like to have a strict total order, but this is unrealistic for many environments.
So the idea we will pursue is to evaluate how close an environment and set of agents populating it are to
this ideal situation from the expected average rewards of the evaluated agents (without an aggregated rating
system6):
6A common approach is to create a rating when we have many experiments, as done with sport ratings, such as the ELO rating
[13] in chess.
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Definition 27. The strict total grading quality for evaluated agents π1, π2 and π3 playing in slots i and j (with
i ̸= j) in environment µ with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up patterns wL˙ is
given by:
STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) ,
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−i,j (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STOi,j(π1, π2, π3, l˙, µ) (28)
where N(µ) ≥ 2, if N(µ) > 2 then |Πo| ≥ 1 otherwise |Πo| ≥ 0 and STOi,j(π1, π2, π3, l˙, µ) (where l˙ has
all its elements instantiated except positions i and j) is 1 if there is a permutation of the three evaluated
agents such that there is a strict total order in their expected average rewards when placed by pairs in l˙
interacting in environment µ in slots i and j, and 0 otherwise. Formally, it is 1 iff there is a permutation
(π′1, π
′
2, π
′
3) such that: Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π′1, π′2]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π′1, π′2]), Ri(µ[l˙ i,j← π′2, π′3]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π′2, π′3]) and
Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π′1, π′3]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π′1, π′3]). For instance, if we have three agents a, b and c in an environment µ and
line-up pattern l˙ for slots i and j, and their expected average rewards when placed by pairs in l˙ shows us that
b < a, a < c and b < c, then we have STOi,j(a, b, c, l˙, µ) = 1 with the permutation (b, a, c). This property is
related to reliability, which we will see later on.
We generalise this for a set of evaluated agents Πe:
Definition 28. The strict total grading quality for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe
playing in slots i and j (with i ̸= j) in environment µ with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a
weight of line-up patterns wL˙ is given by:
STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) , ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
(29)
where ηΠ3 normalises the formula with ηΠ3 =
1∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3 wΠe (π1)wΠe (π2)wΠe (π3)
, |Πe| ≥ 3 and ∃π1, π2, π3 ∈
Πe|π1 ̸= π2 ̸= π3, wΠe(π1) > 0, wΠe(π2) > 0 and wΠe(π3) > 0.
Now, if we aggregate all combinations of pairs of slots, we have:
Definition 29. The strict total grading quality for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe in
environment µ with weight of slots wS , with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up
patterns wL˙ is given by:
STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) , ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 (30)
where ηS21 normalises the formula with ηS21 =
1∑N(µ)
i=1 wS(i,µ)
(∑i−1
j=1 wS(j,µ)+
∑N(µ)
j=i+1 wS(j,µ)
) , N(µ) ≥ 2 and ∃i, j|1 ≤
i ≤ N(µ), 1 ≤ j ≤ N(µ), i ̸= j, wS(i, µ) > 0 and wS(j, µ) > 0.
The previous definition only considers strict total orders, and is useful to determine whether we can find
a strict total order for the evaluated agents. However, this does not say much about the existence of grading
‘inconsistencies’, such as non-discriminative cases such as π1 = π2, π2 = π3 and π1 = π3 which, for the above
definition, are considered in the same way as not ordering cases such as π1 > π2, π2 > π3 and π1 < π3. In order
to distinguish these cases, we can give a new definition as follows:
Definition 30. The partial grading quality for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe in
environment µ with weight of slots wS , with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up
patterns wL˙ is defined as in definition 29 with the use of a partial order with ≤ instead of a strict total order
with <. It is denoted by PG.
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If STG and PG are high, this means that a derivation of a rating is highly consistent to what we see when
using evaluated agents from Πe on slots i and j. A very similar property is known as monotonicity in [21, sec.
5][22], showing an agent set for the matching pennies game that is non-monotonic. Nonetheless, a partial order
can still be constructed for the agent set of all finite state machines for this game [30].
The existence of a meaningful rating allows for subselections of Πo according to this rating, which can be
used to furbish the tests with high-rank agents that can lead to more sophisticated social environments (which
can be detrimental or beneficial, so making it more or less difficult, respectively, depending on whether it is
used for the same team or for opponents).
4.5 Anticipation
One crucial property that is related to social intelligence is anticipation, which means that in both competition
and cooperation, evaluated agents can benefit from anticipating other agents’ moves or, in more general terms,
by having a theory of other’s minds. While a formalisation of this concept is very elusive, we can at least
introduce an approximation.
4.5.1 Competitive Anticipation
The first thing we need to do is to distinguish between competition and cooperation. In competitive anticipation
we usually expect that evaluated agents can perform better if their opponents can be well anticipated. An
example of this is a predator-prey situation. This phenomenon is difficult to define in general, but we can
introduce a simplified approach based on the idea that one evaluated agent anticipates competitively if its
expected average reward competing against a (generally) non-random agent is higher than its expected average
reward competing against a random agent. This can be generalised as follows:
Definition 31. The anticipation benefit for evaluated agent π1 against agent π2, playing in slots i and j
respectively (with i and j in different teams) when competing in environment µ with a class of opponents and
team players Πo and a weight of line-up patterns wL˙ is given by:
ACompi,j(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) ,
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−i,j (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π1, π2])−Ri(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, πr])
)
(31)
where πr is a random agent,
1
2 normalises the result of ACompi,j to be between −1 and 1, N(µ) ≥ 2 and if
N(µ) > 2 then |Πo| ≥ 1 otherwise |Πo| ≥ 0.
We generalise this for a set of evaluated agents Πe:
Definition 32. The anticipation benefit for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe playing in
slot i when competing against slot j (with i and j in different teams) in environment µ with a class of opponents
and team players Πo and a weight of line-up patterns wL˙ is given by:
ACompi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) ,
∑
π1∈Πe
wΠe(π1) max
π2∈Πo
ACompi,j(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) (32)
where |Πe| ≥ 1 and |Πo| ≥ 1.
By aggregating all combinations of pairs of slots, we have:
Definition 33. The anticipation benefit for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe when
competing in environment µ with weight of slots wS , with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a
weight of line-up patterns wL˙ is given by:
AComp(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) , ηS22
∑
t1,t2∈τ |t1 ̸=t2
∑
i∈t1
wS(i, µ)
∑
j∈t2
wS(j, µ)ACompi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) (33)
where ηS22 normalises the formula with ηS22 =
1∑
t1,t2∈τ|t1 ̸=t2
∑
i∈t1 wS(i,µ)
∑
j∈t2 wS(j,µ)
, τ is the partition of slots
on teams for environment µ, N(µ) ≥ 2 and ∃t1, t2 ∈ τ |t1 ̸= t2,∃i ∈ t1, j ∈ t2|wS(i, µ) > 0 and wS(j, µ) > 0.
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If AComp is positive this means that evaluated agents behave better against non-random agents (in general)
than against random agents.One good example of the above definition is when slot i is a predator and j is a
prey. If, in general, evaluated agents in a class perform better with non-random preys than with random preys
then the environment shows a benefit for this evaluated agent class (for these slots). Of course, this depends on
Πo, but if we include non-random opponents with some movement patterns and/or some degree of intelligence,
the definition becomes more meaningful.
4.5.2 Cooperative Anticipation
On the other hand, in cooperative anticipation (or coordination) good rewards can only be obtained with both
agents performing some actions together. Again a general definition accounting for all possible coordination
situations is difficult, but we can introduce a simplified approach based on the following intuitive definition: two
agents π1 and π2 coordinate cooperatively if the sum of the expected average rewards of π1 and π2 are higher
when they interact together than the sum of each one interacting with a random agent.
Definition 34. The anticipation benefit for evaluated agent π1 and agent π2 playing in slots i and j respectively
(with i ̸= j but in the same team) when cooperating in environment µ with a class of opponents and team
players Πo and a weight of line-up patterns wL˙ is given by:
ACoopi,j(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) ,
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−i,j (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π1, π2]) +Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π2])−Ri(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, πr])−Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← πr, π2])
) (34)
where πr is a random agent,
1
4 normalises the result of ACoopi,j to be between −1 and 1, N(µ) ≥ 2 and if
N(µ) > 2 then |Πo| ≥ 1 otherwise |Πo| ≥ 0.
The use of random agents for the above definition may not work in some cases if there are more than two
elements in a team, as coordination may only take place when all of them coordinate and not only a pair (if a
random agent is included, this can be very disruptive). In this case, the above definition could be extended to
reach the number of elements in the team instead.
We can generalise this for a set of evaluated agents Πe:
Definition 35. The anticipation benefit for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe playing
in slot i when cooperating with slot j (with i ̸= j but in the same team) in environment µ with a class of
opponents and team players Πo and a weight of line-up patterns wL˙ is given by:
ACoopi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) ,
∑
π1∈Πe
wΠe(π1) max
π2∈Πo
ACoopi,j(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) (35)
where |Πe| ≥ 1 and |Πo| ≥ 1.
Finally, if we aggregate all combinations of pairs of slots, we have:
Definition 36. The anticipation benefit for a set of evaluated agents Πe with associated weight wΠe when
cooperating in environment µ with weight of slots wS , with a class of opponents and team players Πo and a
weight of line-up patterns wL˙ is given by:
ACoop(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) , ηS23
∑
t∈τ
∑
i,j∈t|i ̸=j
wS(i, µ)wS(j, µ)ACoopi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+
∑
t1,t2,t3∈τ |t1 ̸=t2 ̸=t3
∑
i∈t1
wS(i, µ)
∑
j∈t2
wS(j, µ)ACoopi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
(36)
where ηS23 normalises the formula with ηS23 =
1∑
t∈τ
∑
i,j∈t|i̸=j wS(i,µ)wS(j,µ)+
∑
t1,t2,t3∈τ|t1 ̸=t2 ̸=t3
∑
i∈t1 wS(i,µ)
∑
j∈t2 wS(j,µ)
,
τ is the partition of slots on teams for environment µ, N(µ) ≥ 2 and ∃i, j ∈ t ∈ τ |i ̸= j, wS(i, µ) > 0 and
wS(j, µ) > 0 or ∃t1, t2, t3 ∈ τ |t1 ̸= t2 ̸= t3,∃i ∈ t1, j ∈ t2|wS(i, µ) > 0 and wS(j, µ) > 0.
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The previous definition includes slots in two different teams when the environment contains three or more
teams. This is because two agents from different teams can cooperate against another agent in a third team.
We have defined the anticipation with only two slots, but competition and cooperation can also appear with
three or more agents.
4.6 Symmetry
In game theory, a symmetric game is a game where the payoffs for playing a particular strategy depend only on
the other strategies employed by the rest of agents, not on who is playing them. This property is very useful
for evaluating purposes. Since we can change the positions of the agents and they will maintain their results,
we only need to evaluate the agent playing in one position of the environment.
For our definition of multi-agent environments this definition of symmetry must be reconsidered. The
previous definition means that for each pair of line-ups with the same agents but in different order, the agents
obtain exactly the same results. But with the inclusion of teams this definition is not appropriate. For example,
using an environment with the partition of slots on teams τ = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} and line-up l = (π1, π2, π3, π4),
we have that agents π1 and π2 must both obtain the same result, as π3 and π4 as well. Following the definition
and switching the positions of π2 and π3 we obtain line-up l
′ = (π1, π3, π2, π4), which now means that agents
π1 and π3 must have the same rewards (since they are now in the same team) while maintaining their previous
results, as π2 and π4 as well. This situation can only occur when all slots (and therefore teams) obtain equal
results.
Instead, we extend this definition of symmetry to include teams. First, we denote by σ(l) the set of line-ups
permuting the agent positions in line-up l. This set will correspond with the one used in game theory to define
symmetry. To adapt this set to our definition, we must select a subset of line-ups from σ(l) respecting the
teams defined in τ . We denote this subset with σ(l, τ), where we only select line-ups from σ(l) if original teams
are maintained. Following the example, line-up l′ is not included in σ(l, τ) since π1 and π3 from l′ were not
in the same team in l (as π2 and π4 as well). However, l
′′ = (π3, π4, π2, π1) is included in σ(l, τ), since both
pair of agents (π1, π2) and (π3, π4) are still in the same team. From here, we define symmetry for a multi-agent
environment as follows:
Definition 37. We say a multi-agent environment µ is symmetric if and only if every team in τ has the same
number of elements and:
∀i,K,Π, l ∈ LN(µ)(Π), l′ ∈ σ(l, τ) : R˘Ki (µ[l]) = R˘Ki′ (µ[l′]) (37)
where i′ represents the slot of agent li:i in l′.
Note that we impose that each set in τ must have the same number of elements. This is because we only
consider environments to be symmetric if we can evaluate an agent in every slot and obtain the same result.
Having teams with different number of elements will not allow us to do this.
This definition now fits our goal of symmetry. But too few environments will fit this definition of symmetry
because it is too restrictive. However, we could divide this definition of symmetry of teams into two parts
depending on the relation between the slots:
For the first part we look at the relation between the slots within each team:
Definition 38. We say an environment is Intra-Team Symmetric when the agents within every team can be
swapped without affecting their results.
This kind of symmetry will allow us to evaluate a team in an environment without taking into account their
positions within every set of τ .
For the second part we look at the relation between the slots in different teams. This can be also divided
into two parts:
Definition 39. We say an environment is Partial Inter-Team Symmetric if every pair of teams having the same
number of elements can be swapped without affecting their results.
Definition 40. We say an environment is Total Inter-Team Symmetric if every pair of teams can be swapped
without affecting their results.
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This kind of symmetry will allow us to evaluate a team in an environment without taking into account in
which set of τ they are situated.
Definition 37 will correspond with an Intra-Team and Total Inter-Team Symmetry, where every team of
agents can be located in every set of τ and in different order, maintaining their performance expectation.
Symmetry is not a necessary condition for social behaviours, but it is a very practical one for measurement
as the result does not depend on the slot we use to evaluate and all slots are useful for evaluating the same
ability. This simplifies all previous calculations (for social intelligence and properties) as we can obtain the same
results by calculating them for only one slot or pair of slots.
4.7 Validity
Validity is the most important property of a cognitive test in psychometrics. In our context, the validity of a
definition is that it accounts for the notion we expect it to grasp. For instance, if we say that a given definition
of Υ measures social intelligence but it actually measures arithmetic abilities then the definition is not valid. In
our case, this depends on the choice of Πo (Π) and M as the core of definition 8.
Poor validity may have two sources (or may appear in two different variants): a definition may be too specific
(it does not account for all the abilities the notion is thought to consider) or it is too general (it includes some
abilities that are not part of the notion to be measured). In other words, the measure should account for all,
but not more, of the concept it tries to represent. We refer to these two issues of validity as the generality of
the measure and the specificity of the measure.
Regarding generality, we should be careful about the use of very restrictive choices for Πo and M . It could
be possible to find a single environment that meets all the properties seen in the previous subsections. However,
using just one environment is prone to specialisation, as usual in many AI benchmarks. For instance, if we use
a particular maze as an environment with a set of particular agents, then we can have good scores by using a
very specialised agent for this situation, which may be unable to succeed in other social contexts. For instance,
chess with current chess players is an example where a specialised system (e.g., Deep Blue) is able to score well,
while it is clearly useless for other problems. A similar over-specialisation may happen if the agent class is too
small. This is usual in biology, where some species specialise for predating (or establishing a symbiosis) with
other species.
Consequently, the environment class and the agent class must be general enough to avoid that some pre-
defined or hardwired policies could be optimal for these classes. This is the key issue of a (social) intelligence
test; it must be as general as possible. We need to choose a diverse environment class. One possibility is to
consider all environments (as done by [39, 27]), and another is to find an environment class that is sufficiently
representative (as attempted in [24]).
Similarly, as happens with the environment diversity and most especially while evaluating social intelligence,
we need to consider a class of agents that leads to a diversity in line-up patterns. This class of agents should
incorporate many different types of agents: random agents, agents with some predetermined policies, agents
that are able to learn, human agents, agents with low social intelligence, agents with high social intelligence,
etc. The set of all possible agents (either artificial or biological) is known as machine kingdom in [19, 20] and
raises many questions about the feasibility of any test considering this astronomically large set. Also, there are
doubts about what the weight for this universal set should be. Instead, some representative kinds of agents
could be chosen. In this way, we could aim at social intelligence relative to a smaller (and well-defined) set of
agents, possibly specialising the definition by limiting the resources, the program size [25] or the intelligence of
the agents [18].
Regarding specificity, it is equally important for a measurement to only include those environments and
agents that really reflect what we want to measure. For instance, it is desirable that the evaluation of an
ability is done in an environment where no other abilities are required, or in other words, we want that the
environment evaluates the ability in isolation. Otherwise, it will not be clear which part of the result comes
from the ability to be evaluated, and which part comes from other abilities. Although it is very difficult to
avoid any contamination, the idea is to ensure that the role of these other abilities are minor, or are taken for
granted for all agents.
The properties of dependency (interactivity, non-neutralism) and anticipation (both competitive and co-
operative) seen in previous subsections have been included for the sake of specificity. We are certainly not
interested in non-social environments as this would contaminate the measure with other abilities. In fact, one of
the recurrent issues in defining and measuring social intelligence is to be specific enough to distinguish it from
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general intelligence.
Unlike all other properties in this section, validity is not a property for which a formal account can be given,
as it precisely accounts for how well the definition reflects the natural or intuitive notion that is to be measured.
The assurement about validity must come then from the use of a formal definition (as for definition 8) with a
meaningful instantiation for the agent and environment classes, and also from the experimental results that can
be obtained through the tests derived from the definition. Note that in psychometrics there is usually a lack of
a proper definition of the cognitive abilities of interest (e.g., psychometrics has not presented an unambiguous
definition of intelligence), so validity is applied to a test and not to the definition of a cognitive ability. In fact,
the concept is frequently derived from the test, as has happened with the modern view of intelligence, as “the
ability measured by IQ tests”.
As discussed in the introduction, we are interested in a formal definition whose validity we can discuss and
appraise, and from which tests are derived, and not the other way round.
4.8 Reliability
Another key issue in psychometric tests is the notion of reliability, which means that the measurement is close
to the actual value. Note that this is different to validity, which refers about the true identification or definition
of the actual value. In other words, if we assume validity, i.e., that our definition is correct7, reliability refers
to the quality of the measurement with respect to the actual value. More technically, if the actual value of π
for an ability φ is v then we want a test to give a value which is close to v. The cause of the divergence may be
systematic (bias), non-systematic (variance) or both.
First, we need to consider that reliability applies to tests, as introduced in section 3.4. Reliability is then
defined by considering that a test can be repeated many times, so becoming a random variable that we can
compare to the true value. Formally:
Definition 41. Given a definition of a cognitive ability Υ and a test Υˆ, the test error is given by:
TE(Υˆ) ,Mean((Υˆ−Υ)2) (38)
where the mean is calculated over the repeated application of the test (to one subject or more subjects).
The reliability Rel(Υˆ) can be defined as a decreasing function over TE(Υˆ), such as Rel(Υˆ) = e−TE(Υˆ).
The reason for defining test error as the mean squared error (and not an absolute error) is a customary choice
in many measures of error, as we can decompose it into the squared bias: (Mean(Υˆ)−Υ)2 and the variance of
the error V ar(Υˆ−Υ). These values can be calculated for just one evaluated agent or for all evaluated agents.
If the bias is not zero this means that the mechanism to sample the exercises and/or the number of iterations
is inappropriate, and the choices for pΠo (pΠ), pM , pS and pK in definition 9 must be revised. If there is a high
variance, this suggests that the number of episodes nE is too small, and we need more (i.e., exercises in a tests)
to get a less volatile result.
In this sense, note that some of the properties studied in previous subsections can hold for Υ but may be
significantly different for unreliable tests (i.e., approximations) Υˆ.
The estimation of TE(Υˆ) or Rel(Υˆ) depends on knowing the true value of Υ. This is not possible in practice
for most environments, so Υ will need to be estimated for large samples and compared with an actual test
(working with a small sample). Because of the difficulties of estimating this, in what follows we will just give a
qualitative assessment.
4.9 Efficiency
This property refers to how efficient a test is in terms of the (computational) time required to get a reliable score.
It is easy to see that efficiency and reliability are opposed. If we were able to perform an infinitely number of
infinite episodes, then we would have Υˆ = Υ, with perfect reliability, as we would exhaust Πo and M . However,
as we try to make tests not only finite but more efficient, we lose reliability because of the sampling procedure.
If done properly, it is usually the variance component of the reliability decomposition that is affected if it is
possible to keep the bias close to 0 even with very low values of the number of episodes nE in definition 9.
7The lack of a proper definition for many abilities makes reliability refer to the quality of the result of a single application of
the test in comparison to the idealised average result if the test could be repeated indefinitely.
25
The definition of efficiency then needs to be defined as a ratio between the reliability and the time taken by
the test (depending mostly on nE and pK , but also on pΠo (pΠ), pM and pS).
Definition 42. Given a definition of a cognitive ability Υ and a test Υˆ, the efficiency is given by:
Eff(Υˆ) , Rel(Υˆ)/T ime(Υˆ) (39)
where Time is the average time taken by test Υˆ. Time can be measured as physical (real) time or as computa-
tional time (steps).
While this is the way it should be measured, the big issue is how to choose environments and agents such that
a high efficiency is attained. Clearly, if the selected environments are insensitive to agents actions or require too
many actions to affect rewards, then this will negatively affect efficiency. As we are interested in social abilities,
interactivity and non-neutralism must be high, as otherwise most steps will be useless to get information about
the evaluated agent. This of course includes cases where the evaluated agent is stuck or bored because their
opponents (or teammates) are too good or too bad, or the environment leads the evaluated agent to heaven or
hell situations where actions are almost irrelevant,
Naturally, a way of making tests more efficient is by the use of adaptive tests, as in computerised adaptive
testing. We will not explore this possibility in this paper as our definition of test in section 3.4 is not adaptive
(for adaptive versions of universal tests, the reader is referred to [27, 19]).
Similarly to reliability, we will just give a qualitative assessment of efficiency.
4.10 Summary of properties
In tables 1 and 2 we can see a summary of all previous properties. Table 1 shows the quantitative properties,
while table 2 shows the qualitative8 properties. This completes our picture jointly with figure 2.
With these properties we managed to represent how appropriate an environment µ and the set of agents Πo
we use are in order to evaluate the social intelligence of a given set of evaluated agents Πe. The set of properties
we propose provides key information about the testbed we are analysing. First, we can measure the influence
that a set of agents Πo produces in a set of evaluated agents Πe. Second, we can analyse to what extent the
anticipation abilities are useful for a set of evaluated agents Πe interacting with a set of agents Πo. Third, we
can determine whether cooperation or competition is given more importance in the testbed. Fourth, we estimate
the discriminative power that the testbed has for the evaluation of different agents. Fifth, the grading power of
the testbed indicates how effective it is to rank agents. And sixth, we have some instrumental properties that
are convenient to convert the definition into a practical test.
We think that these properties can be useful to characterise a testbed.
For the quantitative properties we find two kinds of properties. The properties whose values range from 0
to 1 determine the percentage of fulfilment that the environment µ and the set of agents Πo have about this
property when evaluating a set of agents Πe. Therefore, the lower the value the worse the system is in regard to
this property, and the higher the value the better. On the contrary, the kind of properties whose values range
from −1 to 1 must not be interpreted in the same way. Instead, these properties measure to which kind of type
the system is more focussed on, and not a level of accomplishment or quality.
5 Degree of compliance of several multi-agent and social scenarios
Many games and environments have been proposed as testbeds to evaluate performance in a multi-agent envi-
ronment [45, 64, 53, 66]. Typically these games and environments are created or selected to represent a specific
problem or family to analyse or solve. Since we are interested in developing social intelligence tests, it is first
mandatory to evaluate whether these other previous testbeds could be valid as they are (or with minor modifi-
cations). If not, they can still be a good source of inspiration to figure out new environment classes by reusing
some of their ideas or hybridising some of their features.
We would have liked to explore many games and environments, but we can just practically do a selection
of some of the most common and representative in the area of multi-agent systems, game theory and (social)
computer games. We will focus on some testbeds whose specification is complete, so we can analyse the level of
8Some of them can in principle be quantified, but we only give a qualitative assessment in this paper.
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Property Meaning Range Lowest value Highest value
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS)
Social:Social dependency:Interactivity
The action de-
pendency of the
evaluated agents on
the line-up pattern
they encounter.
[0, 1] The evaluated
agents do not take
into account other
agents’ actions in
their behaviour.
The evaluated
agents behave com-
pletely depending
on the other agents’
actions.
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS)
Social:Social dependency:Non-neutralism
The reward de-
pendency of the
evaluated agents on
the line-up pattern
they encounter.
[0, 1] Each evaluated
agent obtains the
same expected
average reward
independently of
the line-up pattern.
The agents in the
line-up pattern di-
rectly exercise in-
fluence on the ex-
pected average re-
wards of each eval-
uated agent.
SRD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS)
Social:Social dependency:Non-neutralism
The slot reward
dependency mea-
sures how competi-
tive or cooperative
the environment is.
[−1, 1] The environment is
completely compet-
itive.
The environment is
completely cooper-
ative.
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS)
Instrumental:Secernment:Discrimination
The fine discrim-
ination between
pairs of evalu-
ated agents when
interacting with
the same line-up
patterns.
[0, 1] Every evaluated
agent obtains the
same expected
average reward
for each line-up
pattern.
Every evaluated
agent obtains dif-
ferent expected
average rewards
for each line-up
pattern.
CD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS)
Instrumental:Secernment:Discrimination
The coarse dis-
crimination
between pairs of
evaluated agents.
[0, 1] Every evaluated
agent obtains
the same (social)
intelligence value.
Every evaluated
agent obtains
different (social)
intelligence values.
STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS)
Instrumental:Secernment:Grading
The strict total
grading measures
the level of strict
grading (<) be-
tween the evaluated
agents.
[0, 1] There is no strict
total order between
the evaluated
agents.
There is a strict to-
tal order between
all the evaluated
agents.
PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS)
Instrumental:Secernment:Grading
The partial grad-
ing measures the
level of partial
grading (≤) be-
tween the evaluated
agents.
[0, 1] There is no partial
order between the
evaluated agents.
There is a par-
tial order between
all the evaluated
agents.
AComp(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS)
Social:Mind modelling:Competitive
The benefit of
anticipating
competitive
agents.
[−1, 1] Every evaluated
agent completely
fails at anticipating
competitive agents’
behaviour.
Every evaluated
agent perfectly
anticipates com-
petitive agents’
behaviour.
ACoop(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS)
Social:Mind modelling:Cooperative
The benefit of an-
ticipating coop-
erative agents.
[−1, 1] Every evaluated
agent completely
fails at anticipating
cooperative agents’
behaviour.
Every evaluated
agent perfectly
anticipates co-
operative agents’
behaviour.
Table 1: Summary of the quantitative properties about a social intelligence testbed µ with slot probability wS ,
evaluated agent set Πe with weights wΠe , class of opponents and team players Πo and line-up probability wL˙.
For each property the table shows its arguments, a brief description, the range of values and a description of
the situations when their lowest and highest values occur.
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Property Meaning
Boundedness
Instrumental:Technical
Rewards are bounded, so all quantitative properties are also
bounded.
Symmetry
Instrumental:Technical
Desirable condition to simplify the measurement in such a way
that only one slot has to be used to evaluate an agent.
Validity
Univocal:Correctness
The test evaluates what it is supposed to evaluate and nothing
more.
Reliability
Instrumental:Testing quality
The result of an agent’s ability in the test is close to its real value.
Efficiency
Instrumental:Testing quality
Decreases with the amount of (computational) time used in the
test to obtain a reliable score.
Table 2: Summary of the qualitative properties (or for which we will give a qualitative assessment) about a
social intelligence testbed, providing a brief description of what each property represents.
compliance of these testbeds for the properties seen in the previous section. In particular, the testbeds that we
are going to analyse in this section are: matching pennies, prisoner’s dilemma, predator-prey (a pursuit game),
Pac-Man and RoboCup Soccer.
5.1 Graphical analysis for the properties
Before starting with the games and environments testbeds, we are going to introduce some indicators and a
graphical representation that will be illustrated on a figurative environment. In table 3 we show a summary
with the most important elements we are using in this section.
Terminology Notation Explanation Example
Social environment
(or game)
µ The rules of the game. Chess.
Social setup ⟨Πo, wL˙, µ, wS⟩ This is more specific than just a
game or environment and deter-
mines all the players and posi-
tions and their alignment prob-
abilities wL˙ and slots.
Playing chess against the
ten best players in Spain
with uniform probability,
starting with white pieces.
Evaluated agents
and distribution
⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ The set of agents to be evaluated
and an associated distribution.
Evaluate the students in
a chess club with uniform
distribution.
Table 3: Summary of the elements used for the evaluation of agents in a multi-agent environment.
In order to assess compliance with interactivity, non-neutralism, anticipation and other properties for an
environment µ we need to specify the evaluated agent class Πe with associated weight wΠe , the agent class Πo
which populates the environment, line-up pattern weights wL˙ and slot weights wS . One choice for Πe, wΠe and
Πo would be to consider any possible agent that is expressible using a given policy language. This, however,
would make the calculation of most properties difficult (if not impossible). A better approach would be to use
a (representative) sample of all agents or a sample of a meaningful class. Instead of that, and in order to give
a more general picture of the environment itself, we will show the range of values that each property can have
(independently of the agents), and how much this range can be restricted (for better or worse) depending on
which Πe, wΠe and Πo we select. In fact, when evaluating a set of agents Πe in a certain setup, we should provide
which set of agents Πo will populate the environment, but we could also let this set unfixed in order to measure
the environment itself. Finally, the use of different weights can lead to different ranges for the properties, but
in what follows we will assume uniform weights for line-up patterns wL˙ and slots wS .
We divided the properties into three types. In the first type we have the properties which have a quantitative
value that can range between 0 and 1. In the second type we have the properties which have a quantitative value
that can range between −1 and 1. And in the third type are the properties for which we provide a qualitative
value.
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For the first two types of properties we calculate the range that each property can have in an environment.
For this, we need to calculate the lowest and highest values that this range can have for each quantitative
property Prop. To achieve this, we will select Πe, wΠe and Πo (from the set of all possible Πe, wΠe and Πo such
that Prop is defined) that obtain the lowest and highest values respectively. We define General as follows:
Definition 43. We denoteGeneral to be the range of values fromGeneralmin(Prop, µ) toGeneralmax(Prop, µ),
where:
Generalmin(Prop, µ) , min
Πe,wΠe ,Πo
Prop(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) (40)
Generalmax(Prop, µ) , max
Πe,wΠe ,Πo
Prop(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) (41)
where the weight for slots wS and weight for line-up patterns wL˙ are uniform weights and the triplet ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩
is selected (from the set of all possible ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ such that Prop is defined) to minimise/maximise the values
of a quantitative property Prop for environment µ.
For the first type of properties Prop we can select some set of agents Πo to obtain a situation where General
is restricted in such a way that Generalmax(Prop, µ) decreases. In particular, we are interested in the setup
with the “lowest maximum”, i.e., we consider those Πo that minimise this maximum. We define Left as follows:
Definition 44. We denote Left to be the most restricted range of values from Leftmin(Prop, µ) to Leftmax(Prop, µ)
that we can obtain when Πo is selected (from the set of all possible Πo such that Prop is defined) to decrease
the values of a quantitative property Prop which range is between 0 and 1 for environment µ, where:
Leftmin(Prop, µ) , Generalmin(Prop, µ) (42)
Leftmax(Prop, µ) , min
Πo
max
Πe,wΠe
Prop(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) (43)
In the same way, for the first type of properties Prop we can select some set of agents Πo to obtain a situation
where General is restricted in such a way that Generalmin(Prop, µ) increases. In particular, we are interested
in the setup with the “highest minimum”, i.e., we consider those Πo that maximise this minimum. We define
Right as follows:
Definition 45. We denoteRight to be the most restricted range of values fromRightmin(Prop, µ) toRightmax(Prop, µ)
that we can obtain when Πo is selected (from the set of all possible Πo such that Prop is defined) to increase
the values of a quantitative property Prop which range is between 0 and 1 for environment µ, where:
Rightmin(Prop, µ) , max
Πo
min
Πe,wΠe
Prop(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) (44)
Rightmax(Prop, µ) , Generalmax(Prop, µ) (45)
For the first type of properties, the General, Left and Right ranges become better as long as their minimum
and maximum values become higher. If the Left range values are lower, this would mean that a bad selection
of Πo is disastrous for the quality of the testbed. If Right range values are higher would mean that there is
a good selection of Πo which improves the quality of the testbed. The comparison between Left and Right
with General shows us the importance that a good selection for the set of opponents and team players Πo has
for a property Prop in an environment µ. As these three ranges are more different, the selection of agents Πo
becomes more important in order to provide a better quality for the testbed.
In figure 3 we present the properties of a figurative environment divided in three sections. The top section
represents five quantitative properties whose range can be between 0 and 19. The middle section represents the
three quantitative properties whose range can be between −1 and 1. Finally, the bottom section represents the
five qualitative properties.
We can see that each property of the first type has the early mentioned General, Left and Right ranges
represented with three bands. The first property (Action Dependency) has a General range from 0 to 1,
9Since FD and CD are similar properties, we decided to just calculate the FD property in order to simplify our analysis.
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Figure 3: Social properties for a figurative environment. Lighter bands mean the values are not formally
calculated, but an estimation is given.
represented with the first band. This is the broadest range that this kind of property can have. This means
that this environment can have any value for this property depending on the set of agents Πo, the set of evaluated
agents Πe and its weight distribution wΠe . The second band represents its Left range, which is equal to [0, 0].
In this case, there exists a set of agents Πo that restricts this range to the minimum possible range. The third
band represents its Right range, which remains from 0 to 1. Now, no set of agents Πo can be selected to
restrict this range. In the next four properties we see some other examples for the three ranges that this type
of property can have. As we can see in the last property of this type (PG), we use a lighter color to represent
that (part of) a range is not formally calculated, but instead we provide an estimation.
Next we arrive at the second type of properties. Here the values for the General range can be between −1
and 1. Unlike the previous case, we do not provide Left and Right ranges for this type of properties. This
is because these properties represent for which kind of social intelligence the environment is more oriented, so
there are not really good or bad ranges for this property.
In the first property of this second type (Slot Reward Dependency), we see that the General range for
this property is equal to [−1,−1], indicating that this environment is purely competitive. The next property
shows another example for this type of properties. Meanwhile, the last property has a label with the text “Not
Defined”. This is because for this environment the property is not defined, so we cannot represent it.
Finally, we arrived at the last type of properties. Here, we denote whether the environment meets the
properties by using a tick (X) or cross (×) mark respectively.
Now that we have explained how we will represent the properties, let us start analysing some true environ-
ments.
5.2 Matching pennies
Matching pennies [61] can be considered the simplest game in game theory featuring competition. This game
consists of two players (or agents) each flipping a coin. If both coins match player 1 wins, otherwise player 2
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wins.
This game is played as a repeated game, which means that the game is played on a single iteration and the
game is repeated for several iterations. Each player can see the actions performed by the other player. The game
is usually repeated during K steps (i.e., it is the iterated matching pennies), so players can use past steps in
order to predict the other player’s strategy. Following definition 4, for agent slot i this environment only allows
two actions Ai = {Head, Tail} and only provides two rewards Ri = {−1, 1}, which correspond to lose and win
respectively. Clearly, in this game, τ = {{1}, {2}} represents the partition of slots in teams, i.e., has two teams
and only one slot in each. For agent in slot i the environment provides an observation set Oi = Aj ∪ {null}
(where agent slot j represents the slot of the other agent) and the observation function ω returns to each agent
the action performed by the other agent in the previous iteration or null if it is the first iteration. Figure 4
shows the reward function ρ as a reward matrix, which has the actions of both agents as input and their rewards
as outputs.
Head Tail
Head (1,−1) (−1, 1)
Tail (−1, 1) (1,−1)
Figure 4: Matching pennies’ payoff matrix. Rows and columns represent the actions of agent 1 and 2 respectively.
Cells content (X,Y ) corresponds to the obtained rewards for agent 1 and agent 2 respectively when the actions
leading to that cell are performed.
Next we discuss the level of compliance of the matching pennies environment with respect to the properties
seen in section 4. We can see a summary of the social properties for the matching pennies in figure 5. In
appendix A we prove how we obtained these values.
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Figure 5: Social properties for the matching pennies using uniform weights for wS and wL˙, and ∆S(a, b) and
∆Q(a, b) return 1 if a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
If we start with the properties, we see that this game is bounded, as rewards are always between −1 and 1.
This means that if the weight functions wS and wL˙ are bounded, the value of Υ (and many other properties)
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will be bounded. Also, matching pennies is a well known zero-sum game, which means that the payoffs of the
agents always sum zero (as we can see in figure 4) and, therefore, agents have totally opposed interests.
We next move to the symmetry property. This game has only two teams with one agent on each team. So,
in order to prove that this environment is not symmetric, we only need to find a pair of line-ups l1 = (π1, π2)
and l2 = (π2, π1) where the sequence of rewards for π1 and/or π2 differs in both line-ups. This becomes trivial
by using the same agent πt (which always performs Tail) as both π1 and π2 (i.e., l1 = l2 = (πt, πt)) and check
whether the agent obtains the same result in both slots. Since πt gets a result of 1 in slot 1 and a result of
−1 in slot 2, we can conclude that this environment is not symmetric. This forces us to calculate some other
properties for all the slots.
If we look to the General range for the action dependency (AD) property, we see that it goes from 0 to 1
(propositions 2 and 3). That means that the evaluated agents can either interact without noticing the other
agent or can perform actions depending on which agent they encounter. But some particular selection of Πo
could make this environment to have a too restrictive Left range with respect to this property, making it
equal to [0, 0] (proposition 4), so no evaluated agent could perform different actions depending on which agent
it interacts with. In addition, we see that no particular selection of Πo can restrict the Right range, which
remains from 0 to 1 (proposition 5).
When we look at the General range for the reward dependency (RD) property, we see that it goes from 0
to 1 (propositions 6 and 7). This means that the evaluated agents can either obtain the same expected average
reward or can obtain different expected average rewards depending on which agent they encounter. But some
particular selection of Πo could make this environment have a too restrictive Left range with respect to this
property, making it equal to [0, 0] (proposition 8). In addition, we see that no particular selection of Πo can
restrict the Right range, which remains from 0 to 1 (proposition 9).
The General range for the fine discrimination (FD) property goes from 0 to 1 (propositions 10 and 11). This
means that two different evaluated agents can either obtain the same expected average reward or can obtain
different expected average rewards. The Left range can be restricted to be equal to [0, 0] (proposition 12), and
the Right range goes from 0 to 1 (proposition 13). This means that, with a bad selection of Πo, no pair of
evaluated agents can be differentiated in terms of performance, and it does not exist a Πo to always differentiate
any pair of evaluated agents.
The General range for the strict total grading (STG) and partial grading (PG) properties has, as in all
previous properties, a minimum value of 0 (propositions 14 and 18) and a maximum value of 1 (propositions 15
and 19). This means that we cannot provide an ordering for some sets of evaluated agents, but we can provide it
for some other sets of evaluated agents. In both STG and PG, Left cannot be restricted by any Πo, remaining
from 0 to 1 (propositions 16 and 20), and the same occurs with Right, which cannot be restricted by any Πo,
remaining from 0 to 1 (propositions 17 and 21).
This environment always has a General range for the slot reward dependency (SRD) property equal to
[−1,−1] (proposition 22). This means that both agent slots have opposed interests, i.e., it is entirely competitive.
The General range for the competitive anticipation (AComp) property goes from − 12 to 12 (propositions
23 and 24). These values tell us that an evaluated agent can improve its results by correctly anticipating the
actions of the other agent, but an incorrect anticipation will worsen its results.
On the contrary, we cannot evaluate the cooperative anticipation (ACoop) property in this environment.
This is because each of the two teams has only one slot (in addition, this is also a zero-sum game), so the
formula cannot be applied.
We now discuss the validity property. Matching pennies is a very simple game. As a result, it seems clear
that it is not general enough to be used (alone) as the basis of a social intelligent test. Nonetheless, there are
different opinions about this, as it has been suggested that matching pennies could be an intelligence test on
its own, under the name ‘Adversarial Sequence Prediction’ [30, 31]. In fact, a tournament was organised in
2011 where computer algorithms competed10 and very interesting emergence phenomena were observed. Only
strategies that were able to see patterns in the other players scored well (better than random). There are of
course some counter-intuitive things about this game. Actually, random agents score exactly the same with
any opponent, even with very intelligent ones. This raises concerns about the validity and reliability of this
environment for a test since, in an intelligence test, the average score of a random policy should not obtain a
good result, since random agents are clearly not intelligent. Also, matching pennies results are non-monotonic
for a set of agents. In [21] there is an example of an agent set for matching pennies that is non-monotonic
(so PG < 1). Nonetheless, partial orders can still be constructed for the agent set of all finite state machines
10See http://matchingpennies.com/tournament/.
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[31]. Another important problem about matching pennies is that it only evaluates pure competition (it is a
zero-sum game), and no form of cooperation can be found (although some versions, or the ternary extension,
rock-paper-scissors, could allow for cooperation). Finally, another strong argument against the validity of this
game as a good environment (alone) for a social intelligence test is that some current systems may score better
than humans, even though these systems are not (socially) intelligent at all and they are designed to play
matching pennies only.
Finally, efficiency is a property where matching pennies excels, since every action has immediate conse-
quences. This means that in most cases, it can be enough to design a test where only a few dozen steps are
performed in order to have a good approximation. Of course, there might be agents that may change their
behaviour in step 10,000 so their assessment up to this point will be completely different to their assessment in
the limit (if no discounting factor is used). For some agents, with our definition of reliability, we get that some
pairs of agents are stable from step 2, so high degrees of reliability (low test error) can be achieved very soon.
When a random agent is involved, the approximation is slower, but not much slower, depending on a binomial
distribution.
Overall, matching pennies is an interesting game, but it lacks the generality that a social intelligence test
should have. Nonetheless, it is a very simple game that illustrates how the range values of several properties
can be calculated and provide very useful information about how an environment or game behaves. In the end,
it has been a useful exercise before analysing more sophisticated scenarios below.
5.3 Prisoner’s dilemma
In the prisoner’s dilemma [46] two prisoners (or agents) are suspects of a crime, and are asked if the other
prisoner is guilty of that crime. If both cooperate and do not blame the other, both spend a short time in
prison. If one cooperates but not the other, the one who blamed reduces its time in prison to the minimum
sentence, but the other prisoner obtains the maximum sentence. Finally, if both prisoners blame the other,
both spend a long time in prison.
As happens with the matching pennies, this game is played as a repeated game, which means that the game
is played on a single iteration and the game is repeated for several iterations. Each player can see the actions
performed by the other player. The game is usually repeated during K steps (i.e., it is the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma), so players can use past steps in order to predict the other player’s strategy. Following definition 4,
for agent slot i this environment only allows two actions Ai = {Cooperate, Blame} and provides four rewards
Ri = {1, 2, 3, 4}, which correspond to the time spent in prison. In this game, τ = {{1}, {2}} represents the
partition of slots in teams, which has two teams and only one slot in each. For agent in slot i the environment
provides an observation set Oi = Aj ∪{null} (where agent slot j represents the slot of the other agent) and the
observation function ω returns to each agent the action performed by the other agent in the previous iteration
or null if it is the first iteration. Figure 6 shows the reward function ρ as a reward matrix, which has the actions
of both agents as input and their rewards as outputs.
Cooperate Blame
Cooperate (2, 2) (4, 1)
Blame (1, 4) (3, 3)
Figure 6: Prisoner’s dilemma’s payoff matrix. Rows and columns represent the actions of agent 1 and 2
respectively.
The payoff matrix in figure 6 is not normalised. We can normalise this matrix to be between −1 and 1,
giving the lowest reward to the highest period in prison and vice versa. Once rewards are normalised, for agent
slot i they are set to Ri = {−1,−0.33, 0.33, 1}. In figure 7 we can see this payoff matrix normalised.
Cooperate Blame
Cooperate (0.33, 0.33) (−1, 1)
Blame (1,−1) (−0.33,−0.33)
Figure 7: Prisoner’s dilemma’s payoff matrix normalised. Maximum sentence in prison is represented by the
lowest reward, while minimum sentence is represented with the highest reward.
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Prisoner’s dilemma differs from matching pennies by including some cooperation, since both agents can
choose to cooperate to spend a relatively little time in prison.
We can see a summary of the social properties for the prisoner’s dilemma in figure 8. In appendix B we
prove how we obtained these values.
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Figure 8: Social properties for the prisoner’s dilemma using uniform weights for wS and wL˙, and ∆S(a, b)
and ∆Q(a, b) return 1 if a and b are equal and 0 otherwise. Lighter bands mean the values are not formally
calculated, but an estimation is given.
With the normalised payoff matrix we can see that this game is bounded, since 1K·n
∑K
k=1
∑n
i=1 ri,k = c
where −0.33 ≤ c ≤ 0.33. In this game some cooperation can appear, as for example, when both agents always
decide to cooperate, so they obtain the maximum joint reward (0.33). But blaming can provide the best reward
to one player if the other player still cooperates, so cooperating now provides the worst reward. Finally, if both
decide to blame, both obtain the worst joint reward (−0.33). As in matching pennies, if the weight functions
wS and wL˙ are bounded, the value of Υ (and many properties) will be bounded.
Analysing the symmetry property, we can see that the payoff matrix is clearly symmetric for both players.
This makes that the payoffs of any strategies made by the agents do not depend on which slots they are, since
they will obtain the same rewards. From this observation we can conclude that this environment is symmetric,
which allows us to calculate some other properties only for one slot and assume that it is maintained for the
other.
If we look at the ranges for the action dependency (AD) property, we encounter exactly the same scenario
than in the matching pennies. That means that evaluated agents can either interact without noticing the other
agent, obtaining a value of 0 (proposition 25), or can always perform actions depending on the agent they
encounter, obtaining a value of 1 (proposition 26). But some particular selections of Πo can provide a too
restricted Left range, forcing this value to be equal to [0, 0] (proposition 27), so no evaluated agent from Πe
can behave differently depending on the agents of Πo. In addition, no particular selection of Πo can restrict the
Right range, remaining from 0 to 1 (proposition 28).
We start to find some differences with the matching pennies when we analyse the reward dependency (RD)
property. As in matching pennies, the General range for this property goes from 0 to 1 (propositions 29 and
34
30), so the expected average rewards of the evaluated agents can either depend or not on which agent they
encounter. Also, some particular selection of Πo could make this environment to have a too restrictive Left
range with respect to this property, making it equal to [0, 0] (proposition 31), so no evaluated agent obtains
different expected average rewards depending on which agent it interacts with. But, a good selection of Πo can
restrict the Right range making it equal to [1, 1] (proposition 32). This means that the evaluated agents will
obtain different expected average rewards depending on which agent they interact with.
We now move to the fine discrimination (FD) property. The General range for this property goes from
0 to 1 (propositions 33 and 34). This means that two evaluated agents can either obtain the same expected
average reward or different expected average rewards depending on the set of agents Πo we select. It exists a
particular Πo which restricts the Left range to be equal to [0, 0] (conjecture 1), meaning that the environment
will not be discriminating the evaluated agents, since every evaluated agent will obtain the same expected
average reward. It is not possible to restrict the Right range in such a way that we can always discriminate
every pair of evaluated agents, so it remains from 0 to 1 (proposition 35), so it is possible to find two different
evaluated agents from some particular Πe obtaining the same result.
The General range for the strict total grading (STG) and partial grading (PG) properties can, as in all
previous properties, reach a minimum value of 0 (propositions 36 and 40) and a maximum value of 1 (propositions
37 and 41) for this environment. This means that we cannot provide an ordering for some sets of evaluated
agents, but we can provide it for some other sets of evaluated agents. In both STG and PG, the Left range
cannot be restricted by any Πo, remaining from 0 to 1 (propositions 38 and 42), and the same occurs with the
Right range, which cannot be restricted by any Πo, remaining from 0 to 1 (propositions 39 and 43).
The General range for the slot reward dependency (SRD) property goes from −1 to 1 (propositions 44 and
45). This provides very different distributions of expected average rewards depending on the strategies used by
the agents.
The General range for the competitive anticipation (AComp) property goes from − 23 to 23 (propositions 46
and 47). Anticipating the strategy of the other agent can be really useful to obtain a good expected average
reward, but it can also provide a really bad expected average reward if the strategy is not correctly anticipated.
We cannot evaluate the cooperative anticipation (ACoop) property in this environment. This is because,
as in the matching pennies environment, each of the two teams has only one slot, so the formula cannot be
applied. This seems counter-intuitive since one of the actions is named to cooperate, but this cooperation is not
meant to improve the agent’s own rewards, but to improve the other agent’s rewards. Indeed, if we reframe the
game by using only one team and calculating the team reward as the mean of the agents’ rewards, then both
agents can cooperate to obtain the best joint reward. This will lead us to a situation where a bad cooperative
anticipation between the agents’ actions can negatively affect the team reward, but also, a good cooperative
anticipation will have good benefits for the team.
We now discuss the validity property. The prisoner’s dilemma is similar in simplicity to the matching pennies
game. But in this game, competition is not so strong, providing some cooperation between the two teams and
making this game more general than the matching pennies. But in this game we cannot evaluate cooperation
within a team, so it is not general enough to evaluate social intelligence. Actually, some simple strategies can
clearly make the adversary’s results get stuck, forcing it to obtain bad rewards independently of its strategy.
This raises concerns about the validity of this environment for a test, since an intelligence test should not give
bad results to intelligent agents.
Finally, the efficiency property is almost as good as in the matching pennies environment. Every action
has immediate consequences on the agents’ results, having good approximations for their results in few steps.
Therefore, reliable values for the ability measured will be reached in short time.
The prisoner’s dilemma resembles the matching pennies in many aspects, but it is slightly a more complex
environment. As many similarities exists between both environments many properties remain equal.
Let us see a more complex environment.
5.4 Predator-prey (Pursuit game)
One typical environment for cooperation that uses a 2D discrete space is a pursuit game called Predator-prey [3],
where the evaluee acts as a predator and has to cooperate/coordinate with other two predators in order to chase
a prey. If they succeed chasing the prey, the goal is achieved. Figure 9 shows an example of a predator-prey
environment.
Many variants have been proposed about this scenario, which provides a high diversity of environments. Some
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♦ ⃝
⃝ ⃝
Figure 9: A predator-prey scenario with a 4x4 grid space. ⃝ denotes a predator, ♦ denotes the prey and a
black cell denotes a block. At each step, agents can stay or move one cell horizontally or vertically, but blocks
cannot be crossed. The prey is chased once it shares a cell with a predator.
examples include spaces with and without obstacles or boundaries, and many variants about the parameters
have been considered: the distance of the scenario that the agents can perceive, the number of predators or
preys, the speed of the agents, etc. Even the definition of how the prey is chased has been modified, e.g., the
prey is surrounded by the predators, or one predator chases the prey by occupying the same position. Some of
these variants add a variety of social complexity to the game, such as different levels of cooperation/competition
by having to interact with different numbers of predators or preys, or having faster preys.
These and other pursuit games have been widely studied and used in multi-agent systems (i.e., [55, 6, 5, 14,
1]), but, in our opinion, no thorough study about their properties has been developed so far.
Since we cannot analyse all the variants we just select one of them to analyse it, but different variants could
have different properties’ values. For this analysis we will use the environment shown in figure 9, which also
shows its initial observation. The game is typically performed in episodes. We will make an episode to end after
six iterations are performed.
Following definition 4, for agent slot i this environment allows four actions Ai = {Up, Right, Down,
Left}, which leads the agent to the cell facing this direction (when an agent performs an action leading to
a block or boundary, the agent does not move). For agent slot i the environment provides three rewards
Ri = {0,−6, 6}, which correspond to ‘the episode is not finished’, ‘lose the chase’ and ‘win the chase’ respec-
tively. τ = {{1}, {2, 3, 4}} represents the partition of slots in teams. The first team {1} contains the prey (which
is located in the upper left corner) and the second team {2, 3, 4} contains three predators (which are located
in the upper right, bottom left and bottom right corners respectively). For agent in slot i the environment
provides an observation set Oi which corresponds to the set of spaces with any possible location of the agents,
and the observation function ω returns for every agent a description of the space as, for example, figure 9. For
the analysis of this environment we will follow the same procedure as for previous environments. This is the
reason why we allow the evaluated agent to play in every slot, even as the prey. But, as mentioned above, if we
only let the agent play as a predator, the values of the properties will be different. Figure 10 shows the reward
function ρ as a payoff matrix which has the current iteration and the chasing situation as input and the agents’
rewards as output. Note that after the six iterations, the average reward will be −1 or 1 depending on whether
the agent wins the chase or not.
Prey has been chased Prey has not been chased
Iteration 1 (0, 0) (0, 0)
Iteration 2 (0, 0) (0, 0)
Iteration 3 (0, 0) (0, 0)
Iteration 4 (0, 0) (0, 0)
Iteration 5 (0, 0) (0, 0)
Iteration 6 (−6, 6) (6,−6)
Figure 10: Predator-prey’s payoff matrix. Rows represent the iteration, while columns represents whether the
prey has been chased or not. Cells content (X,Y ) corresponds to the obtained rewards for the prey and each
predator respectively.
We can see a summary of the social properties for the predator-prey in figure 11. In appendix C we prove
how we obtained these values.
When we start with the properties we see that this game is bounded since its rewards are between −6 and 6,
so average rewards are between −1 and 1. As with previous environments, if weight functions wS and wL˙ are
bounded, the value of Υ and many properties will be bounded.
Analysing the symmetry property, we clearly see that this game is not symmetric. First, prey and predator
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Figure 11: Social properties for the predator-prey using uniform weights for wS and wL˙, and ∆S(a, b) and
∆Q(a, b) return 1 if a and b are equal and 0 otherwise. Lighter bands mean the values are not formally
calculated, but an estimation is given.
teams do not have the same number of agents. And second, changing the slots of the agents within the predator
team does not provide the same sequences of rewards for the agents, owing to they start in different positions.
This forces us to calculate all the other properties for all the slots.
If we look at the action dependency (AD) property, we cannot see any difference with previous environments,
even having a so different environment. For the General range, evaluated agents can either interact without
noticing the other agents, providing a minimum value of 0 (proposition 48), or can perform different actions
depending on the agents they encounter, providing a maximum value of 1 (proposition 49). But some particular
bad selections of Πo could restrict Left range to be equal to [0, 0] (proposition 50). On the contrary, no
particular selection of Πo can restrict the Right range for this property, remaining from 0 to 1 (proposition 51).
When we look at the ranges for the reward dependency (RD) property, we can see that the General range
goes from 0 to 1 (proposition 52 and conjecture 2) so the rewards of the evaluated agents can either differ or not
depending on the agents they encounter. A really bad selection of Πo can make the Left range too restrictive,
staying on [0, 0] (proposition 53) no matter which Πe we are evaluating. But we can restrict the Right range by
selecting a properly Πo, obtaining a range from
13
28 to 1 (approximation 1). This would force that almost half
of the results of the evaluated agents will be different depending on the line-up pattern they interact with.
We now move to the ranges for the fine discrimination (FD) property. The General range goes from 0 to 1
(propositions 54 and 55), i.e., the result of one evaluated agent can be different or not from the result of another
evaluated agent depending on which set of agents Πo is selected. But a bad selection of Πo can restrict too
much the Left range, making this value equal to [0, 0] (proposition 56), so every evaluated agent will obtain the
same result. However, the Right range cannot be restricted, remaining from 0 to 1 (proposition 57), since there
are always two different evaluated agents that can obtain the same expected average reward, independently of
the set of agents Πo.
Strict total grading (STG) and partial grading (PG) properties are clearly different from previous environ-
ments. The General range for the strict total grading property can only go from 0 to 12 (propositions 58 and
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59), so we cannot even have a strict total ordering for all the evaluated agents. In addition, its Left range can
be restricted to be from 0 to 14 (approximation 2), so it would be possible to obtain some strict total ordering.
At least, its Right range can be restricted to be from 14 to
1
2 (approximation 3), which somehow alleviates
this situation. But instead, its partial grading has really good ranges. Its General range goes from 12 to 1
(propositions 60 and 61), its Left range can be restricted to be from 12 to
3
4 (approximation 4) and its Right
range can be restricted to be from 34 to 1 (approximation 5). This makes this environment good for grading the
evaluated agents, so even with a bad selection of Πo we will still be able to obtain some partial orders between
some of the evaluated agents, and provides a promising partial grading for the evaluated agents if Πo is well
selected.
The slot reward dependency (SRD) has a General range equal to [0, 0] (proposition 62). This particular
value comes from the opposite results of preys and predators. As early mentioned, if we had only used the slots
of the predators for evaluating the agents, we would have had another range.
The General range for the competitive anticipation (AComp) property goes from −1 to 12 (propositions 63
and 64). Anticipating the strategy of the other team can be useful to improve the expected average reward, but
only when playing in the predator team, since playing as the prey does not have this benefit. But conversely,
a bad anticipation does really penalise the expected average reward of an evaluated agent either playing in the
prey or predator team.
In this environment we can find cooperation between the agents within the predator team. The General
range for the cooperative anticipation (ACoop) goes from −1 to 1 (propositions 65 and 66). This makes a good
coordination within the predator team to always chase the prey, but a bad coordination can let the prey to
escape.
We now discuss the validity property. In the predator-prey environment we can encounter both competition
between the prey and predators, and cooperation among the predators, which makes it a complex game to
evaluate social intelligence. Both competition and cooperation seem important in this game, giving more
importance to competition rather than cooperation as we can see from AComp and ACoop, where a bad
result can come from incorrectly anticipating while an incorrect anticipation in cooperation does not necessarily
provide bad rewards. But this game gives us a general situation to evaluate social intelligence in a broad way.
Also, agents that are evaluated in this environment can have good orderings as properties STG and PG reflect,
making it a good environment to classify the agents. However, the abilities that the agents need to accomplish
their goals are not balanced. It is easier for the predator team to win the chase if they cooperate adequately,
where the prey will not have a chance to survive. Also, the Left ranges of the properties are usually very
restrictive when Πo is not selected carefully. So it is really necessary to select a correct set of agents, but still,
once a certain level of intelligence is reached we cannot evaluate higher levels of intelligence, since their result
will remain equal. From here, we can say that the social intelligence that this environment is evaluating is clearly
limited to a certain level, and once this level is reached the results will not vary as happens in the Left range
for the RD property. Summarizing, this environment allows us to evaluate both competition and cooperation
which makes it a good environment to evaluate social intelligence, but this can only be evaluated until a certain
level of intelligence. Over this level, the results will not reflect the true intelligence, so the environment will not
be evaluating its actual value. As a result, the game is not valid for interesting levels of social intelligence.
Finally, this environment is not reliable for just one exercise. It has a high variability as only 6 iteration are
allowed and the space is small, so small changes in the first movements may have very different consequences.
With respect to its efficiency, we just need a few interactions to provide us a fast result for the evaluated agent,
which makes this environment efficient. This means that reliability can be obtained in reasonable time by the
repetition of many episodes.
The predator-prey gives us a more complex environment than previous environments. However, it can still
provide us a good environment to evaluate social intelligence if Πo is wisely chosen. But we must be careful,
since we could obtain a really poor environment if they are not properly selected. The results we have obtained
came from our choice to include the possibility to evaluate the agent also playing as the prey. A more classical
approach could have given us a different picture for this environment.
5.5 Pac-Man
Computer games are also used as mainstream environments to evaluate AI systems. One example of the use
of games for evaluating AI is the ALE (Arcade Learning Environment) [2], a framework where a set of arcade
computer games are used to evaluate the performance of current AI algorithms. Here, we will analyse Pac-Man,
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a simple and well known game, but still complex enough to the state of the art in AI, which uses a 2D maze.
The AI community has used this environment as a testbed in order to evaluate their algorithms (e.g., [57, 15]).
This game resembles a pursuit game, but this time the player represents the prey role (most of the time), so it
must avoid being caught by the enemies (represented by ghosts). In order to win, Pac-Man must also collect
all the pills that are present in the environment, which also provide some points. On the other hand, ghosts
are appearing in the environment one by one over time, and they win if at least one of them is able to chase
Pac-Man. If Pac-Man is able to reach certain locations in the environment and eat specific pills, it becomes
invulnerable for a short period of time, and receives additional points by chasing the ghosts. Figure 12 shows
a Pac-Man game screenshot.
Figure 12: A Pac-Man game screenshot. Pac-Man is represented by a yellow circle with a mouth, which
must avoid enemies represented by ghosts. Small pills represent the food that Pac-Man must collect, and big
pills change chasing agents’ roles for a limited period of time. Taken from http: // www. freepik. com/ with
permission.
From the huge diversity of possible situations that can occur in this environment, it is difficult to formally
analyse some of the properties as we did with previous environments. As long as the systems are more complex,
it becomes more difficult to determine their actual levels of cooperation and competition, and more effort is
needed to formalise them and find some Πe, wΠe and Πo to find the environment ranges. Instead, we will
analyse this environment in an informal way. As in previous environments we will assume uniform weights for
wL˙ and wS .
In figure 13 we show a summary with an estimation of the properties for Pac-Man.
When we start with the properties we see that this game is not bounded, since Pac-Man can obtain more
and more points (or rewards) as long as it continues surpassing levels. This makes that Υ will not be bounded
for this environment. Reframing the game by calculating an average of points by time as rewards in order to
make it bounded will change the goal of the game significantly.
Also, the game is not symmetric. On one hand, both teams do not have the same number of slots, which
makes the game not Total Inter-Team Symmetric. On the other hand, we could say that the environment is
Intra-Team Symmetric, since every ghost has the same probability to chase Pac-Man, but this is not exact, since
each ghost appears in different moments of the game, so swapping their behaviour could not provide exactly
the same results, making the environment not Intra-Team Symmetric.
The action dependency (AD) property seems to be as in previous environments. All agents have the possi-
bility to ignore the actions of the other agents or act according to what they did in previous interactions.
When we look at the reward dependency (RD) property, it could obtain some different values. Indeed, it
is too easy to chase Pac-Man if the four ghosts cooperate coherently, but a bad behaviour for the ghosts can
facilitate the game for Pac-Man. In addition, small differences in the behaviour of the agents can provide very
different results as, for example, a ghost passes near Pac-Man and decides to chase or to avoid it. This small
difference in behaviour will provide high differences in their results. Also, when a ghost is far from Pac-Man,
small differences in its behaviour will probably lead to similar results.
The fine discrimination (FD) property also has a huge range of values. As mentioned above, the behaviour
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Figure 13: Estimation of the social properties for the Pac-Man environment using uniform weights for wS and
wL˙, and ∆S(a, b) and ∆Q(a, b) return 1 if a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
of two different evaluated agents can both obtain the same or very different results, highly depending on the
behaviour of the other agents.
It seems difficult to know whether we can establish a grading between the evaluated agents in this environ-
ment. But we venture that the grading properties could be similar to the ones provided in the predator-prey
environment, since both environments have many similarities.
It is also difficult to provide a slot reward dependency, since rewards obtained by one team typically do
not reflect on the other team. For example, every point obtained by Pac-Man does not directly have influence
on the ghost team’s rewards, and chasing Pac-Man only prevents it from obtaining more points. But just
assuming that the rewards of each team are always different, we can obtain a value as we did in the SRD for
the predator-prey environment (which has a similar configuration) to obtain an approximated value, meaning
that the slot reward dependency is more focused on cooperation than competition.
If we look at the anticipation properties, it is possible that competitive anticipation does not have a huge
reflect on rewards, but still anticipating competitors will provide some good rewards. In cooperative anticipation,
it is possible that one ghost can do worse than a random agent, leading to really bad values in this case, but a
good anticipation can make chasing Pac-Man easier.
This game is not very reliable as it depends on many small details. Also, the game is not efficient. We
will need to run the game at least for dozens of iterations to get some stability in the agents’ expected average
rewards, since many of the first actions obtain the same rewards but the crucial part of the game comes when
the pills become scattered.
Finally, with this game we can both evaluate competition and cooperation. We can find competition, since
each team can only gain rewards by making the other team lose rewards. Additionally, in the ghost team
cooperation is also needed to properly chase Pac-Man. For this game, the selection of agents is crucial, a set of
predators with high level of intelligence can make Pac-Man efforts useless, which will always obtain bad results.
This makes the game somewhat valid, but only for lower levels of (social) intelligence if the selection of agents
is wisely chosen, but not for agents with high levels of (social) intelligence where the game becomes not valid.
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5.6 RoboCup Soccer
As an example of a 3D space game we find the RoboCup Soccer competition [38]. Here, two artificial multi-agent
systems (or teams) have to compete against each other in order to win a soccer match. The agents in each team
must cooperate to make the ball reach the adversary’s goal, while cooperate to avoid the adversary to score a
goal. The game follows the rules of a typical soccer match. Figure 14 shows a RoboCup Soccer match.
Figure 14: A standard RoboCup Soccer platform with robots playing a match. Used with permission from
http: // www. robocup2013. org/ , photograph by: Bart van Overbeeke.
As happens with the previous environment, this game has a huge diversity of possible situations that can
occur (including physical and virtual versions), which makes difficult to formally analyse it. Again, in such
complex scenario, it becomes more difficult to determine the levels of cooperation and competition. But also,
due to the high level of complexity of this game, teams tend to some specialisation, with each player focussing
on some specific aspects of the game instead of focusing on the problem in a general way. Again, we will analyse
this environment in an informal way. As in previous environments we will assume uniform weights for wL˙ and
wS .
As in the previous environment, in figure 15 we show a summary with an estimation of the social properties
for the RoboCup Soccer.
When we start with the properties we see that this game is bounded, since rewards (1 for win, 0 for a tie
and −1 for lose) are bounded. This makes that Υ will be bounded if weights are also bounded.
When we look at the symmetry property, both teams have the same number of slots and, if we ignore which
team starts with the possession of the ball on each half, it makes the environment Total Inter-Team Symmetric,
so both teams can swap their slots and the result will remain the same. But, if we want to swap the slots of
two players within the same team, they will not obtain the same results (as for example the goalkeeper has
different rules), so the environment is not Intra-Team Symmetric. Since for the symmetry condition we need
the environment to be both Total Inter-Team Symmetric and Intra-Team Symmetric, we can conclude that the
RoboCup Soccer is not symmetric.
The action dependency (AD) property is similar to previous environments. All the evaluated agents have
the possibility to act differently depending on the agents they encounter, but, at least, in this game an agent
can affect the actions of the evaluated agents. For example, one agent can knock the evaluated agent down to
the ground, so now it will only be able to stand up.
We now see the reward dependency (RD) property, which can have a huge range. A change in the line-up of
course can change the result of the match. Conversely, only changing one agent in the line-up can completely
change the match result to make a team lose. changing the agents’ rewards. And we can reason in the same
way for the fine discrimination (FD) property, since the behaviour of only one agent (the agent to be evaluated)
can also make its team to either win/lose the game, or obtain the same result.
It is not easy to determine if there exists some grading between the evaluated agents in the RoboCup Soccer.
Instead, we can take a look at some professional (human) Soccer leagues. It is not unusual to see situations
where two teams repeatedly tie, and a third team beats one of them while loses against the other one repeatedly.
This situation shows us that there is no strict grading between teams (and neither is between their players) for
this game.
The slot reward dependency is straightforward for this environment. We have two teams with five players
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Figure 15: Estimation of the social properties for the RoboCup Soccer using uniform weights for wS and wL˙,
and ∆S(a, b) and ∆Q(a, b) return 1 if a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
on each team. Every agent within a team will obtain the same reward, while the other agents within the other
team will obtain the opposite reward. Using a correlation function over these rewards and over all slots, we
obtain a slot reward dependency equal to 0.
If we look at the anticipation properties, correctly anticipating both competitive and cooperative can provide
a high advantage for each of the teams, so the team of the evaluated agent can score more goals and win the
game more easily. A bad competitive anticipation can lead the opponent to win the game, while a good one
can provide good results. In cooperative anticipation, the evaluated agent could play worse if it is not correctly
anticipating its teammate, but a good anticipation can provide them really good results.
Let us now consider the validity of this game. First, with this game we can both evaluate competition and
cooperation. We can find competition, since both teams must compete to win the game. Additionally, the
agents within each team can cooperate to mislead the other team and score more goals. Second, increasing the
social intelligence of the agents will typically increase the difficulty of the match, since more skilled agents will
score goals more easily, and also defend better, preventing the other team to score. This makes the game useful
to match a high variety of skill levels. But conversely, this game also evaluates some other skills than social
intelligence, such as for example, their ability to predict the movement that the ball will do when it is kicked. In
principle, there are reasons to consider this game a valid scenario to evaluate social intelligence. However, since
the agents will need more than their social intelligence in order to play the game, we think that an evaluation
using this kind of environment will not only evaluate social intelligence, but also other abilities such as motion
understanding. For this reason we consider this environment not valid to evaluate social intelligence.
This game is not reliable. In this game, it is widely known that two teams that are facing each other do not
necessarily obtain the same result in every match. This depends highly on the decisions made by the agents,
since a small decision change can lead to a very different result on the match. Also, the result of the game
depends on luck (at least for the physical version), since the players cannot always predict the correct movement
of the ball.
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5.7 Summary
So far, we have analysed some ranges of values that the properties presented in this paper can have for the five
environments we have selected. Next, let us group the environment properties by the different ranges in order
to make a comparison between the environments through their properties.
In figure 16 we see the General range of the quantitative properties for the five environments.
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Figure 16: General range for the quantitative properties of the five environments analysed in this paper using
uniform weights for wS and wL˙, and ∆S(a, b) and ∆Q(a, b) return 1 if a and b are equal and 0 otherwise. Lighter
bands mean that an estimation is given.
As we can see in the top part of figure 16, there are few differences with respect to this range for the
environments. In the first three properties all the environments have the broadest possible range. We only
see some difference for the grading properties in the last three environments. While the first two environments
have the broadest possible range, the last three environments seems that as long as the strict total grading gets
worse, the partial grading gets a better range. This is simply explained because agents in the same team obtain
the same rewards, so it is not possible to obtain a strict total ordering for them while it is still possible for
agents in different teams. Obviously, the agents in the same team always have a partial ordering, making this
range higher.
In the bottom part of figure 16 we can see more differences. In the slot reward dependency property we
can see the first big difference between the environments. The majority of the environments have a unique
(and usually different) value for this property. While the matching pennies is completely competitive, Pac-Man
is slightly more oriented to cooperation, and predator-prey and RoboCup Soccer are neutral (i.e., provides
both competition and cooperation to the same extent). But, prisoner’s dilemma is the only one that has the
broadest possible range instead of having a predetermined configuration, so this environment allows the agents
to dynamically cooperate and compete with agents in the other team depending on which actions they perform.
Finally we have the two anticipation properties. In both of them, the agents obtain better rewards when
43
they correctly anticipate, but their rewards get worse when they incorrectly anticipate.
In the competitive anticipation we see some small differences between the environments. While a correct
competitive anticipation provides good rewards, some environments usually provide much worse rewards when
incorrectly anticipating competitive agents, as we can see for the predator-prey and RoboCup Soccer. For the
cooperative anticipation we see another different picture. In this case two of the environments do not have this
property, since they do not provide teams where the agents will be able to cooperate. However, the last three
environments provide teams where cooperative anticipation can be useful between cooperative agents, and also
they (almost) provide the broadest range for this property.
It is much more interesting to see what happens with these environments if we make a bad selection of Πo.
In figure 17 we can see the Left ranges of the quantitative properties which range is between 0 and 1 for the
five environments.
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Figure 17: Left range for the quantitative properties which range is between 0 and 1 of the five environments
analysed in this paper using uniform weights for wS and wL˙, and ∆S(a, b) and ∆Q(a, b) return 1 if a and b are
equal and 0 otherwise. Lighter bands mean that an estimation is given.
We can see that both the action and reward dependency properties have the worst possible range for all the
environments. This means that a bad selection of Πo will be disastrous with respect to these properties. In
fact, this is not surprising, since Πo could be populated only with agents having the same exact behaviour, so
the evaluated agents will not be able to behave or obtain different rewards depending on which agents from Πo
they are interacting with.
For the fine discrimination property, we can see that (almost) all the environments have a very low range,
so the evaluated agents can hardly be discriminated.
The strict total grading property clearly gives us an order of their compliance for the environments. RoboCup
Soccer is clearly the worst environment, while predator-prey and Pac-Man follow it. Meanwhile, matching
pennies and prisoner’s dilemma cannot be restricted with any particular Πo, obtaining the best range for this
property.
Finally, the partial grading has different ranges for the environments. Predator-prey and Pac-Man have
the same range, and they also have a clearly better range than the RoboCup Soccer. Matching pennies and
prisoner’s dilemma have the broadest possible range. At this point, it is not clear which pair matching pennies
and prisoner’s dilemma, or predator-prey and Pac-Man has a better range. From one side, the range for
matching pennies and prisoner’s dilemma goes from 0 to 1, so the selection of Πo does not necessarily worsens
the property, but still it is possible to have a bad value. From the other side, the worst value for the predator-
prey and Pac-Man cannot be as bad as in matching pennies and prisoner’s dilemma. However, the selection of
Πo does worsen the values for this property.
Let us next see the effect that a good selection of Πo can have on some quantitative properties for the
environments. This is possibly the most interesting picture, because it gives us the best we can do with a right
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choice of Πo. In figure 18 we can see the Right ranges of the quantitative properties which range is between 0
and 1 for the five environments.
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Figure 18: Right range for the quantitative properties which range is between 0 and 1 of the five environments
analysed in this paper using uniform weights for wS and wL˙, and ∆S(a, b) and ∆Q(a, b) return 1 if a and b are
equal and 0 otherwise. Lighter bands mean that an estimation is given.
We can see that the action dependency and fine discrimination properties cannot improve much by selecting
an appropriate Πo. At least RoboCup Soccer can slightly restrict its action dependency range, which means
that even with the best possible choice of Πo we cannot ensure that there will be a high action dependency.
For the reward dependency property the ranges vary. Matching pennies and RoboCup Soccer cannot restrict
their respective ranges. Pac-Man can slightly restrict this range and predator-prey does not have a bad range, so
depending on which line-up pattern the evaluated agents encounter, they will certainly obtain some differences
in their expected average rewards. But prisoner’s dilemma can ace this property, making the expected average
rewards different for every evaluated agent depending on the line-up pattern they interact with.
For the strict total grading we find more differences. It is not clear which environment has a better range,
but at least we can say that RoboCup Soccer has the worst range among the five environments. However, it
is not as clear which of the other four environment has a better range. From one side, the range of matching
pennies and prisoners’ dilemma goes from 0 to 1, so the selection of Πo does not necessarily improve their
property, but still it is possible to have a good value. On the other hand, the best value for the predator-prey
and Pac-Man cannot be as good as in matching pennies and prisoner’s dilemma. However, the selection of Πo
does improve the values for this property.
Finally, the partial grading gives us more information about the orderings. RoboCup Soccer has improved
its range, but it is still worse than the predator-prey and Pac-Man, which now are clearly the best to obtain an
ordering. However matching pennies and prisoner’s dilemma cannot restrict this range, making them the worst
of the five environments.
Overall, the Right range is more informative. Note that the Πo that we use to calculate the values for each
environment’s property is not necessarily the same. We just obtain the values locally for each property. That
means that some points could not be achievable at the same time.
Lastly, in figure 19 we see a summary of the qualitative properties to obtain a practical test for the environ-
ments.
As we can see, almost all the environments have bounded rewards. This provides a bounded value for Υ. But
only the prisoner’s dilemma is symmetric, so in order to evaluate an agent in the other environments, we will need
to evaluate them in all the slots. With respect to the validity property, no environment is correctly evaluating
social intelligence. Some of them are not sufficiently general, as happens with the matching pennies or the
prisoners’ dilemma. We have the opposite situation with RoboCup Soccer, where more abilities are evaluated
and it seems difficult to isolate social intelligence from these other abilities. Finally, other environments can only
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Boundedness Symmetry Validity Reliability Efficiency
Matching Pennies     
Prisoner's Dilemma     
Predator-prey     
Pac-Man     
RoboCup Soccer     
Figure 19: Qualitative properties of the five environments analysed in this paper.
evaluate the social intelligence to a certain degree, as happens in the predator-prey or Pac-Man. With respect
to the reliable property, the prisoners’ dilemma can evaluate every level of performance with a good result, but
we cannot say the same for the rest of the environments. In matching pennies every agent interacting against
a random agent will obtain the same result independently of their intelligence, while the rest of environments
will not be able to provide a correct value for this property over certain level of intelligence. Lastly, due to its
simplicity, matching pennies, prisoners’ dilemma and predator-prey are really efficient to provide a result for
the agents, but the rest of environments will need to run the game during several iterations and episodes to
converge to their results.
From this analysis and comparison between the properties of the environments we made in this section, we
can provide some insights. First, we give some findings about the five environments.
• As we have seen in our analysis, these environments are typically covering anticipation well. Competitive
anticipation is well covered in all the environments, while cooperative anticipation is not defined for the
first two environments, but the last three are covering it very well. It also seems that the partial grading
is generally well covered, so we can find some partial orderings between the evaluated agents.
• We can find some other properties that the environments are not covering well. One example is the
action dependency, where (almost) every environment analysed in this paper obtained the same poor
ranges. This property is something which is not usually thought about when designing an environment,
but the possibility of having influence on the actions that other players can do is an interesting thing
to consider when designing a multi-agent environment and, in particular, if we want to evaluate social
intelligence. Another property which is not usually well covered is the slot reward dependency, where these
environments are typically only giving one value. We do not mean that the environments do not have good
values, but instead, an environment having a broader range of values will provide us a more interesting
scenario, where the relations of competition and cooperation between agents can change dynamically.
• As we can see from their qualitative properties, four of the five environments we selected have some
difficulties to be used as a practical test. None of them provides symmetry to simplify the evaluation.
The range of abilities required to succeed in these environments are not appropriate to be a valid test to
evaluate social intelligence accurately, as well as their reliability is compromised depending on the agents
we use to populate the environment. At least some of them are efficient enough to obtain results in a
short period of time, and they usually provide bounded rewards, so we can calculate a bounded value of
the (social) intelligence of the agents.
• With these properties, we obtained different ranges of General, Left and Right for each of the five
environments. In addition, we could see that some little changes over the definition of an environment
(as occurs with the matching pennies and prisoner’s dilemma) are clearly reflected with these properties.
In fact, every kind of environment will have particular ranges of values for these properties, with which
we will be able to select the (social) environment(s) that best fits our goals (e.g., select an environment
focused on anticipating other agents).
• As we have seen, a good selection of Πo is crucial in order to obtain appropriate social environments.
But, how could we provide a Πo which is appropriate to evaluate the social ability of an agent in a large
number of environments? This is a difficult task. When starting the evaluation, since the intelligence of
the evaluated agent is not known, it would be appropriate to use one Πo which agents are not too smart
during the first environments. As long as the evaluation goes ahead and the intelligence of the evaluee is
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better known, it would be better to use another Πo whose agents are conforming to this level of intelligence.
In order to solve this problem, we could provide a unique Πo and use some kind of distribution which is
continuously evolving, giving more probability to the agents which are obtaining better results on these
environments (e.g., as in the spirit of the Darwin-Wallace distribution [18]).
From the previous analysis we can now distinguish the features of the environments that could be reused for
the design of better environments to measure social intelligence more effectively. The first environment we
saw is matching pennies, but it does not seem to have any particular useful feature from the properties we
analysed. Next we saw the prisoner’s dilemma environment, which is similar to the matching pennies with some
little modifications. This prisoner’s dilemma offers some nice features to include in a social intelligence test.
First, we notice its capability to dynamically change the relation between the slots, providing a competitive
and cooperative environment at the same time depending on the agents’ actions. Second, the evaluated agent
can obtain drastically different results when it interacts with very different agents from Πo. And third, the
symmetry of the payoff matrix, its reliability and efficiency makes this environment a good candidate to provide
a simple test. The third environment was the predator-prey. This is the first environment that we analysed
providing several agents in (at least) one team. From this team of agents, it is possible to anticipate cooperative
agents in such a way that really good performance can be achieved when it is done correctly, and an incorrect
anticipation can provide really bad rewards. The same occurs while anticipating competitive agents, but in this
case, both teams can anticipate the agents in the other team. Also, we can obtain good partial gradings for the
evaluated agents and it is a really efficient game, providing a result in a short period of time. However, Pac-Man
and RoboCup Soccer do not provide significant features beyond those provided by predator-prey. At least, in
RoboCup Soccer it is possible to exert a slight influence on other agents’ actions, but only to some extent.
Conversely, we also distinguish those features that we do not want to appear in environments for social
intelligent tests. The first feature we distinguish is that none of these environments are valid to evaluate
social intelligence since they are evaluating: 1) more abilities than necessary, as in RoboCup Soccer where the
agents need their motion understanding to play the game, 2) not enough abilities, as in matching pennies and
prisoner’s dilemma where the agents cannot cooperate with agents in the same team, or 3) is only valid for
lower levels of intelligence, as in predator-prey and Pac-Man where the predators and ghost can easily chase
the prey and Pac-Man respectively once they reach a certain level of (social) intelligence. Also, the majority of
the environments do not provide a reliable result due to many reasons. For example, the results of the agents
can be easily restricted to always obtain the same results (as occurs in matching pennies by using a random
agent). Also, little changes in the behaviour of the agents can create a butterfly effect, making the agents to
obtain very different results (as occurs in the last three environments). Also, the environments are typically
not symmetric, which will force to evaluate the agents in all slots, and complex environments usually need a
lot of iterations to provide a “reliable” result. In these five environments, it is weird (if not impossible) to find
a situation where an agent can directly influence on which actions are available for one (or more) of the other
agents. The capability to directly influence on the available actions of the rest of agents could provide us a
richer social environment. Also, some environments (matching pennies and prisoner’s dilemma) are not suitable
to let the agents anticipate cooperation within a team, since they do not provide the agents a team of agents
to cooperate with them. Finally, when we see in more detail some environments, we notice that predator-prey
and Pac-Man provide a really difficult/hostile environment, where the predators and ghosts respectively have
an enormous advantage to win the game.
Even if it is not the goal of this paper (but a future work), we consider that a good environment measuring
social intelligence would have (at least) these characteristics: 1) It provides two or more teams to interact with,
and two or more agents on each team. By having this, the agents will be able to compete against the other
team(s), cooperate with the agents within the same team and, in the case where more than two teams are
presented in the environment, cooperate with other teams. This will provide anticipation to the environment,
so the agents will be able to competitive and cooperative anticipate other agents. 2) The agents should influence
in some way the rewards obtained by the other agents, providing reward dependency to the environment. 3)
There should be limited rewards that the agents can obtain and the payoff of the agents will only depend on the
actions they perform. This will provide us a bounded and symmetric environment, which will be ideal to create
a practical test. 4) There should not be easy equilibria in the environment. If such circumstance occurs, most
of the agents (the intelligent ones) will always perform the same actions, which will limit the results obtained
by the agents. Avoiding easy equilibria will provide to the environment more discriminative power, reward
dependency and grading for the agents. 5) The environment should provide different kind of spaces where the
agents can move. This will avoid the agents to specialise to a particular space. This will make the environment
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more valid to evaluate (social) intelligence in a more broader way. 6) The agents must be able to influence in
some extent the actions that the other agents can perform, creating richer social situations and providing some
action dependency to the environment.
Finally, what can we say about the properties? Are they sufficient to characterise any environment? How
should they be used? Are the plots useful? Is the Left and Right ranges more meaningful than the General
ranges? Some insights below.
• With these properties we are able to obtain different values for each environment. This gives us some idea
about the strengths and weakness of each environment.
• Here, we only evaluated one agent from a set of evaluated agents Πe interacting with a set of opponents and
team players Πo. But more specialised properties (and even a definition of social collective intelligence)
can be easily extended by, for example, dividing the set of agents Πo into two sets (i.e., one for opponent
players and one for team players) or, instead of evaluating the agents in isolation, evaluating together a
group (or collective) of agents.
• There are also other issues which may not be covered on these properties, as for example communication
among teammates. They do not provide information about misleading opponents, or the possibility of
the agents to influence the actions of other agents on its benefit. Also, the properties do not show us the
contribution of the agents to their teams’ rewards, as well as the impact that their inclusion in the line-up
has in the results of the other teams.
• We proposed some useful properties to measure the appropriateness of the environments to evaluate social
intelligence, which are also useful to characterise these environments. These properties provide us some
interesting information about the environments such as the fine and coarse discrimination, which give
us a measure of their discriminative power. Other interesting properties are the action, reward and slot
reward dependency, giving us an idea about the existing dependency between the actions/rewards of the
agents, and which relation between the slots is given more importance in the environment (i.e., it is a
more competitive- or cooperative-oriented environment), and if this relation is static or can change during
the evaluation.
• We used the Left and Right ranges in order to compare for each property how a particular good or bad
selection of Πo can affect that property in an environment. Conversely, a real test shall provide a unique
Πo to evaluate the agents, obtaining a unique range for each property. This selection of Πo will (most
probably) make the properties to barely look like the Left or Right ranges we calculated for this five
environments, providing instead more varied ranges. Therefore, a comparison between some testbeds with
their Πo fixed will give us a more clear idea about their differences.
6 Conclusions and Future work
Social intelligence has been an important area of study in psychology, comparative cognition and economics for
more than a century, and more recently, in artificial intelligence. However, despite the fact that other tests have
been created to evaluate other cognitive abilities, nowadays it is still difficult to find a proper test to evaluate
social intelligence. Also, current tests tend to be focussed on evaluating the ability of a single species and it is
even more complicated to find a test to evaluate social intelligence that is applicable to machines. In fact, tests
designed to succeed on a task that requires social intelligence usually also require other abilities to succeed in
the task, making them not appropriate for this purpose. This lack of general socially-oriented tests may be due
to the absence of a precise (and formal) definition of social intelligence.
In this paper we formalise a definition of social intelligence and some useful social properties for multi-agent
environments. In particular, the contributions are:
• We analysed what social behaviour implies, reviewing what it means from several disciplines.
• We have considered various options for a definition, and we finally proposed a parametrised definition that
formalises the notion of performing well in an environment with other (social) agents. We also indicate
how a test can be constructed using this definition.
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• We proposed some properties along with their formal definitions in order to better analyse the appropri-
ateness of an environment to evaluate social intelligence.
• With this definition of social intelligence and the properties proposed, we analysed and compared several
tests and games from artificial intelligence and game theory where social intelligence has an important
role to see which properties they meet and which can be improved in order to evaluate social intelligence.
This definition of social intelligence along with the properties proposed here are a first attempt in order to
determine whether a testbed is useful for the assessment of social intelligence. As far as we know, this is the
first approximation to provide a formal definition of social intelligence along with some useful properties to judge
a certain testbed. More research will provide us more information about which properties can be improved and
information about other properties to complement the ones presented here.
The characterisation of social intelligence proposed here along with the properties we propose to determine
whether an environment is useful to evaluate social intelligence has some open features to be solved.
• First, it is not clear which utility function the agents must have. Should they be regulated using a discount
factor as usual in reinforcement learning? Should we give more importance to later rewards, when the
agents are supposed to understand how to behave? Or is it better to use an average (as we did in this
paper), giving the same importance to all the rewards?
• Second, every test should provide which level of complexity it is evaluating. We postulated that the level
of complexity should be determined by the agents included in the environment (and their intelligence), the
agent setting that determines how teams are formed and the environment where the agent is evaluated.
We determined how the first two parameters should influence the formula, but without indicating the
formula itself. Should the level of intelligence of the agents weight more than the agent setting, or should
it be otherwise? How can we consider the environment in this formula?
• Third, we noticed that every space used to define an environment necessarily evaluates some spatial
intelligence. In theory, we should calculate which part of the result comes from spatial intelligence and
subtract it, but this seems very difficult. Alternatively, we could figure out an environment class where
no other abilities needed to interact will be really useful. Or at least with a wide variety such that, on
average, these other abilities do not bias the result.
• Fourth, we could also relax the definition of social intelligence by letting the agents cooperate without
placing them in a team. Life has taught us that alliances can arise from several agents, even when they
do not share the same objectives, to improve the chances of success. It would be interesting to analyse
whether a test evaluating only competition can indirectly evaluate this spontaneous cooperation.
• Fifth, social intelligence is linked to communication and language. We have not included any property
or feature in the definitions to account for the presence of communication and language, or to facilitate
that. Clearly, communication is possible through actions. Even language can be transmitted by the agent
actions with a proper coding. However, this could be rendered more easily to agents. Nonetheless, any
particular communication protocol can make the test non-universal. Instead we think that some extra
actions that could be observed immediately by other agents (or by a subset of them) could be basic enough
as a signal.
This article goes beyond the simple properties of game theory in many ways, opening a number of possibilities
for the evaluation of multi-agent environments. Of course, further research is needed to clarify all these ques-
tions. We have set some formal principles and made the difficulties arise. In fact, the evaluation of non-social
intelligence itself has not been fully achieved and it is still being investigated. The evaluation of social intel-
ligence is still more convoluted. This article provides the basis of how we can evaluate social intelligence in a
formal way following these principles.
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Appendix
Before starting with each of the environments, we will prove a lemma that will be helpful for the Left and
Right ranges.
We could calculate Left and Right using Πe and Πo with a high number of agents. However, the more
agents we include the more difficult the calculation becomes. Instead of this, and in order to simplify calcula-
tions, we can just use the minimum necessary number of agents in Πe and Πo for that property to obtain the
maximum/minimum value following the idea on lemma 1:
Lemma 1. In order to calculate Left/Right maximum/minimum value for a property Prop, the length of the
set of evaluated agents |Πe| and the length of the set of opponents and team players |Πo| can be respectively
equal to the minimum number of evaluated agents n and agents to populate the environment m needed to
calculate Prop.
Proof. Let Πe = {π1, . . . , πn, . . . , πp} be the set of agents evaluated with weight wΠe in an environment µ with
weight of slots wS using a set of opponents and team players Πo and wL˙ as a weight for line-up patterns.
Let us suppose that we want to calculate the value for a property Prop which needs n evaluated agents to
be defined, its definition calculates first the value for each evaluated agent π and then these values are weighted
using wΠe(π) to provide the property value. Following this definition we obtain a list of values (v1, . . . , vn, . . . , vp)
(one for each evaluated agent) that will be weighted with wΠe to obtain the property value v. If we get rid of
the evaluated agent which obtains the maximum value for Prop and we rearrange wΠe to sum 1, then the new
property value v′ will always be lower than v. We can repeat this process until n agents remain in Πe (i.e.,
|Πe| = n) to obtain vmin for this set of evaluated agents. An analogous process applies to obtaining vmax by
getting rid of the evaluated agent which obtains the minimum value for Prop.
The same reasoning applies to the properties that calculate the values for pairs of evaluated agents, but
in this case we get rid of the agent whose sum of values (the values of the pairs where this agent is used) is
highest/lowest. Also, the same reasoning applies for Πo.
A Matching Pennies properties
In this section we prove how we obtained the values for the properties for the matching pennies environment
(section 5.2). To calculate some of the values for the properties, we make use of lemma 2.
Lemma 2. In the matching pennies environment and for any slot, introducing a random agent πr in a line-up
will always provide an expected average reward equal to 0 for both agents.
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Proof. A random agent πr has a probability of p
j
r,h = p
j
r,t =
1
2 to perform both Head and Tail at iteration j.
Let us denote with πs the agent that πr is interacting with, and denote with p
1
s,h the probability of performing
Head and p1s,t = 1− p1s,h the probability of performing Tail at the first iteration for πs.
To calculate the expected reward of an agent, we sum the possible rewards that this agent can obtain
multiplied by the probability that these rewards occurs. When we calculate the expected reward for πr for the
first iteration in the matching pennies environment µ in any slot i, we obtain:
∀i : R1i (πr, µ) = p1r,h
(
p1s,h × r1h,h,i + p1s,t × r1h,t,i
)
+ p1r,t
(
p1s,h × r1t,h,i + p1s,t × r1t,t,i
)
where rja1,a2,i is the reward that the agent in slot i obtains at iteration j when one agent performs a1 and the
other agent performs a2.
From the matching pennies’ payoff matrix (figure 4), we can see that for every slot i, rh,h,i = rt,t,i and
rh,t,i = rt,h,i, so we name them re,i and rd,i respectively. We can also see that the reward values are the inverse
of each other, having rd,i = −re,i. Renaming the rewards in the formula and rearranging it we obtain:
∀i : R1i (πr, µ) = p1r,h
(
p1s,h × re,i + p1s,t × rd,i
)
+ p1r,t
(
p1s,h × rd,i + p1s,t × re,i
)
=
= p1r,h
(
p1s,h × re,i + p1s,t × (−re,i)
)
+ p1r,t
(
p1s,h × (−re,i) + p1s,t × re,i
)
=
= p1r,h
(
re,i ×
(
p1s,h − p1s,t
))
+ p1r,t
(
(−re,i)×
(
p1s,h − p1s,t
))
=
= p1r,h
(
re,i ×
(
p1s,h − p1s,t
))− p1r,t (re,i × (p1s,h − p1s,t)) =
=
(
p1r,h − p1r,t
)× (re,i × (p1s,h − p1s,t))
And since πr gives the same probability to both Head and Tail (p
1
r,h = p
1
r,t =
1
2 ) we obtain the following
expected reward:
∀i : R1i (πr, µ) =
(
1
2
− 1
2
)
× (re,i × (p1s,h − p1s,t)) = 0
We calculated the expected reward for the first iteration. At this point πs could change its behaviour
depending on what happened on the previous iteration, using different probabilities p2s,h and p
2
s,t for iteration 2.
But note that it does not matter which probabilities pns,h and p
n
s,t we use, the result will still be 0, and averaging
over the iterations we obtain an expected average reward equal to 0. Obviously, since this is a zero-sum game,
when πr obtains an expected average reward of 0, πs obtains the same expected average reward of 0.
A.1 Action Dependency
We start with the action dependency (AD) property. As given in section 4.2.1, we want to know if the evaluated
agents behave differently depending on which line-up they interact with. We use ∆S(a, b) = 1 if distributions
a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 2. Generalmin for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πt} with wΠe(πt) = 1 and Πo = {πh1, πh2} (a
πh agent always performs Head and a πt agent always performs Tail).
Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 13, we could calculate its AD
value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly
definition 12. We start with slot 1:
AD1(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πt]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πt])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆S(A˘1(µ[πt, πh1]), A˘1(µ[πt, πh2]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆S(a, b) and ∆S(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆S(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
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In this case, we only need to calculate ∆S(A˘1(µ[πt, πh1 ]), A˘1(µ[πt, πh2 ])), where the agent in both slots 1
(πt) will perform the same sequence of actions (always Tail) independently of the line-up. So:
AD1(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And for slot 2, the agent in both slots 2 (πt) will also perform the same sequence of actions (always Tail)
independently of the line-up. So:
AD2(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← πt]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← πt])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆S(A˘2(µ[πh1, πt]), A˘2(µ[πh2, πt])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
2
{AD1(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD2(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the action dependency property, therefore matching pennies has
Generalmin = 0 for this property.
Proposition 3. Generalmax for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 1 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πm} with wΠe(πm) = 1 and Πo = {πh, πt} (a
πm agent first acts randomly and then always mimics the other agent’s last action, a πh agent always performs
Head and a πt agent always performs Tail).
Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 13, we could calculate its AD
value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly
definition 12. We start with slot 1:
AD1(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πm]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πm])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆S(A˘1(µ[πm, πh]), A˘1(µ[πm, πt]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆S(a, b) and ∆S(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆S(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
From iteration 2, πm will mimic the last action of the agent in slot 2, and since πh will always perform Head
and πt will always perform Tail, the agent in both slots 1 (πm) will perform different sequences of actions on
each line-up. So:
AD1(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
And for slot 2, the agent in both slots 2 (πm) will also perform different sequences of actions on each line-up.
So:
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AD2(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← πm]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← πm])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆S(A˘2(µ[πh, πm]), A˘2(µ[πt, πm])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
2
{AD1(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD2(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{1 + 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the action dependency property, therefore matching pennies has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 4. Leftmax for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πo = {πh1, πh2} (a πh agent always performs Head) we find this
situation no matter which pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we use.
Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πe and wΠe are instantiated
with any permitted values). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for
every slot. Following definition 13, we can calculate its AD value for each slot. We start with slot 1:
AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 12 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π from
Πe:
AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← π]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← π])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆S(A˘1(µ[π, πh1]), A˘1(µ[π, πh2]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆S(a, b) and ∆S(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆S(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
A πh agent will always perform Head, so we obtain a situation where the agent in both slots 1 (any π) will
be able to differentiate with which agent is interacting, so it will not be able to change its distribution of action
sequences depending on the opponent’s behaviour. So:
AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And for slot 2:
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AD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)AD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate AD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for
all evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 12 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π
from Πe:
AD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← π]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← π])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆S(A˘2(µ[πh1, π]), A˘2(µ[πh2, π]))
Again, a πh agent will always perform Head, so we obtain a situation where the agent in both slots 2 (any
π) will be able to differentiate with which agent is interacting, so it will not be able to change its distribution
of action sequences depending on the opponent’s behaviour. So:
AD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
AD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
2
{AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
So, for every pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we obtain the same result:
∀Πe, wΠe : AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, matching pennies has Leftmax = 0 for this property.
Proposition 5. Rightmin for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πh} with wΠe(πh) = 1 (a πh agent always performs Head) we
find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every slot.
Following definition 13, we could calculate its AD value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its
weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly definition 12. We start with slot 1:
AD1(πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πh]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πh]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain two different line-up patterns
u˙ and v˙ from L˙
N(µ)
−1 (Πo) to calculate ∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πh]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πh])). We calculate this value for two
figurative line-up patterns u˙ = (∗, π1) and v˙ = (∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo):
∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πh]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πh])) = ∆S(A˘1(µ[πh, π1]), A˘1(µ[πh, π2]))
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Here, the agent in both slots 1 (πh) will perform the same sequence of actions (always Head) independently
of the line-up. So no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
AD1(πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And for slot 2:
AD2(πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← πh]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← πh]))
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain two different line-up
patterns u˙ and v˙ from L˙
N(µ)
−2 (Πo) to calculate ∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← πh]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← πh])). We calculate this value for
two figurative line-up patterns u˙ = (∗, π1) and v˙ = (∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo):
∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← πh]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← πh])) = ∆S(A˘2(µ[π1, πh]), A˘2(µ[π2, πh]))
Again, the agent in both slots 2 (πh) will perform the same sequence of actions (always Head) independently
of the line-up. So no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
AD2(πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
2
{AD1(πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD2(πh,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, matching pennies has Rightmin = 0 for this property.
A.2 Reward Dependency
We continue with the reward dependency (RD) property. As given in section 4.3.1, we want to know if the
evaluated agents obtain different expected average rewards depending on which line-up they interact with. We
use ∆Q(a, b) = 1 if numbers a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 6. Generalmin for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πt} with wΠe(πt) = 1 and Πo = {πh1, πh2} (a
πh agent always performs Head and a πt agent always performs Tail).
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 16, we could calculate its RD
value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly
definition 15. We start with slot 1:
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RD1(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← πt]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← πt])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆Q(R1(µ[πt, πh1]), R1(µ[πt, πh2]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆Q(a, b) and ∆Q(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆Q(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate ∆Q(R1(µ[πt, πh1]), R1(µ[πt, πh2])), where πt will always perform Tail
and a πh agent will always perform Head, so the agent in both slots 1 (πt) will obtain the same expected average
reward (−1) independently of the line-up. So:
RD1(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And for slot 2, the agent in both slots 2 (πt) will also obtain the same expected average reward (1) indepen-
dently of the line-up. So:
RD2(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R2(µ[u˙
2← πt]), R2(µ[v˙ 2← πt])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆Q(R2(µ[πh1, πt]), R2(µ[πh2, πt])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
2
{RD1(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD2(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the reward dependency property, therefore matching pennies has
Generalmin = 0 for this property.
Proposition 7. Generalmax for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to 1 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πt} with wΠe(πt) = 1 and Πo = {πh, πt} (a
πh agent always performs Head and a πt agent always performs Tail).
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 16, we could calculate its RD
value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly
definition 15. We start with slot 1:
RD1(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← πt]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← πt])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆Q(R1(µ[πt, πh]), R1(µ[πt, πt]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆Q(a, b) and ∆Q(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆Q(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
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In line-up (πt, πh), where πt will always perform Tail and πh will always perform Head, the agent in slot 1
(πt) will obtain one expected average reward (−1), while in line-up (πt, πt), where both πt will always perform
Tail, the agent in slot 1 (πt) will obtain a different expected average reward (1). So:
RD1(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
And for slot 2, the agent in slot 2 (πt) will also obtain different expected average rewards depending on the
line-up. So:
RD2(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R2(µ[u˙
2← πt]), R2(µ[v˙ 2← πt])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆Q(R2(µ[πh, πt]), R2(µ[πt, πt]))
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
2
{RD1(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD2(πt,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{1 + 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the reward dependency property, therefore matching pennies has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 8. Leftmax for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πo = {πh1, πh2} (a πh agent always performs Head) we find this
situation no matter which pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we use.
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πe and wΠe are instantiated
with any permitted values). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for
every slot. Following definition 16, we can calculate its RD value for each slot. We start with slot 1:
RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 15 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π from
Πe:
RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← π]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← π])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆Q(R1(µ[π, πh1]), R1(µ[π, πh2]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆Q(a, b) and ∆Q(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆Q(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
A πh agent will always perform Head, so we obtain a situation where the agent in both slots 1 (any π) will
be able to differentiate with which agent is interacting, so it will not be able to change its distribution of action
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sequences depending on the opponent’s behaviour, obtaining agent in both slots 1 (any π) the same expected
average reward. So:
RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And for slot 2:
RD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)RD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate RD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for
all evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 15 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π
from Πe:
RD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R2(µ[u˙
2← π]), R2(µ[v˙ 2← π])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆Q(R2(µ[πh1, π]), R2(µ[πh2, π]))
Again, a πh agent will always perform Head, so we obtain a situation where the agent in both slots 2 (any
π) will be able to differentiate with which agent is interacting, so it will not be able to change its distribution
of action sequences depending on the opponent’s behaviour, obtaining agent in both slots 2 (any π) the same
expected average reward. So:
RD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
RD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
2
{RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
So, for every pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we obtain the same result:
∀Πe, wΠe : RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, matching pennies has Leftmax = 0 for this property.
Proposition 9. Rightmin for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πr} with wΠe(πr) = 1 (a πr agent always acts randomly) we
find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every slot.
Following definition 16, we could calculate its RD value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its
weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly definition 15. We start with slot 1:
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RD1(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← πr]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← πr]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain two different line-up patterns u˙
and v˙ from L˙
N(µ)
−1 (Πo) to calculate ∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← πr]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← πr])). We calculate this value for two figurative
line-up patterns u˙ = (∗, π1) and v˙ = (∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo):
∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← πr]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← πr])) = ∆Q(R1(µ[πr, π1]), R1(µ[πr, π2]))
Here, the agent in both slots 1 (πr) makes its expected average reward equal to its opponent expected
average reward (both have an expected average reward of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So no matter which agents
are in Πo we obtain:
RD1(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And for slot 2:
RD2(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R2(µ[u˙
2← πr]), R2(µ[v˙ 2← πr]))
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain two different line-up
patterns u˙ and v˙ from L˙
N(µ)
−2 (Πo) to calculate ∆Q(R2(µ[u˙
2← πr]), R2(µ[v˙ 2← πr])). We calculate this value for
two figurative line-up patterns u˙ = (∗, π1) and v˙ = (∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo):
∆Q(R2(µ[u˙
2← πr]), R2(µ[v˙ 2← πr])) = ∆Q(R2(µ[π1, πr]), R2(µ[π2, πr]))
Again, the agent in both slots 2 (πr) makes its expected average reward equal to its opponent expected
average reward (both have an expected average reward of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So no matter which agents
are in Πo we obtain:
RD2(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
2
{RD1(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD2(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, matching pennies has Rightmin = 0 for this property.
A.3 Fine Discrimination
Now we move to the fine discrimination (FD) property. As given in section 4.4.1, we want to know if different
evaluated agents obtain different expected average rewards when interacting in the environment. We use
∆Q(a, b) = 1 if numbers a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
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Proposition 10. Generalmin for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πt1, πt2} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = {πh} (a πh agent always performs Head and a πt agent always performs Tail).
Following definition 23, we obtain the FD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 22, we can calculate its FD value
for each slot. We start with slot 1:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD1(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate both FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and FDi(π2, π1,Πo, wL˙, µ)} since they provide
the same result, by calculating only FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate FD1(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this
value:
FD1(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πt1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πt2])) =
= ∆Q(R1(µ[πt1, πh]), R1(µ[πt2, πh]))
Here, a πt agent will always perform Tail and πh will always perform Head, so both agents in slot 1 (πt1
and πt2) will obtain the same expected average reward (−1). So:
FD1(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And for slot 2:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD2(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate FD2(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this
value:
FD2(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← πt1]), R2(µ[l˙ 2← πt2])) =
= ∆Q(R2(µ[πh, πt1]), R2(µ[πh, πt2]))
Here, πh will always perform Head and a πt agent will always perform Tail, so both agents in slot 2 (πt1
and πt2) will obtain the same expected average reward (1). So:
FD2(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
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FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
2
{FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the fine discriminative property, therefore matching pennies has
Generalmin = 0 for this property.
Proposition 11. Generalmax for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 1 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πh, πt} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = {πh} (a πh agent always performs Head and a πt agent always performs Tail).
Following definition 23, we obtain the FD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 22, we can calculate its FD value
for each slot. We start with slot 1:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD1(πh, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate both FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and FDi(π2, π1,Πo, wL˙, µ)} since they provide
the same result, by calculating only FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate FD1(πh, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this value:
FD1(πh, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πh]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πt])) =
= ∆Q(R1(µ[πh, πh]), R1(µ[πt, πh]))
In line-up (πh, πh), where both πh will always perform Head, the agent in slot 1 (πh) will obtain one expected
average reward (1), while in line-up (πt, πh), where πt will always perform Tail and πh will always perform Head,
the agent in slot 1 (πt) will obtain a different expected average reward (−1). So:
FD1(πh, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
And for slot 2:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD2(πh, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate FD2(πh, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this value:
FD2(πh, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← πh]), R2(µ[l˙ 2← πt])) =
= ∆Q(R2(µ[πh, πh]), R2(µ[πh, πt]))
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In line-up (πh, πh), where both πh will always perform Head, the agent in slot 2 (πh) will obtain one expected
average reward (−1), while in line-up (πh, πt), where πh will always perform Head and πt will always perform
Head, the agent in slot 2 (πt) will obtain a different expected average reward (1). So:
FD2(πh, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
2
{FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{1 + 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the fine discriminative property, therefore matching pennies has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 12. Leftmax for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πo = {πr} (a πr agent always acts randomly) we find this situation
no matter which pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we use.
Following definition 23, we obtain the FD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πe and wΠe are instantiated
with any permitted values). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for
every slot. Following definition 22, we can calculate its FD value for each slot. We start with slot 1:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
pair of evaluated agents π1, π2 ∈ Πe|π1 ̸= π2. We follow definition 21 to calculate this value for two figurative
evaluated agents π1 and π2 from Πe such that π1 ̸= π2:
FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← π2])) =
= ∆Q(R1(µ[π1, πr]), R1(µ[π2, πr]))
Here, the agent in both slots 2 (πr) makes its expected average reward equal to its opponent expected
average reward (both have an expected average reward of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So no matter which agents
π1 and π2 are we obtain:
FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And for slot 2:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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Again, we do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
for all pair of evaluated agents π1, π2 ∈ Πe|π1 ̸= π2. We follow definition 21 to calculate this value for two
figurative evaluated agents π1 and π2 from Πe such that π1 ̸= π2:
FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 2← π2])) =
= ∆Q(R2(µ[πr, π1]), R2(µ[πr, π2]))
Again, the agent in both slots 1 (πr) makes its expected average reward equal to its opponent expected
average reward (both have an expected average reward of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So no matter which agents
π1 and π2 are we obtain:
FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
=
1
2
{FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
So, for every pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we obtain the same result:
∀Πe, wΠe : FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, matching pennies has Leftmax = 0 for this property.
Proposition 13. Rightmin for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πt1, πt2} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πt agent always
performs Tail) we find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 23, we obtain the FD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted values). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every slot.
Following definition 22, we can calculate its FD value for each slot. We start with slot 1:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD1(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate both FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and FDi(π2, π1,Πo, wL˙, µ)} since they provide
the same result, by calculating only FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate FD1(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this
value:
FD1(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πt1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πt2]))
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We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1 (Πo) to calculate ∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πt1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πt2])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π) from L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo):
∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πt1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πt2])) = ∆Q(R1(µ[πt1, π]), R1(µ[πt2, π]))
A πt agent will always perform Tail, so we obtain a situation where the agent in both slots 2 (any π) will
be able to differentiate with which agent is interacting, so it will not be able to change its distribution of
action sequences depending on the opponent’s behaviour, obtaining both agents in slot 1 (πt1 and πt2) the same
expected average reward. So:
FD1(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And for slot 2:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD2(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate FD2(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this
value:
FD2(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← πt1]), R2(µ[l˙ 2← πt2]))
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−2 (Πo) to calculate ∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← πt1]), R2(µ[l˙ 2← πt2])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo):
∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← πt1]), R2(µ[l˙ 2← πt2])) = ∆Q(R2(µ[π, πt1]), R2(µ[π, πt2]))
Again, a πt agent will always perform Tail, so we obtain a situation where the agent in both slots 1 (any
π) will be able to differentiate with which agent is interacting, so it will not be able to change its distribution
of action sequences depending on the opponent’s behaviour, obtaining both agents in slot 2 (πt1 and πt2) the
same expected average reward. So:
FD2(πt1, πt2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
=
1
2
{FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
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∀Πo : FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, matching pennies has Rightmin = 0 for this property.
A.4 Strict Total Grading
We arrive to the strict total grading (STG) property. As given in section 4.4.2, we want to know if there exists
a strict ordering between the evaluated agents when interacting in the environment.
To simplify the notation, we use the next table to represent the STO: Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π1, π2]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π2]),
Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π2, π3]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π2, π3]) and Ri(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]).
Slot i Slot j
π1 < π2
π2 < π3
π1 < π3
Proposition 14. Generalmin for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πr1, πr2, πr3} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = ∅ (a πr agent always acts randomly).
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not
symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots. Following definition 28, we can calculate
its STG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πr1, πr2, πr3.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πr1 < πr2 πr1 < πr3 πr2 < πr1
πr2 < πr3 πr3 < πr2 πr1 < πr3
πr1 < πr3 πr1 < πr2 πr2 < πr3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πr2 < πr3 πr3 < πr1 πr3 < πr2
πr3 < πr1 πr1 < πr2 πr2 < πr1
πr2 < πr1 πr3 < πr2 πr3 < πr1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation we have at least one random agent making
its expected average reward equal to its opponent expected average reward (both have an expected average
reward of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So:
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STG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And for slots 2 and 1:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate STG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate this
value:
STG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3, l˙, µ) =
= STO2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,1 for all the permutations of πr1, πr2, πr3.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πr1 < πr2 πr1 < πr3 πr2 < πr1
πr2 < πr3 πr3 < πr2 πr1 < πr3
πr1 < πr3 πr1 < πr2 πr2 < πr3
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πr2 < πr3 πr3 < πr1 πr3 < πr2
πr3 < πr1 πr1 < πr2 πr2 < πr1
πr2 < πr1 πr3 < πr2 πr3 < πr1
Again, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation we have at least one random agent
making its expected average reward equal to its opponent expected average reward (both have an expected
average reward of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So:
STG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the strict total grading property, therefore matching pennies has
Generalmin = 0 for this property.
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Proposition 15. Generalmax for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to 1 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πh, πh/t, πm/o} with uniform weight for wΠe
and Πo = ∅ (a πh agent always performs Head, a πh/t agent always performs Head when playing in slot 1 and
always performs Tail when playing in slot 2, and a πm/o agent always mimics the last action of its opponent
when playing in slot 1 and always performs the opposite of this action when playing in slot 2)11.
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not
symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots. Following definition 28, we can calculate
its STG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πh, πh/t, πm/o.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πh < πh/t πh < πm/o πh/t < πh
πh/t < πm/o πm/o < πh/t πh < πm/o
πh < πm/o πh < πh/t πh/t < πm/o
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πh/t < πm/o πm/o < πh πm/o < πh/t
πm/o < πh πh < πh/t πh/t < πh
πh/t < πh πm/o < πh/t πm/o < πh
It is possible to find a STO for the first permutation. In πh < πh/t, πh will always perform Head and
πh/t will always perform Tail, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In
πh/t < πm/o, πh/t will always perform Head and πm/o will always perform Tail, so they will obtain an expected
average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In πh < πm/o, πh will always perform Head and πm/o will always
perform Tail, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. So:
STG1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And for slots 2 and 1:
11πh/t and πm/o have to know in which slot they are playing. To infer this, they start with a random action at the first iteration
and then look at the action of their opponent and the reward they obtain.
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STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate STG2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate this
value:
STG2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o, l˙, µ) =
= STO2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,1 for all the permutations of πh, πh/t, πm/o.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πh < πh/t πh < πm/o πh/t < πh
πh/t < πm/o πm/o < πh/t πh < πm/o
πh < πm/o πh < πh/t πh/t < πm/o
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πh/t < πm/o πm/o < πh πm/o < πh/t
πm/o < πh πh < πh/t πh/t < πh
πh/t < πh πm/o < πh/t πm/o < πh
Again, it is possible to find a STO for the first permutation. In πh < πh/t, πh will always perform Head
and πh/t will always perform Head, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In
πh/t < πm/o, πh/t will always perform Tail and πm/o will always perform Tail, so they will obtain an expected
average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In πh < πm/o, πh will always perform Head and πm/o will always
perform Head, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. So:
STG2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{1 + 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the strict total grading property, therefore matching pennies has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 16. Leftmax for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to 1 for the matching pennies
environment.
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Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πe = {πh, πh/t, πm/o} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πh agent always
performs Head, a πh/t agent always performs Head when playing in slot 1 and always performs Tail when
playing in slot 2, and a πm/o agent always mimics the last action of its opponent when playing in slot 1 and
always performs the opposite of this action when playing in slot 2)12 we find this situation no matter which Πo
we use.
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of
slots. Following definition 28, we can calculate its STG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of STG1,2.
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πh, πh/t, πm/o.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πh < πh/t πh < πm/o πh/t < πh
πh/t < πm/o πm/o < πh/t πh < πm/o
πh < πm/o πh < πh/t πh/t < πm/o
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πh/t < πm/o πm/o < πh πm/o < πh/t
πm/o < πh πh < πh/t πh/t < πh
πh/t < πh πm/o < πh/t πm/o < πh
It is possible to find a STO for the first permutation. In πh < πh/t, πh will always perform Head and
πh/t will always perform Tail, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In
πh/t < πm/o, πh/t will always perform Head and πm/o will always perform Tail, so they will obtain an expected
average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In πh < πm/o, πh will always perform Head and πm/o will always
perform Tail, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. So:
STG1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And for slots 2 and 1:
12πh/t and πm/o have to know in which slot they are playing. To infer this, they start with a random action at the first iteration
and then look at the action of their opponent and the reward they obtain.
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STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate STG2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate this
value:
STG2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o, l˙, µ) =
= STO2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note again that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of STG2,1.
The following table shows us STO2,1 for all the permutations of πh, πh/t, πm/o.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πh < πh/t πh < πm/o πh/t < πh
πh/t < πm/o πm/o < πh/t πh < πm/o
πh < πm/o πh < πh/t πh/t < πm/o
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πh/t < πm/o πm/o < πh πm/o < πh/t
πm/o < πh πh < πh/t πh/t < πh
πh/t < πh πm/o < πh/t πm/o < πh
Again, it is possible to find a STO for the first permutation. In πh < πh/t, πh will always perform Head
and πh/t will always perform Head, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In
πh/t < πm/o, πh/t will always perform Tail and πm/o will always perform Tail, so they will obtain an expected
average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In πh < πm/o, πh will always perform Head and πm/o will always
perform Head, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. So:
STG2,1(πh, πh/t, πm/o,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{1 + 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the strict total grading property and no Πo is able to influence this
result, therefore matching pennies has Leftmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 17. Rightmin for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
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Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πr1, πr2, πr3} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πr agent always
acts randomly) we find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of
slots. Following definition 28, we can calculate its STG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of STG1,2.
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πr1, πr2, πr3.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πr1 < πr2 πr1 < πr3 πr2 < πr1
πr2 < πr3 πr3 < πr2 πr1 < πr3
πr1 < πr3 πr1 < πr2 πr2 < πr3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πr2 < πr3 πr3 < πr1 πr3 < πr2
πr3 < πr1 πr1 < πr2 πr2 < πr1
πr2 < πr1 πr3 < πr2 πr3 < πr1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation we have at least one random agent making
its expected average reward equal to its opponent expected average reward (both have an expected average
reward of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So:
STG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And for slots 2 and 1:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate STG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate this
value:
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STG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3, l˙, µ) =
= STO2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note again that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of STG2,1.
The following table shows us STO2,1 for all the permutations of πr1, πr2, πr3.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πr1 < πr2 πr1 < πr3 πr2 < πr1
πr2 < πr3 πr3 < πr2 πr1 < πr3
πr1 < πr3 πr1 < πr2 πr2 < πr3
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πr2 < πr3 πr3 < πr1 πr3 < πr2
πr3 < πr1 πr1 < πr2 πr2 < πr1
πr2 < πr1 πr3 < πr2 πr3 < πr1
Again, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation we have at least one random agent
making its expected average reward equal to its opponent expected average reward (both have an expected
average reward of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So:
STG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the strict total grading property and no Πo is able to influence this
result, therefore matching pennies has Rightmin = 0 for this property.
A.5 Partial Grading
Now we arrive to the partial grading (PG) property. As given in section 4.4.2, we want to know if there exists
a partial ordering between the evaluated agents when interacting in the environment.
To simplify the notation, we use the next table to represent the PO: Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π1, π2]) ≤ Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π2]),
Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π2, π3]) ≤ Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π2, π3]) and Ri(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]) ≤ Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]).
Slot i Slot j
π1 ≤ π2
π2 ≤ π3
π1 ≤ π3
75
Proposition 18. Generalmin for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πh1, πh2, πt} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = ∅ (a πh agent always performs Head and a πt agent always performs Tail).
Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not symmet-
ric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots. Following definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate
its PG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,2(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(πh1, πh2, πt, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,2(πh1, πh2, πt, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of πh1, πh2, πt.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πh1 ≤ πh2 πh1 ≤ πt πh2 ≤ πh1
πh2 ≤ πt πt ≤ πh2 πh1 ≤ πt
πh1 ≤ πt πh1 ≤ πh2 πh2 ≤ πt
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πh2 ≤ πt πt ≤ πh1 πt ≤ πh2
πt ≤ πh1 πh1 ≤ πh2 πh2 ≤ πh1
πh2 ≤ πh1 πt ≤ πh2 πt ≤ πh1
But, it is not possible to find a PO, since for every permutation we have either πh1 ≤ πh2 or πh2 ≤ πh1. In
both cases, a πh agent will always perform Head, so they will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1
respectively. So:
PG1,2(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And for slots 2 and 1:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,1(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate PG2,1(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to calculate
this value:
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PG2,1(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,1(πh1, πh2, πt, l˙, µ) =
= PO2,1(πh1, πh2, πt, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,1 for all the permutations of πh1, πh2, πt.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πh1 ≤ πh2 πh1 ≤ πt πh2 ≤ πh1
πh2 ≤ πt πt ≤ πh2 πh1 ≤ πt
πh1 ≤ πt πh1 ≤ πh2 πh2 ≤ πt
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πh2 ≤ πt πt ≤ πh1 πt ≤ πh2
πt ≤ πh1 πh1 ≤ πh2 πh2 ≤ πh1
πh2 ≤ πh1 πt ≤ πh2 πt ≤ πh1
Again, it is not possible to find a PO, since for every permutation we have either πh1 ≤ πt or πt ≤ πh1.
In πh1 ≤ πt, πh1 will always perform Head and πt will always perform Tail, so they will obtain an expected
average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. In πt ≤ πh1, πt will always perform Tail and πh1 will always perform
Head, so they will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. So:
PG2,1(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the partial grading property, therefore matching pennies hasGeneralmin =
0 for this property.
Proposition 19. Generalmax for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to 1 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πr1, πr2, πr3} with uniform weight for wΠe
and Πo = ∅ (a πr agent always acts randomly).
Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not symmet-
ric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots. Following definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate
its PG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of πr1, πr2, πr3.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πr1 ≤ πr2 πr1 ≤ πr3 πr2 ≤ πr1
πr2 ≤ πr3 πr3 ≤ πr2 πr1 ≤ πr3
πr1 ≤ πr3 πr1 ≤ πr2 πr2 ≤ πr3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πr2 ≤ πr3 πr3 ≤ πr1 πr3 ≤ πr2
πr3 ≤ πr1 πr1 ≤ πr2 πr2 ≤ πr1
πr2 ≤ πr1 πr3 ≤ πr2 πr3 ≤ πr1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we have at least one random agent making its
expected average reward equal to its opponent expected average reward (both have an expected average reward
of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So:
PG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And for slots 2 and 1:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate PG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to calculate
this value:
PG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3, l˙, µ) =
= PO2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,1 for all the permutations of πr1, πr2, πr3.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πr1 ≤ πr2 πr1 ≤ πr3 πr2 ≤ πr1
πr2 ≤ πr3 πr3 ≤ πr2 πr1 ≤ πr3
πr1 ≤ πr3 πr1 ≤ πr2 πr2 ≤ πr3
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πr2 ≤ πr3 πr3 ≤ πr1 πr3 ≤ πr2
πr3 ≤ πr1 πr1 ≤ πr2 πr2 ≤ πr1
πr2 ≤ πr1 πr3 ≤ πr2 πr3 ≤ πr1
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Again, it is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we have at least one random agent making its
expected average reward equal to its opponent expected average reward (both have an expected average reward
of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So:
PG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{1 + 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the partial grading property, therefore matching pennies has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 20. Leftmax for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to 1 for the matching pennies envi-
ronment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πe = {πr1, πr2, πr3} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πr agent always
acts randomly) we find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of
slots. Following definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate its PG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots
1 and 2:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(πh, πh/t, πm/o, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of PG1,2.
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of πr1, πr2, πr3.
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Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πr1 ≤ πr2 πr1 ≤ πr3 πr2 ≤ πr1
πr2 ≤ πr3 πr3 ≤ πr2 πr1 ≤ πr3
πr1 ≤ πr3 πr1 ≤ πr2 πr2 ≤ πr3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πr2 ≤ πr3 πr3 ≤ πr1 πr3 ≤ πr2
πr3 ≤ πr1 πr1 ≤ πr2 πr2 ≤ πr1
πr2 ≤ πr1 πr3 ≤ πr2 πr3 ≤ πr1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we have at least one random agent making its
expected average reward equal to its opponent expected average reward (both have an expected average reward
of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So:
PG1,2(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And for slots 2 and 1:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate PG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to calculate
this value:
PG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3, l˙, µ) =
= PO2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note again that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of PG2,1.
The following table shows us PO2,1 for all the permutations of πr1, πr2, πr3.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πr1 ≤ πr2 πr1 ≤ πr3 πr2 ≤ πr1
πr2 ≤ πr3 πr3 ≤ πr2 πr1 ≤ πr3
πr1 ≤ πr3 πr1 ≤ πr2 πr2 ≤ πr3
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πr2 ≤ πr3 πr3 ≤ πr1 πr3 ≤ πr2
πr3 ≤ πr1 πr1 ≤ πr2 πr2 ≤ πr1
πr2 ≤ πr1 πr3 ≤ πr2 πr3 ≤ πr1
Again, it is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we have at least one random agent making its
expected average reward equal to its opponent expected average reward (both have an expected average reward
of 0 as proved in lemma 2). So:
PG2,1(πr1, πr2, πr3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
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PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{1 + 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the partial grading property and no Πo is able to influence this
result, therefore matching pennies has Leftmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 21. Rightmin for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to 0 for the matching pennies
environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πh1, πh2, πt} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πh agent always
perform Head and a πt agent always perform Tail) we find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of
slots. Following definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate its PG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots
1 and 2:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,2(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(πh1, πh2, πt, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,2(πh1, πh2, πt, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of PG1,2.
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of πh1, πh2, πt.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πh1 ≤ πh2 πh1 ≤ πt πh2 ≤ πh1
πh2 ≤ πt πt ≤ πh2 πh1 ≤ πt
πh1 ≤ πt πh1 ≤ πh2 πh2 ≤ πt
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πh2 ≤ πt πt ≤ πh1 πt ≤ πh2
πt ≤ πh1 πh1 ≤ πh2 πh2 ≤ πh1
πh2 ≤ πh1 πt ≤ πh2 πt ≤ πh1
But, it is not possible to find a PO, since for every permutation we have either πh1 ≤ πh2 or πh2 ≤ πh1. In
both cases, πh will always perform Head, so they will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively.
So:
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PG1,2(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And for slots 2 and 1:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,1(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate PG2,1(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to calculate
this value:
PG2,1(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,1(πh1, πh2, πt, l˙, µ) =
= PO2,1(πh1, πh2, πt, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note again that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of PG2,1.
The following table shows us PO2,1 for all the permutations of πh1, πh2, πt.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πh1 ≤ πh2 πh1 ≤ πt πh2 ≤ πh1
πh2 ≤ πt πt ≤ πh2 πh1 ≤ πt
πh1 ≤ πt πh1 ≤ πh2 πh2 ≤ πt
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πh2 ≤ πt πt ≤ πh1 πt ≤ πh2
πt ≤ πh1 πh1 ≤ πh2 πh2 ≤ πh1
πh2 ≤ πh1 πt ≤ πh2 πt ≤ πh1
Again, it is not possible to find a PO, since for every permutation we have either πh1 ≤ πt or πt ≤ πh1.
In πh1 ≤ πt, πh1 will always perform Head and πt will always perform Tail, so they will obtain an expected
average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. In πt ≤ πh1, πt will always perform Tail and πh1 will always perform
Head, so they will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. So:
PG2,1(πh1, πh2, πt,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{0 + 0} = 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the partial grading property and no Πo is able to influence this result,
therefore matching pennies has Rightmin = 0 for this property.
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A.6 Slot Reward Dependency
Next we see the slot reward dependency (SRD) property. As given in section 4.3.2, we want to know how much
competitive or cooperative the environment is.
Proposition 22. General range for the slot reward dependency (SRD) property is equal to [−1,−1] for the
matching pennies environment.
Proof. Following definition 20, we obtain the SRD value for any ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πe, wΠe and Πo are
instantiated with any permitted values). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this
property for every pair of slots. Following definition 19, we can calculate its SRD value for each pair of slots.
We start with slots 1 and 2:
SRD1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD1,2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD1,2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD1,2(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 1← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1 (Πo) to calculate corr(R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 1← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo):
corr(R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 1← π1])) = corr(R1(µ[π1, π2]), R2(µ[π1, π2]))
This game is a zero-sum game with two agents. That means that, in every game, the sum of both agents’
rewards will always be zero, or in other words, when the agent in slot 1 (any π1) obtains a reward r the agent in
slot 2 (any π2) obtains −r as reward, and this relation is propagated to expected average rewards as well. Since
we use a correlation function between the expected average rewards, and the agents in slots 1 and 2 always
obtain opposite expected average reward, then the correlation function will always obtain the same value13 of
−1. So:
SRD1,2(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
Therefore:
SRD1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
And for slots 2 and 1:
SRD2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD2,1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD2,1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
for all evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent
π1 from Πe:
SRD2,1(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 2← π1]))
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−2 (Πo) to calculate corr(R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 2← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo):
corr(R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 2← π1])) = corr(R2(µ[π2, π1]), R1(µ[π2, π1]))
13Provided there is at least one game which is not a tie.
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Again, this game is a zero-sum game with two agents. That means that, in every game, the sum of both
agents’ rewards will always be zero, or in other words, when the agent in slot 2 (any π1) obtains a reward r the
agent in slot 1 (any π2) obtains −r as reward, and this relation is propagated to expected average rewards as
well. Since we use a correlation function between the expected average rewards, and the agents in slots 2 and
1 always obtain opposite expected average reward, then the correlation function will always obtain the same
value of −1. So:
SRD2,1(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
Therefore:
SRD2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
SRD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)SRDi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)SRDi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{SRD1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + SRD2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{−1 + (−1)} = −1
So, for every trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ we obtain the same result:
∀Πe, wΠe ,Πo : SRD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = −1
Therefore, matching pennies has General = [−1,−1] for this property.
A.7 Competitive Anticipation
Finally, we follow with the competitive anticipation (AComp) property. As given in section 4.5.1, we want to
know how much benefit the evaluated agents obtain when they anticipate competing agents.
Proposition 23. Generalmin for the competitive anticipation (AComp) property is equal to − 12 for the match-
ing pennies environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πt/h} with wΠe(πt/h) = 1 and Πo = {πh} (a πh
agent always performs Head and a πt/h agent always performs Tail when playing in slot 1 and always performs
Head when playing in slot 2)14.
Following definition 33, we obtain the AComp value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not
symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots in different teams. Following definition 32,
we could calculate its AComp value for each pair of slots but, since Πe has only one agent, its weight is equal
to 1 and Πo also has only one agent, it is equivalent to use directly definition 31. We start with slots 1 and 2:
AComp1,2(πt/h, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R1(µ[l˙
1,2← πt/h, πh])−R1(µ[l˙ 1,2← πt/h, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R1(µ[πt/h, πh])−R1(µ[πt/h, πr])
)
14πt/h has to know in which slot it is playing. To infer this, it starts with a random action at the first iteration and then look
at the action of its opponent and the reward it obtains.
84
We know from lemma 2 that R1(µ[πt/h, πr]) = 0, so we only need to calculate R1(µ[πt/h, πh]), where πt/h
will always perform Tail and πh will always perform Head, so the agent in slot 1 (πt/h) will obtain an expected
average reward of −1. So:
AComp1,2(πt/h, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
((−1)− 0) = −1
2
Note that this is the minimum possible value for AComp1,2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) since R1(µ[π1, πr]) will always be
equal to 0 for this environment.
And for slots 2 and 1:
AComp2,1(πt/h, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R2(µ[l˙
2,1← πt/h, πh])−R2(µ[l˙ 2,1← πt/h, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R2(µ[πh, πt/h])−R2(µ[πr, πt/h])
)
Again, we know from lemma 2 that R2(µ[πr, πt/h]) = 0, so we only need to calculate R2(µ[πh, πt/h]), where
πh and πt/h will always perform Head, so the agent in slot 2 (πt/h) will obtain an expected average reward of
−1. So:
AComp2,1(πt/h, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
((−1)− 0) = −1
2
Note again that this is the minimum possible value for AComp2,1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) since R2(µ[πr, π1]) will
always be equal to 0 for this environment.
And finally, we weight over the slots:
AComp(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS22
∑
t1,t2∈τ |t1 ̸=t2
∑
i∈t1
wS(i, µ)
∑
j∈t2
wS(j, µ)ACompi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{AComp1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{AComp1,2(πt/h, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp2,1(πt/h, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{
−1
2
+
(
−1
2
)}
= −1
2
Since − 12 is the lowest possible value that we can obtain for the competitive anticipation property, therefore
matching pennies has Generalmin = − 12 for this property.
Proposition 24. Generalmax for the competitive anticipation (AComp) property is equal to
1
2 for the matching
pennies environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πh/t} with wΠe(πh/t) = 1 and Πo = {πh}
(a πh agent always performs Head and a πh/t agent always performs Head when playing in slot 1 and always
performs Tail when playing in slot 2)15.
Following definition 33, we obtain the AComp value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not
symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots in different teams. Following definition 32,
we could calculate its AComp value for each pair of slots but, since Πe has only one agent, its weight is equal
to 1 and Πo also has only one agent, it is equivalent to use directly definition 31. We start with slots 1 and 2:
AComp1,2(πh/t, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R1(µ[l˙
1,2← πh/t, πh])−R1(µ[l˙ 1,2← πh/t, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R1(µ[πh/t, πh])−R1(µ[πh/t, πr])
)
15πh/t has to know in which slot it is playing. To infer this, it starts with a random action at the first iteration and then look
at the action of its opponent and the reward it obtains.
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We know from lemma 2 that R1(µ[πh/t, πr]) = 0, so we only need to calculate R1(µ[πh/t, πh]), where πh/t
and πh will always perform Head, so the agent in slot 1 (πh/t) will obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
AComp1,2(πh/t, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
(1− 0) = 1
2
Note that this is the maximum possible value for AComp1,2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) since R1(µ[π1, πr]) will always be
equal to 0 for this environment.
And for slots 2 and 1:
AComp2,1(πh/t, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R2(µ[l˙
2,1← πh/t, πh])−R2(µ[l˙ 2,1← πh/t, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R2(µ[πh, πh/t])−R2(µ[πr, πh/t])
)
Again, we know from lemma 2 that R2(µ[πr, πh/t]) = 0, so we only need to calculate R2(µ[πh, πh/t]), where
πh will always perform Head and πh/t will always perform Tail, so the agent in slot 2 (πh/t) will obtain an
expected average reward of 1. So:
AComp2,1(πh/t, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
(1− 0) = 1
2
Note again that this is the maximum possible value for AComp2,1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) since R2(µ[πr, π1]) will
always be equal to 0 for this environment.
And finally, we weight over the slots:
AComp(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS22
∑
t1,t2∈τ |t1 ̸=t2
∑
i∈t1
wS(i, µ)
∑
j∈t2
wS(j, µ)ACompi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{AComp1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{AComp1,2(πh/t, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp2,1(πh/t, πh,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
2
1
1
2
1
2
{
1
2
+
1
2
}
=
1
2
Since 12 is the highest possible value that we can obtain for the competitive anticipation property, therefore
matching pennies has Generalmax =
1
2 for this property.
B Prisoner’s Dilemma properties
In this section we prove how we obtained the values for the properties for the prisoner’s dilemma environment
(section 5.3).
B.1 Action Dependency
We start with the action dependency (AD) property. As given in section 4.2.1, we want to know if the evaluated
agents behave differently depending on which line-up they interact with. We use ∆S(a, b) = 1 if distributions
a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 25. Generalmin for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πb} with wΠe(πb) = 1 and Πo = {πc1, πc2} (a
πc agent always performs Cooperate and a πb agent always performs Blame).
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Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one slot and generalise its result to all slots. Following definition 13,
we could calculate its AD value for slot 1 but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is
equivalent to use directly definition 12 for slot 1:
AD1(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πb]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πb])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆S(A˘1(µ[πb, πc1]), A˘1(µ[πb, πc2]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆S(a, b) and ∆S(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆S(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate ∆S(A˘1(µ[πb, πc1 ]), A˘1(µ[πb, πc2 ])), where the agent in both slots 1
(πb) will perform the same sequence of actions (always Blame) independently of the line-up. So:
AD1(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And finally, generalising for all slots:
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= AD1(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the action dependency property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma has
Generalmin = 0 for this property.
Proposition 26. Generalmax for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 1 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πm} with wΠe(πm) = 1 and Πo = {πc, πb} (a
πm agent first acts randomly and then always mimics the other agent’s last action, a πc agent always performs
Cooperate and a πb agent always performs Blame).
Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one slot and generalise its result to all slots. Following definition 13,
we could calculate its AD value for slot 1 but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is
equivalent to use directly definition 12 for slot 1:
AD1(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πm]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πm])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆S(A˘1(µ[πm, πc]), A˘1(µ[πm, πb]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆S(a, b) and ∆S(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆S(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
From iteration 2, πm will mimic the last action of the agent in slot 2, and since πc will always perform
Cooperate and πb will always perform Blame, the agent in both slots 1 (πm) will perform different sequences of
actions on each line-up. So:
AD1(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
And finally, generalising for all slots:
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AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= AD1(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the action dependency property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 27. Leftmax for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πo = {πc1, πc2} (a πc agent always performs Cooperate) we find this
situation no matter which pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we use.
Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πe and wΠe are instantiated
with any permitted values). Since the environment is symmetric, we just need to calculate this property for one
slot and generalise its result to all slots. Following definition 13, we can calculate its AD value for slot 1:
AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 12 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π from
Πe:
AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← π]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← π])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆S(A˘1(µ[π, πc1]), A˘1(µ[π, πc2]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆S(a, b) and ∆S(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆S(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
A πc agent will always perform Cooperate, so we obtain a situation where the agent in both slots 1 (any π)
will be able to differentiate with which agent is interacting, so it will not be able to change its distribution of
action sequences depending on the opponent’s behaviour. So:
AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, generalising for all slots:
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 0
So, for every pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we obtain the same result:
∀Πe, wΠe : AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, prisoner’s dilemma has Leftmax = 0 for this property.
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Proposition 28. Rightmin for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πc} with wΠe(πc) = 1 (a πc agent always performs Cooperate)
we find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is symmetric, we just need to calculate this property for one slot and
generalise its result to all slots. Following definition 13, we could calculate its AD value for slot 1 but, since Πe
has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly definition 12 for slot 1:
AD1(πc,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πc]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πc]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain two different line-up patterns u˙
and v˙ from L˙
N(µ)
−1 (Πo) to calculate ∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πc]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πc])). We calculate this value for two figurative
line-up patterns u˙ = (∗, π1) and v˙ = (∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo):
∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πc]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πc])) = ∆S(A˘1(µ[πc, π1]), A˘1(µ[πc, π2]))
Here, the agent in both slots 1 (πc) will perform the same sequence of actions (always Cooperate) indepen-
dently of the line-up. So no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
AD1(πc,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, generalising for all slots:
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= AD1(πc,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 0
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, prisoner’s dilemma has Rightmin = 0 for this property.
B.2 Reward Dependency
We continue with the reward dependency (RD) property. As given in section 4.3.1, we want to know if the
evaluated agents obtain different expected average rewards depending on which line-up they interact with. We
use ∆Q(a, b) = 1 if numbers a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 29. Generalmin for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πb} with wΠe(πb) = 1 and Πo = {πc1, πc2} (a
πc agent always performs Cooperate and a πb agent always performs Blame).
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one slot and generalise its result to all slots. Following definition 16,
we could calculate its RD value for slot 1 but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is
equivalent to use directly definition 15 for slot 1:
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RD1(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← πb]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← πb])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆Q(R1(µ[πb, πc1]), R1(µ[πb, πc2]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆Q(a, b) and ∆Q(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆Q(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate ∆Q(R1(µ[πb, πc1]), R1(µ[πb, πc2])), where πb will always perform Blame
and πc will always perform Cooperate, so the agent in both slots 1 (πb) will obtain the same expected average
reward (1) independently of the line-up. So:
RD1(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And finally, generalising for all slots:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= RD1(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the reward dependency property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma has
Generalmin = 0 for this property.
Proposition 30. Generalmax for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to 1 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πb} with wΠe(πb) = 1 and Πo = {πc, πb} (a
πc agent always performs Cooperate and a πb agent always performs Blame).
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one slot and generalise its result to all slots. Following definition 16,
we could calculate its RD value for slot 1 but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is
equivalent to use directly definition 15 for slot 1:
RD1(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← πb]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← πb])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆Q(R1(µ[πb, πc]), R1(µ[πb, πb]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆Q(a, b) and ∆Q(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆Q(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
In line-up (πb, πc), where πb will always perform Blame and πc will always perform Cooperate, the agent
in slot 1 (πb) will obtain one expected average reward (1), while in line-up (πb, πb), where both πb will always
perform Blame, the agent in slot 1 (πb) will obtain a different expected average reward (− 13 ). So:
RD1(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
And finally, generalising for all slots:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= RD1(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 1
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Since 1 is the highest possible value for the reward dependency property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 31. Leftmax for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πo = {πc1, πc2} (a πc agent always performs Cooperate) we find this
situation no matter which pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we use.
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πe and wΠe are instantiated
with any permitted values). Since the environment is symmetric, we just need to calculate this property for one
slot and generalise its result to all slots. Following definition 16, we can calculate its RD value for slot 1:
RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 15 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π from
Πe:
RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← π]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← π])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆Q(R1(µ[π, πc1]), R1(µ[π, πc2]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆Q(a, b) and ∆Q(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆Q(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
A πc agent will always perform Cooperate, so we obtain a situation where the agent in both slots 1 (any
π) will be able to differentiate with which agent is interacting, so it will not be able to change its distribution
of action sequences depending on the opponent’s behaviour, obtaining agent in both slots 1 (any π) the same
expected average reward. So:
RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, generalising for all slots:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 0
So, for every pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we obtain the same result:
∀Πe, wΠe : RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, prisoner’s dilemma has Leftmax = 0 for this property.
Proposition 32. Rightmin for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to 1 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
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Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πo = {πc, πb} (a πc agent always performs Cooperate and a πb agent
always performs Blame) we find this situation no matter which pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we use.
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πe and wΠe are instantiated
with any permitted values). Since the environment is symmetric, we just need to calculate this property for one
slot and generalise its result to all slots. Following definition 16, we can calculate its RD value for slot 1:
RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 15 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π from
Πe:
RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← π]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← π])) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
∆Q(R1(µ[π, πc]), R1(µ[π, πb]))
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆Q(a, b) and ∆Q(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆Q(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2. From the matching pennies’ payoff matrix (figure 4)
In line-up (π, πc), where πc will always perform Cooperate, the agent in slot 1 (π) will obtain an expected
average reward between 13 and 1, while in line-up (π, πb), where πb will always perform Blame, the agent in slot
1 (π) will obtain another expected average reward between −1 and − 13 . So:
RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
And finally, generalising for all slots:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 1
So, for every pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we obtain the same result:
∀Πe, wΠe : RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 1
Therefore, prisoner’s dilemma has Rightmin = 1 for this property.
B.3 Fine Discrimination
Now we move to the fine discrimination (FD) property. As given in section 4.4.1, we want to know if different
evaluated agents obtain different expected average rewards when interacting in the environment. We use
∆Q(a, b) = 1 if numbers a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 33. Generalmin for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πb1, πb2} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = {πc} (a πc agent always performs Cooperate and a πb agent always performs Blame).
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Following definition 23, we obtain the FD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one slot and generalise its result to all slots. Following definition 22,
we can calculate its FD value for slot 1:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD1(πb1, πb2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate both FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and FDi(π2, π1,Πo, wL˙, µ)} since they provide
the same result, by calculating only FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate FD1(πb1, πb2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this
value:
FD1(πb1, πb2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πb1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πb2])) =
= ∆Q(R1(µ[πb1, πc]), R1(µ[πb2, πc]))
Here, a πb agent will always perform Blame and πc will always perform Cooperate, so both agents in slot 1
(πb1 and πb2) will obtain the same expected average reward (1). So:
FD1(πb1, πb2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And finally, generalising for all slots:
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the fine discriminative property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma has
Generalmin = 0 for this property.
Proposition 34. Generalmax for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 1 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πc, πb} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = {πc} (a πc agent always performs Cooperate and a πb agent always performs Blame).
Following definition 23, we obtain the FD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one slot and generalise its result to all slots. Following definition 22,
we can calculate its FD value for slot 1:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD1(πc, πb,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate both FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and FDi(π2, π1,Πo, wL˙, µ)} since they provide
the same result, by calculating only FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate FD1(πc, πb,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this value:
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FD1(πc, πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πc]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πb])) =
= ∆Q(R1(µ[πc, πc]), R1(µ[πb, πc]))
In line-up (πc, πc), where both πc will always perform Cooperate, the agent in slot 1 (πc) will obtain one
expected average reward ( 13 ), while in line-up (πb, πc), where πb will always perform Blame and πc will always
perform Cooperate, the agent in slot 1 (πb) will obtain a different expected average reward (1). So:
FD1(πc, πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
And finally, generalising for all slots:
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the fine discriminative property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Conjecture 1. Leftmax for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
An agent π ∈ Πo can force every evaluated agent to obtain an expected average reward equal to 0 (in the
limit). The procedure is simple. While the evaluated agent has an expected average reward lower/greater than
0, π performs Cooperate/Blame forcing the evaluated agent to increase/decrease its expected average reward.
If this procedure is repeated indefinitely, the expected average reward of any evaluated agent will tend to 0. So:
∀π1, π2∃Πo : FD(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, prisoner’s dilemma has Leftmax = 0 for this property.
Proposition 35. Rightmin for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πb1, πb2} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πb agent always
performs Blame) we find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 23, we obtain the FD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted values). Since the environment is symmetric, we just need to calculate this property for one slot and
generalise its result to all slots. Following definition 22, we can calculate its FD value for slot 1:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD1(πb1, πb2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate both FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and FDi(π2, π1,Πo, wL˙, µ)} since they provide
the same result, by calculating only FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate FD1(πb1, πb2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this
value:
FD1(πb1, πb2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πb1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πb2]))
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We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1 (Πo) to calculate ∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πb1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πb2])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π) from L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo):
∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πb1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πb2])) = ∆Q(R1(µ[πb1, π]), R1(µ[πb2, π]))
A πb agent will always perform Blame, so we obtain a situation where the agent in both slots 2 (any π)
will be able to differentiate with which agent is interacting, so it will not be able to change its distribution of
action sequences depending on the opponent’s behaviour, obtaining both agents in slot 1 (πb1 and πb2) the same
expected average reward. So:
FD1(πb1, πb2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And finally, generalising for all slots:
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
= FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
= 0
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, prisoner’s dilemma has Rightmin = 0 for this property.
B.4 Strict Total Grading
We arrive to the strict total grading (STG) property. As given in section 4.4.2, we want to know if there exists
a strict ordering between the evaluated agents when interacting in the environment.
To simplify the notation, we use the next table to represent the STO: Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π1, π2]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π2]),
Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π2, π3]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π2, π3]) and Ri(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]).
Slot i Slot j
π1 < π2
π2 < π3
π1 < π3
Proposition 36. Generalmin for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πb1, πb2, πb3} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = ∅ (a πb agent always performs Blame).
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one pair of slots and generalise its result to all pair of slots. Following
definition 28, we can calculate its STG value for slots 1 and 2:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πb1, πb2, πb3.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πb1 < πb2 πb1 < πb3 πb2 < πb1
πb2 < πb3 πb3 < πb2 πb1 < πb3
πb1 < πb3 πb1 < πb2 πb2 < πb3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πb2 < πb3 πb3 < πb1 πb3 < πb2
πb3 < πb1 πb1 < πb2 πb2 < πb1
πb2 < πb1 πb3 < πb2 πb3 < πb1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation we always have πbi < πbj , where a πb
agent will always perform Blame, so they will both obtain an expected average reward of − 13 . So:
STG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, generalising for all slots:
STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
= STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the strict total grading property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma has
Generalmin = 0 for this property.
Proposition 37. Generalmax for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to 1 for the prisoner’s
dilemma environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πc, πb, πr} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = ∅ (a πc agent always performs Cooperate, a πb agent always performs Blame and a πr agent always acts
randomly).
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one pair of slots and generalise its result to all pair of slots. Following
definition 28, we can calculate its STG value for slots 1 and 2:
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STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πc, πb, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πc, πb, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate this
value:
STG1,2(πc, πb, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πc, πb, πr, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,2(πc, πb, πr, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πc, πb, πr.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πc < πb πc < πr πb < πc
πb < πr πr < πb πc < πr
πc < πr πc < πb πb < πr
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πb < πr πr < πc πr < πb
πr < πc πc < πb πb < πc
πb < πc πr < πb πr < πc
It is possible to find a STO for the second permutation. In πc < πr, πc will always perform Cooperate and πr
will always act randomly, so they will obtain an expected average reward of − 13 and 23 respectively. In πr < πb,
πr will always act randomly and πb will always perform Blame, so they will obtain an expected average reward
of − 23 and 13 respectively. In πc < πb, πc will always perform Cooperate and πb will always perform Blame, so
they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. So:
STG1,2(πc, πb, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, generalising for all slots:
STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
= STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the strict total grading property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 38. Leftmax for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to 1 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
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Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πe = {πc, πb, πr} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πc agent always
performs Cooperate, a πb agent always performs Blame and a πr agent always acts randomly) we find this
situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted values). Since the environment is symmetric, we just need to calculate this property for one pair of
slots and generalise its result to all pair of slots. Following definition 28, we can calculate its STG value for
slots 1 and 2:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πc, πb, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πc, πb, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate this
value:
STG1,2(πc, πb, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πc, πb, πr, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,2(πc, πb, πr, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of STG1,2.
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πc, πb, πr.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πc < πb πc < πr πb < πc
πb < πr πr < πb πc < πr
πc < πr πc < πb πb < πr
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πb < πr πr < πc πr < πb
πr < πc πc < πb πb < πc
πb < πc πr < πb πr < πc
It is possible to find a STO for the second permutation. In πc < πr, πc will always perform Cooperate and πr
will always act randomly, so they will obtain an expected average reward of − 13 and 23 respectively. In πr < πb,
πr will always act randomly and πb will always perform Blame, so they will obtain an expected average reward
of − 23 and 13 respectively. In πc < πb, πc will always perform Cooperate and πb will always perform Blame, so
they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. So:
STG1,2(πc, πb, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, generalising for all slots:
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STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
= STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 1
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 1
Therefore, prisoner’s dilemma has Leftmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 39. Rightmin for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πb1, πb2, πb3} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πb agent always
performs Blame) we find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted values). Since the environment is symmetric, we just need to calculate this property for one pair of
slots and generalise its result to all pair of slots. Following definition 28, we can calculate its STG value for
slots 1 and 2:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of STG1,2.
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πb1, πb2, πb3.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πb1 < πb2 πb1 < πb3 πb2 < πb1
πb2 < πb3 πb3 < πb2 πb1 < πb3
πb1 < πb3 πb1 < πb2 πb2 < πb3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πb2 < πb3 πb3 < πb1 πb3 < πb2
πb3 < πb1 πb1 < πb2 πb2 < πb1
πb2 < πb1 πb3 < πb2 πb3 < πb1
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But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation we always have πbi < πbj , where a πb
agent will always perform Blame, so they will both obtain an expected average reward of − 13 . So:
STG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, generalising for all slots:
STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
= STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 0
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, prisoner’s dilemma has Rightmin = 0 for this property.
B.5 Partial Grading
Now we arrive to the partial grading (PG) property. As given in section 4.4.2, we want to know if there exists
a partial ordering between the evaluated agents when interacting in the environment.
To simplify the notation, we use the next table to represent the PO: Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π1, π2]) ≤ Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π2]),
Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π2, π3]) ≤ Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π2, π3]) and Ri(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]) ≤ Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]).
Slot i Slot j
π1 ≤ π2
π2 ≤ π3
π1 ≤ π3
Proposition 40. Generalmin for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {π−ccbb , π−bbcb , πm} with uniform weight for
wΠe and Πo = ∅ (a πm agent first acts randomly and then always mimics the other agent’s last action, a π−ccbb
agent always performs Blame except for the last three actions where it performs Cooperate twice and finalises
performing Blame, and a π−bbcb agent always performs Blame except for the last three actions where it performs
Blame twice and finalises performing Cooperate).
Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one pair of slots and generalise its result to all pair of slots. Following
definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate its PG value for slots 1 and 2:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG)
to calculate this value:
PG1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
π−ccbb ≤ π−bbcb π−ccbb ≤ πm π−bbcb ≤ π−ccbb
π−bbcb ≤ πm πm ≤ π−bbcb π−ccbb ≤ πm
π−ccbb ≤ πm π−ccbb ≤ π−bbcb π−bbcb ≤ πm
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
π−bbcb ≤ πm πm ≤ π−ccbb πm ≤ π−bbcb
πm ≤ π−ccbb π−ccbb ≤ π−bbcb π−bbcb ≤ π−ccbb
π−bbcb ≤ π−ccbb πm ≤ π−bbcb πm ≤ π−ccbb
But, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since π−ccbb > πm, π
−bbc
b > π
−ccb
b and πm > π
−bbc
b .
So:
PG1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, generalising for all slots:
PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
= PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the partial grading property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma has
Generalmin = 0 for this property.
Proposition 41. Generalmax for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to 1 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πb1, πb2, πb3} with uniform weight for wΠe
and Πo = ∅ (a πb agent always performs Blame).
Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one pair of slots and generalise its result to all pair of slots. Following
definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate its PG value for slots 1 and 2:
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PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3, (∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of πb1, πb2, πb3.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πb1 ≤ πb2 πb1 ≤ πb3 πb2 ≤ πb1
πb2 ≤ πb3 πb3 ≤ πb2 πb1 ≤ πb3
πb1 ≤ πb3 πb1 ≤ πb2 πb2 ≤ πb3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πb2 ≤ πb3 πb3 ≤ πb1 πb3 ≤ πb2
πb3 ≤ πb1 πb1 ≤ πb2 πb2 ≤ πb1
πb2 ≤ πb1 πb3 ≤ πb2 πb3 ≤ πb1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we always have πbi ≤ πbj , where a πb agent will
always perform Blame, so they will both obtain an expected average reward of − 13 . So:
PG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, generalising for all slots:
PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
= PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the partial grading property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 42. Leftmax for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to 1 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πe = {πb1, πb2, πb3} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πb agent always
performs Blame) we find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
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Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted values). Since the environment is symmetric, we just need to calculate this property for one pair of
slots and generalise its result to all pair of slots. Following definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate its PG value
for slots 1 and 2:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of PG1,2.
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of πb1, πb2, πb3.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πb1 ≤ πb2 πb1 ≤ πb3 πb2 ≤ πb1
πb2 ≤ πb3 πb3 ≤ πb2 πb1 ≤ πb3
πb1 ≤ πb3 πb1 ≤ πb2 πb2 ≤ πb3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πb2 ≤ πb3 πb3 ≤ πb1 πb3 ≤ πb2
πb3 ≤ πb1 πb1 ≤ πb2 πb2 ≤ πb1
πb2 ≤ πb1 πb3 ≤ πb2 πb3 ≤ πb1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we always have πbi ≤ πbj , where a πb agent will
always perform Blame, so they will both obtain an expected average reward of − 13 . So:
PG1,2(πb1, πb2, πb3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, generalising for all slots:
PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
= PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 1
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 1
Therefore, prisoner’s dilemma has Leftmax = 1 for this property.
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Proposition 43. Rightmin for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to 0 for the prisoner’s dilemma
environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {π−ccbb , π−bbcb , πm} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πm agent
first acts randomly and then always mimics the other agent’s last action, a π−ccbb agent always performs Blame
except for the last three actions where it performs Cooperate twice and finalises performing Blame, and a π−bbcb
agent always performs Blame except for the last three actions where it performs Blame twice and finalises
performing Cooperate) we find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted values). Since the environment is symmetric, we just need to calculate this property for one pair of
slots and generalise its result to all pair of slots. Following definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate its PG value
for slots 1 and 2:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG)
to calculate this value:
PG1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm, (∗, ∗), µ)
Note that the choice of Πo does not affect the result of PG1,2.
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
π−ccbb ≤ π−bbcb π−ccbb ≤ πm π−bbcb ≤ π−ccbb
π−bbcb ≤ πm πm ≤ π−bbcb π−ccbb ≤ πm
π−ccbb ≤ πm π−ccbb ≤ π−bbcb π−bbcb ≤ πm
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
π−bbcb ≤ πm πm ≤ π−ccbb πm ≤ π−bbcb
πm ≤ π−ccbb π−ccbb ≤ π−bbcb π−bbcb ≤ π−ccbb
π−bbcb ≤ π−ccbb πm ≤ π−bbcb πm ≤ π−ccbb
But, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since π−ccbb < π
−bbc
b , π
−bbc
b < πm but π
−ccb
b > πm.
So:
PG1,2(π
−ccb
b , π
−bbc
b , πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, generalising for all slots:
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PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
= PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 0
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, prisoner’s dilemma has Rightmin = 0 for this property.
B.6 Slot Reward Dependency
Next we see the slot reward dependency (SRD) property. As given in section 4.3.2, we want to know how much
competitive or cooperative the environment is.
Proposition 44. Generalmin for the slot reward dependency (SRD) property is equal to −1 for the prisoner’s
dilemma environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πb} with wΠe(πb) = 1 and Πo = {πc} (a πc
agent always performs Cooperate and a πb agent always performs Blame).
Following definition 20, we obtain the SRD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one pair of slots and generalise its result to all pair of slots. Following
definition 19, we could calculate its SRD value for slots 1 and 2 but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight
is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly definition 18 for slots 1 and 2:
SRD1,2(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R1(µ[l˙
1← πb]), R2(µ[l˙ 1← πb])) =
= corr(R1(µ[πb, πc]), R2(µ[πb, πc]))
In line-up (πb, πc), where πb will always perform Blame and πc will always perform Cooperate, they will
obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Since we use a correlation function between the
expected average rewards, and the agents in slots 1 and 2 obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1
respectively, then the correlation function will obtain the value of −1. So:
SRD1,2(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
And finally:
SRD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)SRDi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)SRDi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
= SRD1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= SRD1,2(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= −1
Since −1 is the lowest possible value for the slot reward dependency property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma
has Generalmin = −1 for this property.
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Proposition 45. Generalmax for the slot reward dependency (SRD) property is equal to 1 for the prisoner’s
dilemma environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πb} with wΠe(πb) = 1 and Πo = {πb} (a πb
agent always performs Blame).
Following definition 20, we obtain the SRD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is symmetric,
we just need to calculate this property for one pair of slots and generalise its result to all pair of slots. Following
definition 19, we could calculate its SRD value for slots 1 and 2 but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight
is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly definition 18 for slots 1 and 2:
SRD1,2(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R1(µ[l˙
1← πb]), R2(µ[l˙ 1← πb])) =
= corr(R1(µ[πb, πb]), R2(µ[πb, πb]))
In line-up (πb, πb), where both πb will always perform Blame, they will both obtain an expected average
reward of − 13 . Since we use a correlation function between the expected average rewards, and the agents in slots
1 and 2 obtain the same expected average reward of − 13 , then the correlation function will obtain the value of
1. So:
SRD1,2(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
And finally:
SRD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)SRDi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)SRDi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
= SRD1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= SRD1,2(πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the slot reward dependency property, therefore prisoner’s dilemma
has Generalmax = 1 for this property.
B.7 Competitive Anticipation
Finally, we follow with the competitive anticipation (AComp) property. As given in section 4.5.1, we want to
know how much benefit the evaluated agents obtain when they anticipate competing agents.
Proposition 46. Generalmin for the competitive anticipation (AComp) property is equal to − 23 for the pris-
oner’s dilemma environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πc/b} with wΠe(πc/b) = 1 and Πo = {πb} (a
πc/b agent performs Cooperate until the other agent also performs Cooperate, then it starts to perform Blame,
and a πb agent always performs Blame).
Following definition 33, we obtain the AComp value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is sym-
metric, we just need to calculate this property for one pair of slots in different teams, and generalise its result to
all pair of slots. Following definition 32, we could calculate its AComp value for slots 1 and 2 but, since Πe has
only one agent, its weight is equal to 1 and Πo also has only one agent, it is equivalent to use directly definition
31 for slots 1 and 2:
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AComp1,2(πc/b, πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R1(µ[l˙
1,2← πc/b, πb])−R1(µ[l˙ 1,2← πc/b, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R1(µ[πc/b, πb])−R1(µ[πc/b, πr])
)
In line-up (πc/b, πb), where πc/b will always perform Cooperate and πb will always perform Blame, the agent
in slot 1 (πc/b) will obtain an expected average reward of −1. In line-up (πc/b, πr), where πc/b will start with
Cooperate and then will continue with Blame once πr performs Cooperate, and πr will always act randomly,
the agent in slot 1 (πc/b) will obtain an expected average reward of
1
3 (in the limit). So:
AComp1,2(πc/b, πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
(
(−1)− 1
3
)
= −2
3
Note that this is the minimum possible value for AComp1,2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) since interacting with a random
agent cannot provide a greater result than 13 for this environment.
And finally, generalising for all slots:
AComp(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS22
∑
t1,t2∈τ |t1 ̸=t2
∑
i∈t1
wS(i, µ)
∑
j∈t2
wS(j, µ)ACompi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= AComp1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= AComp1,2(πc/b, πb,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= −2
3
Since − 23 is the lowest possible value that we can obtain for the competitive anticipation property, therefore
prisoner’s dilemma has Generalmin = − 23 for this property.
Proposition 47. Generalmax for the competitive anticipation (AComp) property is equal to
2
3 for the prisoner’s
dilemma environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πb/c} with wΠe(πb/c) = 1 and Πo = {πc}
(a πb/c agent performs Blame until the other agent also performs Blame, then it starts to perform Cooperate,
and a πc agent always performs Cooperate).
Following definition 33, we obtain the AComp value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is sym-
metric, we just need to calculate this property for one pair of slots in different teams, and generalise its result to
all pair of slots. Following definition 32, we could calculate its AComp value for slots 1 and 2 but, since Πe has
only one agent, its weight is equal to 1 and Πo also has only one agent, it is equivalent to use directly definition
31 for slots 1 and 2:
AComp1,2(πb/c, πc,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R1(µ[l˙
1,2← πb/c, πc])−R1(µ[l˙ 1,2← πb/c, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R1(µ[πb/c, πc])−R1(µ[πb/c, πr])
)
In line-up (πb/c, πc), where πb/c will always perform Blame and πc will always perform Cooperate, the agent
in slot 1 (πb/c) will obtain an expected average reward of 1. In line-up (πb/c, πr), where πb/c will start with
Blame and then will continue with Cooperate once πr performs Blame, and πr will always act randomly, the
agent in slot 1 (πb/c) will obtain an expected average reward of − 13 (in the limit). So:
AComp1,2(πb/c, πc,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
(
1−
(
−1
3
))
=
2
3
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Note that this is the maximum possible value for AComp1,2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) since interacting with a random
agent cannot provide a lower result than − 13 for this environment.
And finally, generalising for all slots:
AComp(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS22
∑
t1,t2∈τ |t1 ̸=t2
∑
i∈t1
wS(i, µ)
∑
j∈t2
wS(j, µ)ACompi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= AComp1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= AComp1,2(πb/c, πc,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
2
3
Since 23 is the highest possible value that we can obtain for the competitive anticipation property, therefore
prisoner’s dilemma has Generalmax =
2
3 for this property.
C Predator-prey properties
In this section we prove how we obtained the values for the properties for the predator-prey environment (section
5.4). To calculate some of the values for the properties, we make use of lemma 3.
Lemma 3. When three well coordinated predators are trying to chase the prey, it will always be chased in 5
iterations or less no matter the behaviour of the prey.
Since there exists a lot of variants to chase the prey, we cannot show them all. Instead, here we show one
of the largest sequences of actions to chase the prey in 5 iterations when the prey is trying to escape and the
predators are well coordinated.
♦ ⃝
⃝ ⃝
⃝
♦
⃝
⃝
⃝
⃝ ♦
⃝
⃝
♦ ⃝
⃝
♦
⃝⃝
⃝
⊗⃝
⃝
Figure 20: One of the largest sequences of actions to chase the prey in 5 iterations with three well coordinated
predators.
⊗
represents a chased prey.
Other behaviours of the prey will lead it closer to the boundaries, which would be easier for the predators
to chase it.
C.1 Action Dependency
We start with the action dependency (AD) property. As given in section 4.2.1, we want to know if the evaluated
agents behave differently depending on which line-up they interact with. We use ∆S(a, b) = 1 if distributions
a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 48. Generalmin for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 0 for the predator-prey
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πu} with wΠe(πu) = 1 and Πo = {πd1, πd2} (a
πd agent always performs Down and a πu agent always performs Up).
Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 13, we could calculate its AD
value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly
definition 12. We start with slot 1:
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AD1(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πu]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πu])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘1(µ[πu, πd1, πd1, πd1]), A˘1(µ[πu, πd1, πd1, πd2]))+
+∆S(A˘1(µ[πu, πd1, πd1, πd1]), A˘1(µ[πu, πd1, πd2, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘1(µ[πu, πd2, πd2, πd1]), A˘1(µ[πu, πd2, πd2, πd2]))}
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆S(a, b) and ∆S(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆S(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we have 28 possible pairs of line-ups where the agent in both slots 1 (πu) will perform the same
sequence of actions (always Up) independently of the line-up. So:
AD1(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
For slot 2, the agent in both slots 2 (πu) will also perform the same sequence of actions (always Up)
independently of the line-up. So:
AD2(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← πu]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← πu])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘2(µ[πd1, πu, πd1, πd1]), A˘2(µ[πd1, πu, πd1, πd2]))+
+∆S(A˘2(µ[πd1, πu, πd1, πd1]), A˘2(µ[πd1, πu, πd2, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘2(µ[πd2, πu, πd2, πd1]), A˘2(µ[πd2, πu, πd2, πd2]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
For slot 3, the agent in both slots 3 (πu) will also perform the same sequence of actions (always Up)
independently of the line-up. So:
AD3(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘3(µ[u˙
3← πu]), A˘3(µ[v˙ 3← πu])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘3(µ[πd1, πd1, πu, πd1]), A˘3(µ[πd1, πd1, πu, πd2]))+
+∆S(A˘3(µ[πd1, πd1, πu, πd1]), A˘3(µ[πd1, πd2, πu, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘3(µ[πd2, πd2, πu, πd1]), A˘3(µ[πd2, πd2, πu, πd2]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
And for slot 4, the agent in both slots 4 (πu) will also perform the same sequence of actions (always Up)
independently of the line-up. So:
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AD4(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘4(µ[u˙
4← πu]), A˘4(µ[v˙ 4← πu])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd1, πu]), A˘4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd2, πu]))+
+∆S(A˘4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd1, πu]), A˘4(µ[πd1, πd2, πd1, πu]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘4(µ[πd2, πd2, πd1, πu]), A˘4(µ[πd2, πd2, πd2, πu]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
4
{AD1(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD2(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AD3(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD4(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{0 + 0 + 0 + 0} = 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the action dependency property, therefore predator-prey hasGeneralmin =
0 for this property.
Proposition 49. Generalmax for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 1 for the predator-prey
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πm} with wΠe(πm) = 1 and Πo = {πu, πd}
(a πm agent first acts randomly and then always mimics sequentially the other agents’ last action, a πu agent
always performs Up and a πd agent always performs Down).
Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 13, we could calculate its AD
value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly
definition 12. We start with slot 1:
AD1(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πm]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πm])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘1(µ[πm, πu, πu, πu]), A˘1(µ[πm, πu, πu, πd]))+
+∆S(A˘1(µ[πm, πu, πu, πu]), A˘1(µ[πm, πu, πd, πu]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘1(µ[πm, πd, πd, πu]), A˘1(µ[πm, πd, πd, πd]))}
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆S(a, b) and ∆S(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆S(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we have 28 possible pairs of line-ups where the agent in both slots 1 (πm) will perform different
sequences of actions depending on the line-up. So:
AD1(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 1} = 1
110
For slot 2, the agent in both slots 2 (πm) will also perform different sequences of actions depending on the
line-up. So:
AD2(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← πm]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← πm])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘2(µ[πu, πm, πu, πu]), A˘2(µ[πu, πm, πu, πd]))+
+∆S(A˘2(µ[πu, πm, πu, πu]), A˘2(µ[πu, πm, πd, πu]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘2(µ[πd, πm, πd, πu]), A˘2(µ[πd, πm, πd, πd]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 1} = 1
For slot 3, the agent in both slots 3 (πm) will also perform different sequences of actions depending on the
line-up. So:
AD3(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘3(µ[u˙
3← πm]), A˘3(µ[v˙ 3← πm])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘3(µ[πu, πu, πm, πu]), A˘3(µ[πu, πu, πm, πd]))+
+∆S(A˘3(µ[πu, πu, πm, πu]), A˘3(µ[πu, πd, πm, πu]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘3(µ[πd, πd, πm, πu]), A˘3(µ[πd, πd, πm, πd]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 1} = 1
And for slot 4, the agent in both slots 4 (πm) will also perform different sequences of actions depending on
the line-up. So:
AD4(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘4(µ[u˙
4← πm]), A˘4(µ[v˙ 4← πm])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘4(µ[πu, πu, πu, πm]), A˘4(µ[πu, πu, πd, πm]))+
+∆S(A˘4(µ[πu, πu, πu, πm]), A˘4(µ[πu, πd, πu, πm]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘4(µ[πd, πd, πu, πm]), A˘4(µ[πd, πd, πd, πm]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 1} = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
111
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
4
{AD1(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD2(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AD3(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD4(πm,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{1 + 1 + 1 + 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the action dependency property, therefore predator-prey has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 50. Leftmax for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 0 for the predator-prey envi-
ronment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πo = {πd1, πd2} (a πd agent always performs Down) we find this
situation no matter which pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we use.
Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πe and wΠe are instantiated
with any permitted values). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for
every slot. Following definition 13, we can calculate its AD value for each slot. We start with slot 1:
AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 12 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π from
Πe:
AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← π]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← π])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘1(µ[π, πd1, πd1, πd1]), A˘1(µ[π, πd1, πd1, πd2]))+
+∆S(A˘1(µ[π, πd1, πd1, πd1]), A˘1(µ[π, πd1, πd2, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘1(µ[π, πd2, πd2, πd1]), A˘1(µ[π, πd2, πd2, πd2]))}
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆S(a, b) and ∆S(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆S(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
A πd agent will always perform Down, so for the 28 possible pairs of line-ups we obtain a situation where
the agent in both slots 1 (any π) will be able to differentiate with which agents is interacting, so it will not be
able to change its distribution of action sequences depending on the line-up. So:
AD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
For slot 2:
AD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)AD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
112
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate AD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 12 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π from
Πe:
AD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← π]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← π])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘2(µ[πd1, π, πd1, πd1]), A˘2(µ[πd1, π, πd1, πd2]))+
+∆S(A˘2(µ[πd1, π, πd1, πd1]), A˘2(µ[πd1, π, πd2, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘2(µ[πd2, π, πd2, πd1]), A˘2(µ[πd2, π, πd2, πd2]))}
A πd agent will always perform Down, so for the 28 possible pairs of line-ups we obtain a situation where
the agent in both slots 2 (any π) will be able to differentiate with which agents is interacting, so it will not be
able to change its distribution of action sequences depending on the line-up. So:
AD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
AD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
For slot 3:
AD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)AD3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate AD3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 12 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π from
Πe:
AD3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘3(µ[u˙
3← π]), A˘3(µ[v˙ 3← π])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘3(µ[πd1, πd1, π, πd1]), A˘3(µ[πd1, πd1, π, πd2]))+
+∆S(A˘3(µ[πd1, πd1, π, πd1]), A˘3(µ[πd1, πd2, π, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘3(µ[πd2, πd2, π, πd1]), A˘3(µ[πd2, πd2, π, πd2]))}
A πd agent will always perform Down, so for the 28 possible pairs of line-ups we obtain a situation where
the agent in both slots 3 (any π) will be able to differentiate with which agents is interacting, so it will not be
able to change its distribution of action sequences depending on the line-up. So:
AD3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
AD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And for slot 4:
AD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)AD4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate AD4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 12 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π from
Πe:
AD4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘4(µ[u˙
4← π]), A˘4(µ[v˙ 4← π])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆S(A˘4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd1, π]), A˘4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd2, π]))+
+∆S(A˘4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd1, π]), A˘4(µ[πd1, πd2, πd1, π]))+
...
+ ∆S(A˘4(µ[πd2, πd2, πd1, π]), A˘4(µ[πd2, πd2, πd2, π]))}
A πd agent will always perform Down, so for the 28 possible pairs of line-ups we obtain a situation where
the agent in both slots 4 (any π) will be able to differentiate with which agents is interacting, so it will not be
able to change its distribution of action sequences depending on the line-up. So:
AD4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
AD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
4
{AD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{0 + 0 + 0 + 0} = 0
So, for every pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we obtain the same result:
∀Πe, wΠe : AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, predator-prey has Leftmax = 0 for this property.
Proposition 51. Rightmin for the action dependency (AD) property is equal to 0 for the predator-prey
environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πu} with wΠe(πu) = 1 (a πu agent always performs Up) we
find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 14, we obtain the AD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every slot.
Following definition 13, we could calculate its AD value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its
weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly definition 12. We start with slot 1:
AD1(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πu]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πu]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain two different line-up patterns
u˙ and v˙ from L˙
N(µ)
−1 (Πo) to calculate ∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πu]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πu])). We calculate this value for two
figurative line-up patterns u˙ = (∗, π1, π2, π3) and v˙ = (∗, π4, π5, π6) from L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo):
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∆S(A˘1(µ[u˙
1← πu]), A˘1(µ[v˙ 1← πu])) = ∆S(A˘1(µ[πu, π1, π2, π3]), A˘1(µ[πu, π4, π5, π6]))
Here, the agent in both slots 1 (πu) will perform the same sequence of actions (always Up) independently
of the line-up. So no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
AD1(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
For slot 2:
AD2(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← πu]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← πu]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain two different line-up patterns
u˙ and v˙ from L˙
N(µ)
−2 (Πo) to calculate ∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← πu]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← πu])). We calculate this value for two
figurative line-up patterns u˙ = (π1, ∗, π2, π3) and v˙ = (π4, ∗, π5, π6) from L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo):
∆S(A˘2(µ[u˙
2← πu]), A˘2(µ[v˙ 2← πu])) = ∆S(A˘2(µ[π1, πu, π2, π3]), A˘2(µ[π4, πu, π5, π6]))
Here, the agent in both slots 2 (πu) will perform the same sequence of actions (always Up) independently
of the line-up. So no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
AD2(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
For slot 3:
AD3(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘3(µ[u˙
3← πu]), A˘3(µ[v˙ 3← πu]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain two different line-up patterns
u˙ and v˙ from L˙
N(µ)
−3 (Πo) to calculate ∆S(A˘3(µ[u˙
3← πu]), A˘3(µ[v˙ 3← πu])). We calculate this value for two
figurative line-up patterns u˙ = (π1, π2, ∗, π3) and v˙ = (π4, π5, ∗, π6) from L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo):
∆S(A˘3(µ[u˙
3← πu]), A˘3(µ[v˙ 3← πu])) = ∆S(A˘3(µ[π1, π2, πu, π3]), A˘3(µ[π4, π5, πu, π6]))
Here, the agent in both slots 3 (πu) will perform the same sequence of actions (always Up) independently
of the line-up. So no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
AD3(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And for slot 4:
AD4(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆S(A˘4(µ[u˙
4← πu]), A˘4(µ[v˙ 4← πu]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain two different line-up patterns
u˙ and v˙ from L˙
N(µ)
−4 (Πo) to calculate ∆S(A˘4(µ[u˙
4← πu]), A˘4(µ[v˙ 4← πu])). We calculate this value for two
figurative line-up patterns u˙ = (π1, π2, π3, ∗) and v˙ = (π4, π5, π6, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo):
∆S(A˘4(µ[u˙
4← πu]), A˘4(µ[v˙ 4← πu])) = ∆S(A˘4(µ[π1, π2, π3, πu]), A˘4(µ[π4, π5, π6, πu]))
Here, the agent in both slots 4 (πu) will perform the same sequence of actions (always Up) independently
of the line-up. So no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
AD4(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
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AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)ADi(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
4
{AD1(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD2(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AD3(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AD4(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{0 + 0 + 0 + 0} = 0
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : AD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, predator-prey has Rightmin = 0 for this property.
C.2 Reward Dependency
We continue with the reward dependency (RD) property. As given in section 4.3.1, we want to know if the
evaluated agents obtain different expected average rewards depending on which line-up they interact with. We
use ∆Q(a, b) = 1 if numbers a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 52. Generalmin for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to 0 for the predator-prey
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πu} with wΠe(πu) = 1 and Πo = {πd1, πd2} (a
πd agent always performs Down and a πu agent always performs Up).
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 16, we could calculate its RD
value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly
definition 15. We start with slot 1:
RD1(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← πu]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← πu])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R1(µ[πu, πd1, πd1, πd1]), R1(µ[πu, πd1, πd1, πd2]))+
+∆Q(R1(µ[πu, πd1, πd1, πd1]), R1(µ[πu, πd1, πd2, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R1(µ[πu, πd2, πd2, πd1]), R1(µ[πu, πd2, πd2, πd2]))}
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆Q(a, b) and ∆Q(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆Q(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we have 28 possible pairs of line-ups, where πu will always perform Up and a πd agent will
always perform Down, so the agent in both slots 1 (πu) will obtain the same expected average reward (1)
independently of the line-up. So:
RD1(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
For slot 2, the agent in both slots 2 (πu) will also obtain the same expected average reward (1) independently
of the line-up. So:
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RD2(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R2(µ[u˙
2← πu]), R2(µ[v˙ 2← πu])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R2(µ[πd1, πu, πd1, πd1]), R2(µ[πd1, πu, πd1, πd2]))+
+∆Q(R2(µ[πd1, πu, πd1, πd1]), R2(µ[πd1, πu, πd2, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R2(µ[πd2, πu, πd2, πd1]), R2(µ[πd2, πu, πd2, πd2]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
For slot 3, the agent in both slots 3 (πu) will also obtain the same expected average reward (−1) independently
of the line-up. So:
RD3(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R3(µ[u˙
3← πu]), R3(µ[v˙ 3← πu])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R3(µ[πd1, πd1, πu, πd1]), R3(µ[πd1, πd1, πu, πd2]))+
+∆Q(R3(µ[πd1, πd1, πu, πd1]), R3(µ[πd1, πd2, πu, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R3(µ[πd2, πd2, πu, πd1]), R3(µ[πd2, πd2, πu, πd2]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
And for slot 4, the agent in both slots 4 (πu) will also obtain the same expected average reward (1) inde-
pendently of the line-up. So:
RD4(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R4(µ[u˙
4← πu]), R4(µ[v˙ 4← πu])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd1, πu]), R4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd2, πu]))+
+∆Q(R4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd1, πu]), R4(µ[πd1, πd2, πd1, πu]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R4(µ[πd2, πd2, πd1, πu]), R4(µ[πd2, πd2, πd2, πu]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
4
{RD1(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD2(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+RD3(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD4(πu,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{0 + 0 + 0 + 0} = 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the reward dependency property, therefore predator-prey hasGeneralmin =
0 for this property.
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Conjecture 2. Generalmax for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to 1 for the predator-prey
environment.
To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πr} with wΠe(πr) = 1 and Πo = {πs, πr} (a
πr agent always acts randomly and a πs agent always stays in the same cell
16).
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 16, we could calculate its RD
value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly
definition 15. We start with slot 1:
RD1(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← πr]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← πr])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R1(µ[πr, πs, πs, πs]), R1(µ[πr, πs, πs, πr]))+
+∆Q(R1(µ[πr, πs, πs, πs]), R1(µ[πr, πs, πr, πs]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R1(µ[πr, πr, πr, πs]), R1(µ[πr, πr, πr, πr]))}
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆Q(a, b) and ∆Q(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆Q(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
The expected average reward of these line-ups highly depends on the agents’ positions, obtaining an expected
average reward from −1 to 1 (exclusive, since there always exists some probability that the prey will either be
chased or not) to the agent in slot 1 (πr). One reason is the stochastic behaviour of the πr agents, which
makes that no pair of line-ups can obtain exactly the same result. Another reason is that the positions of
the slots where the random agents play as a predator do not have a symmetric place in the space (blocks are
not symmetrically located in the space) which, for each πr in a different slot, provides (most likely) different
probabilities to chase the prey17. This makes every pair of line-up to have different expected average rewards,
making its reward dependency equal to 1.
RD1(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 1} = 1
For slot 2, also the result of these line-ups highly depends on the agents’ positions. So:
RD2(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R2(µ[u˙
2← πr]), R2(µ[v˙ 2← πr])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R2(µ[πs, πr, πs, πs]), R2(µ[πs, πr, πs, πr]))+
+∆Q(R2(µ[πs, πr, πs, πs]), R2(µ[πs, πr, πr, πs]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R2(µ[πr, πr, πr, πs]), R2(µ[πr, πr, πr, πr]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 1} = 1
For slot 3, also the result of these line-ups highly depends on the agents’ positions. So:
16Note that every cell has an action which is blocked by a block or a boundary, therefore an agent performing this action will
stay at its current cell.
17It is more likely that the prey will be chased by the lower left predator than the upper right predator, and the lower right
predator will have the lowest chance to chase the prey.
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RD3(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R3(µ[u˙
3← πr]), R3(µ[v˙ 3← πr])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R3(µ[πs, πs, πr, πs]), R3(µ[πs, πs, πr, πr]))+
+∆Q(R3(µ[πs, πs, πr, πs]), R3(µ[πs, πr, πr, πs]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R3(µ[πr, πr, πr, πs]), R3(µ[πr, πr, πr, πr]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 1} = 1
And for slot 4, also the result of these line-ups highly depends on the agents’ positions. So:
RD4(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R4(µ[u˙
4← πr]), R4(µ[v˙ 4← πr])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R4(µ[πs, πs, πs, πr]), R4(µ[πs, πs, πr, πr]))+
+∆Q(R4(µ[πs, πs, πs, πr]), R4(µ[πs, πr, πs, πr]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R4(µ[πr, πr, πs, πr]), R4(µ[πr, πr, πr, πr]))} =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 1} = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
4
{RD1(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD2(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+RD3(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD4(πr,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{1 + 1 + 1 + 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the reward dependency property, therefore predator-prey has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
Proposition 53. Leftmax for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to 0 for the predator-prey
environment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πo = {πd1, πd2} (a πd agent always performs Down) we find this
situation no matter which pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we use.
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πe and wΠe are instantiated
with any permitted values). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for
every slot. Following definition 16, we can calculate its RD value for slot 1:
RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 15 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π from
Πe:
119
RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← π]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← π])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R1(µ[π, πd1, πd1, πd1]), R1(µ[π, πd1, πd1, πd2]))+
+∆Q(R1(µ[π, πd1, πd1, πd1]), R1(µ[π, πd1, πd2, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R1(µ[π, πd2, πd2, πd1]), R1(µ[π, πd2, πd2, πd2]))}
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆Q(a, b) and ∆Q(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆Q(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
A πd agent will always perform Down, so for the 28 possible pairs of line-ups we obtain a situation where
the agent in both slots 1 (any π) will be able to differentiate with which agents is interacting, so it will not
be able to change its distribution of action sequences depending on the line-up, obtaining agent in both slots 1
(any π) the same expected average reward. So:
RD1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
For slot 2:
RD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)RD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate RD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for
all evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 15 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π
from Πe:
RD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R2(µ[u˙
2← π]), R2(µ[v˙ 2← π])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R2(µ[πd1, π, πd1, πd1]), R2(µ[πd1, π, πd1, πd2]))+
+∆Q(R2(µ[πd1, π, πd1, πd1]), R2(µ[πd1, π, πd2, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R2(µ[πd2, π, πd2, πd1]), R2(µ[πd2, π, πd2, πd2]))}
Again, a πd agent will always perform Down, so for the 28 possible pairs of line-ups we obtain a situation
where the agent in both slots 2 (any π) will be able to differentiate with which agents is interacting, so it will
not be able to change its distribution of action sequences depending on the line-up, obtaining agent in both
slots 2 (any π) the same expected average reward. So:
RD2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
RD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
For slot 3:
RD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)RD3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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Again, we do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate RD3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for
all evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 15 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π
from Πe:
RD3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R3(µ[u˙
3← π]), R3(µ[v˙ 3← π])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R3(µ[πd1, πd1, π, πd1]), R3(µ[πd1, πd1, π, πd2]))+
+∆Q(R3(µ[πd1, πd1, π, πd1]), R3(µ[πd1, πd2, π, πd1]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R3(µ[πd2, πd2, π, πd1]), R3(µ[πd2, πd2, π, πd2]))}
Again, a πd agent will always perform Down, so for the 28 possible pairs of line-ups we obtain a situation
where the agent in both slots 3 (any π) will be able to differentiate with which agents is interacting, so it will
not be able to change its distribution of action sequences depending on the line-up, obtaining agent in both
slots 3 (any π) the same expected average reward. So:
RD3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
RD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And for slot 4:
RD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)RD4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate RD4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for
all evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 15 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π
from Πe:
RD4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R4(µ[u˙
4← π]), R4(µ[v˙ 4← π])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd1, π]), R4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd2, π]))+
+∆Q(R4(µ[πd1, πd1, πd1, π]), R4(µ[πd1, πd2, πd1, π]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R4(µ[πd2, πd2, πd1, π]), R4(µ[πd2, πd2, πd2, π]))}
Again, a πd agent will always perform Down, so for the 28 possible pairs of line-ups we obtain a situation
where the agent in both slots 4 (any π) will be able to differentiate with which agents is interacting, so it will
not be able to change its distribution of action sequences depending on the line-up, obtaining agent in both
slots 4 (any π) the same expected average reward. So:
RD4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{28× 0} = 0
Therefore, no matter which agents are in Πe and their weights wΠe we obtain:
RD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
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RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
4
{RD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+RD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{0 + 0 + 0 + 0} = 0
So, for every pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we obtain the same result:
∀Πe, wΠe : RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, predator-prey has Leftmax = 0 for this property.
Approximation 1. Rightmin for the reward dependency (RD) property is equal to
13
28 (as a lower approxima-
tion) for the predator-prey environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πchase} with wΠe(πchase) = 1 and Πo = {πlose, πwin} (a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator, a πlose
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to do not chase when playing as the predator,
and a πwin agent always tries to not be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as the
predator) we find a lower approximation with this situation.
Following definition 17, we obtain the RD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 16, we could calculate its RD
value for each slot but, since Πe has only one agent and its weight is equal to 1, it is equivalent to use directly
definition 15. We start with slot 1:
RD1(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)|u˙ ̸=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R1(µ[u˙
1← πchase]), R1(µ[v˙ 1← πchase])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R1(µ[πchase, πlose, πlose, πlose]), R1(µ[πchase, πlose, πlose, πwin]))+
+∆Q(R1(µ[πchase, πlose, πlose, πlose]), R1(µ[πchase, πlose, πwin, πlose]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R1(µ[πchase, πwin, πwin, πlose]), R1(µ[πchase, πwin, πwin, πwin]))}
Note that we avoided to calculate both ∆Q(a, b) and ∆Q(b, a) since they provide the same result, by calculating
only ∆Q(a, b) and multiplying the result by 2.
From the 28 possible pairs of line-ups that we obtained, πchase tries to make equal the maximum number of
pairs, while πwin and πlose try to diverge the maximum number of pairs. In this case, the agents from Πo can
only assure that two line-up patterns obtain different results ((∗, πlose, πlose, πlose) and (∗, πwin, πwin, πwin)),
therefore the agent from Πe (πchase) can make equal seven of the eight line-ups
18. So:
RD1(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{7× 1 + 21× 0} = 1
4
For slot 2:
18Note that only one predator trying to win is enough to chase a prey who wants to be chased.
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RD2(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R2(µ[u˙
2← πchase]), R2(µ[v˙ 2← πchase])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R2(µ[πlose, πchase, πlose, πlose]), R2(µ[πlose, πchase, πlose, πwin]))+
+∆Q(R2(µ[πlose, πchase, πlose, πlose]), R2(µ[πlose, πchase, πwin, πlose]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R2(µ[πwin, πchase, πwin, πlose]), R2(µ[πwin, πchase, πwin, πwin]))}
From the 28 possible pairs of line-ups that we obtained, πchase tries to make equal the maximum number
of pairs, while πwin and πlose try to diverge the maximum number of pairs. In this case, the agents from
Πo can assure that three line-up patterns obtain the same result ((πlose, ∗, πlose, πwin), (πlose, ∗, πwin, πlose) and
(πlose, ∗, πwin, πwin)) and other three line-up patterns obtain a different result ((πwin, ∗, πlose, πlose), (πwin, ∗, πlose, πwin)
and (πwin, ∗, πwin, πlose)), therefore the agent from Πe (πchase) can only make equal five of the eight line-ups.
So:
RD2(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{15× 1 + 13× 0} = 15
28
For slot 3:
RD3(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R3(µ[u˙
3← πchase]), R3(µ[v˙ 3← πchase])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R3(µ[πlose, πlose, πchase, πlose]), R3(µ[πlose, πlose, πchase, πwin]))+
+∆Q(R3(µ[πlose, πlose, πchase, πlose]), R3(µ[πlose, πwin, πchase, πlose]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R3(µ[πwin, πwin, πchase, πlose]), R3(µ[πwin, πwin, πchase, πwin]))}
From the 28 possible pairs of line-ups that we obtained, πchase tries to make equal the maximum number
of pairs, while πwin and πlose try to diverge the maximum number of pairs. In this case, the agents from
Πo can assure that three line-up patterns obtain the same result ((πlose, πlose, ∗, πwin), (πlose, πwin, ∗, πlose) and
(πlose, πwin, ∗, πwin)) and other three line-up patterns obtain a different result ((πwin, πlose, ∗, πlose), (πwin, πlose, ∗, πwin)
and (πwin, πwin, ∗, πlose)), therefore the agent from Πe (πchase) can only make equal five of the eight line-ups.
So:
RD3(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{15× 1 + 13× 0} = 15
28
And for slot 4:
RD4(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηL˙2
∑
u˙,v˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)|u̸˙=v˙
wL˙(u˙)wL˙(v˙)∆Q(R4(µ[u˙
4← πchase]), R4(µ[v˙ 4← πchase])) =
= 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{∆Q(R4(µ[πlose, πlose, πlose, πchase]), R4(µ[πlose, πlose, πwin, πchase]))+
+∆Q(R4(µ[πlose, πlose, πlose, πchase]), R4(µ[πlose, πwin, πlose, πchase]))+
...
+ ∆Q(R4(µ[πwin, πwin, πlose, πchase]), R4(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πchase]))}
From the 28 possible pairs of line-ups that we obtained, πchase tries to make equal the maximum number
of pairs, while πwin and πlose try to diverge the maximum number of pairs. In this case, the agents from
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Πo can assure that three line-up patterns obtain the same result ((πlose, πlose, πwin, ∗), (πlose, πwin, πlose, ∗) and
(πlose, πwin, πwin, ∗)) and other three line-up patterns obtain a different result ((πwin, πlose, πlose, ∗), (πwin, πlose, πwin, ∗)
and (πwin, πwin, πlose, ∗)), therefore the agent from Πe (πchase) can only make equal five of the eight line-ups.
So:
RD4(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
8
7
1
8
1
8
{15× 1 + 13× 0} = 15
28
And finally, we weight over the slots:
RD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)RDi(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
4
{RD1(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD2(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+RD3(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ) +RD4(πchase,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{
1
4
+
15
28
+
15
28
+
15
28
}
=
13
28
Therefore, predator-prey has Rightmin =
13
28 (as a lower approximation) for this property.
C.3 Fine Discrimination
Now we move to the fine discrimination (FD) property. As given in section 4.4.1, we want to know if different
evaluated agents obtain different expected average rewards when interacting in the environment. We use
∆Q(a, b) = 1 if numbers a and b are equal and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 54. Generalmin for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 0 for the predator-prey
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πu1, πu2} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = {πd} (a πu agent always performs Up and a πd agent always performs Down).
Following definition 23, we obtain the FD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 22, we can calculate its FD value
for each slot. We start with slot 1:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD1(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate both FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and FDi(π2, π1,Πo, wL˙, µ)} since they provide
the same result, by calculating only FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate FD1(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this
value:
FD1(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πu1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πu2])) =
= ∆Q(R1(µ[πu1, πd, πd, πd]), R1(µ[πu2, πd, πd, πd]))
Here, a πu agent will always perform Up and πd will always perform Down, so both agents in slot 1 (πu1
and πu2) will obtain the same expected average reward (1). So:
FD1(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
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Therefore:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
For slot 2:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD2(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate FD2(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this value:
FD2(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← πu1]), R2(µ[l˙ 2← πu2])) =
= ∆Q(R2(µ[πd, πu1, πd, πd]), R2(µ[πd, πu2, πd, πd]))
Again, a πu agent will always perform Up and πd will always perform Down, so both agents in slot 2 (πu1
and πu2) will obtain the same expected average reward (1). So:
FD2(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
For slot 3:
FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD3(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD3(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate FD3(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this value:
FD3(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R3(µ[l˙
3← πu1]), R3(µ[l˙ 3← πu2])) =
= ∆Q(R3(µ[πd, πd, πu1, πd]), R3(µ[πd, πd, πu2, πd]))
Again, a πu agent will always perform Up and πd will always perform Down, so both agents in slot 3 (πu1
and πu2) will obtain the same expected average reward (−1). So:
FD3(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And for slot 4:
FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD4(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD4(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate FD4(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this value:
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FD4(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R4(µ[l˙
4← πu1]), R4(µ[l˙ 4← πu2])) =
= ∆Q(R4(µ[πd, πd, πd, πu1]), R4(µ[πd, πd, πd, πu2]))
Again, a πu agent will always perform Up and πd will always perform Down, so both agents in slot 4 (πu1
and πu2) will obtain the same expected average reward (1). So:
FD4(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
4
{FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{0 + 0 + 0 + 0} = 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the fine discriminative property, therefore predator-prey hasGeneralmin =
0 for this property.
Proposition 55. Generalmax for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 1 for the predator-prey
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πs, πr} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = {πs} (a πr agent always acts randomly and a πs agent always stays in the same cell19).
Following definition 23, we obtain the FD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not sym-
metric, we need to calculate this property for every slot. Following definition 22, we can calculate its FD value
for each slot. We start with slot 1:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD1(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate both FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and FDi(π2, π1,Πo, wL˙, µ)} since they provide
the same result, by calculating only FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate FD1(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this value:
FD1(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πs]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πr])) =
= ∆Q(R1(µ[πs, πs, πs, πs]), R1(µ[πr, πs, πs, πs]))
Here, a πs agent will always stay in the same cell and πr will always act randomly. In this case, πs will never
been chased but πr will have a possibility to be chased, so they will obtain different expected average rewards.
So:
FD1(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
19Note that every cell has an action which is blocked by a block or a boundary, therefore an agent performing this action will
stay at its current cell.
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Therefore:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
For slot 2:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD2(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate FD2(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this value:
FD2(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← πs]), R2(µ[l˙ 2← πr])) =
= ∆Q(R2(µ[πs, πs, πs, πs]), R2(µ[πs, πr, πs, πs]))
Again, a πs agent will always stay in the same cell and πr will always act randomly. In this case, πs will
never chase the prey but πr will have a possibility to chase the prey, so they will obtain different expected
average rewards. So:
FD2(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
For slot 3:
FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD3(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD3(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate FD3(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this value:
FD3(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R3(µ[l˙
3← πs]), R3(µ[l˙ 3← πr])) =
= ∆Q(R3(µ[πs, πs, πs, πs]), R3(µ[πs, πs, πr, πs]))
Again, a πs agent will always stay in the same cell and πr will always act randomly. In this case, πs will
never chase the prey but πr will have a possibility to chase the prey, so they will obtain different expected
average rewards. So:
FD3(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
And for slot 4:
FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD4(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD4(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Again, we only need to calculate FD4(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this value:
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FD4(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R4(µ[l˙
4← πs]), R4(µ[l˙ 4← πr])) =
= ∆Q(R4(µ[πs, πs, πs, πs]), R4(µ[πs, πs, πs, πr]))
Again, a πs agent will always stay in the same cell and πr will always act randomly. In this case, πs will
never chase the prey but πr will have a possibility to chase the prey, so they will obtain different expected
average rewards. So:
FD4(πs, πr,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
1
4
{FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{1 + 1 + 1 + 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the fine discriminative property, therefore predator-prey hasGeneralmax =
1 for this property.
Proposition 56. Leftmax for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 0 for the predator-prey envi-
ronment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πo = {πchase} (a πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing
as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator) we find this situation no matter which pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩
we use.
Following definition 23, we obtain the FD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πe and wΠe are instantiated
with any permitted values). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for
every slot. Following definition 22, we can calculate its FD value for each slot. We start with slot 1:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
pair of evaluated agents π1, π2 ∈ Πe|π1 ̸= π2. We follow definition 21 to calculate this value for two figurative
evaluated agents π1 and π2 from Πe such that π1 ̸= π2:
FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← π2])) =
= ∆Q(R1(µ[π1, πchase, πchase, πchase]), R1(µ[π2, πchase, πchase, πchase]))
Here, the predators will coordinate to always chase the prey as seen in lemma 3. So no matter which agents
π1 and π2 are we obtain:
FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
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FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
For slot 2:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
pair of evaluated agents π1, π2 ∈ Πe|π1 ̸= π2. We follow definition 21 to calculate this value for two figurative
evaluated agents π1 and π2 from Πe such that π1 ̸= π2:
FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 2← π2])) =
= ∆Q(R2(µ[πchase, π1, πchase, πchase]), R2(µ[πchase, π2, πchase, πchase]))
Here, the prey will always try to be chased, and also at least one predator is trying to chase they prey,
therefore the prey will always been chased. So no matter which agents π1 and π2 are we obtain:
FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
For slot 3:
FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD3(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate FD3(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
pair of evaluated agents π1, π2 ∈ Πe|π1 ̸= π2. We follow definition 21 to calculate this value for two figurative
evaluated agents π1 and π2 from Πe such that π1 ̸= π2:
FD3(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R3(µ[l˙
3← π1]), R3(µ[l˙ 3← π2])) =
= ∆Q(R3(µ[πchase, πchase, π1, πchase]), R3(µ[πchase, πchase, π2, πchase]))
Here, the prey will always try to be chased, and also at least one predator is trying to chase they prey,
therefore the prey will always been chased. So no matter which agents π1 and π2 are we obtain:
FD3(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And for slot 4:
FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD4(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate FD4(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
pair of evaluated agents π1, π2 ∈ Πe|π1 ̸= π2. We follow definition 21 to calculate this value for two figurative
evaluated agents π1 and π2 from Πe such that π1 ̸= π2:
FD4(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R4(µ[l˙
4← π1]), R4(µ[l˙ 4← π2])) =
= ∆Q(R4(µ[πchase, πchase, πchase, π1]), R4(µ[πchase, πchase, πchase, π2]))
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Here, the prey will always try to be chased, and also at least one predator is trying to chase they prey,
therefore the prey will always been chased. So no matter which agents π1 and π2 are we obtain:
FD4(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
=
1
4
{FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{0 + 0 + 0 + 0} = 0
So, for every pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ we obtain the same result:
∀Πe, wΠe : FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, predator-prey has Leftmax = 0 for this property.
Proposition 57. Rightmin for the fine discrimination (FD) property is equal to 0 for the predator-prey envi-
ronment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πu1, πu2} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πu agent always
performs Up) we find this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 23, we obtain the FD value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted values). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every slot.
Following definition 22, we can calculate its FD value for each slot. We start with slot 1:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD1(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD1(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate both FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and FDi(π2, π1,Πo, wL˙, µ)} since they provide
the same result, by calculating only FDi(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ)} and multiplying the result by 2.
In this case, we only need to calculate FD1(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this
value:
FD1(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πu1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πu2]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1 (Πo) to calculate ∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πu1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πu2])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, π2, π3) from L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo):
∆Q(R1(µ[l˙
1← πu1]), R1(µ[l˙ 1← πu2])) = ∆Q(R1(µ[πu1, π1, π2, π3]), R1(µ[πu2, π1, π2, π3]))
A πu agent will always perform Up, so we obtain a situation where the other agents (any π1, π2, π3) will be
able to differentiate with which agent they are interacting, so they will not be able to change their distribution
of action sequences depending on the behaviour of the agent in slot 1, obtaining both agents in slot 1 (πu1 and
πu2) the same expected average reward. So:
130
FD1(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
For slot 2:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD2(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD2(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate FD2(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this
value:
FD2(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← πu1]), R2(µ[l˙ 2← πu2]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−2 (Πo) to calculate ∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← πu1]), R2(µ[l˙ 2← πu2])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, π2, π3) from L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo):
∆Q(R2(µ[l˙
2← πu1]), R2(µ[l˙ 2← πu2])) = ∆Q(R2(µ[π1, πu1, π2, π3]), R2(µ[π1, πu2, π2, π3]))
A πu agent will always perform Up, so we obtain a situation where the other agents (any π1, π2, π3) will be
able to differentiate with which agent they are interacting, so they will not be able to change their distribution
of action sequences depending on the behaviour of the agent in slot 2, obtaining both agents in slot 2 (πu1 and
πu2) the same expected average reward. So:
FD2(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
For slot 3:
FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD3(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD3(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate FD3(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this
value:
FD3(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R3(µ[l˙
3← πu1]), R3(µ[l˙ 3← πu2]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−3 (Πo) to calculate ∆Q(R3(µ[l˙
3← πu1]), R3(µ[l˙ 3← πu2])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, π2, ∗, π3) from L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo):
∆Q(R3(µ[l˙
3← πu1]), R3(µ[l˙ 3← πu2])) = ∆Q(R3(µ[π1, π2, πu1, π3]), R3(µ[π1, π2, πu2, π3]))
A πu agent will always perform Up, so we obtain a situation where the other agents (any π1, π2, π3) will be
able to differentiate with which agent they are interacting, so they will not be able to change their distribution
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of action sequences depending on the behaviour of the agent in slot 3, obtaining both agents in slot 3 (πu1 and
πu2) the same expected average reward. So:
FD3(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And for slot 4:
FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ2
∑
π1,π2∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)FD4(π1, π2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
FD4(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate FD4(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 21 to calculate this
value:
FD4(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)∆Q(R4(µ[l˙
4← πu1]), R4(µ[l˙ 4← πu2]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−4 (Πo) to calculate ∆Q(R4(µ[l˙
4← πu1]), R4(µ[l˙ 4← πu2])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, π2, π3, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo):
∆Q(R4(µ[l˙
4← πu1]), R4(µ[l˙ 4← πu2])) = ∆Q(R4(µ[π1, π2, π3, πu1]), R4(µ[π1, π2, π3, πu2]))
A πu agent will always perform Up, so we obtain a situation where the other agents (any π1, π2, π3) will be
able to differentiate with which agent they are interacting, so they will not be able to change their distribution
of action sequences depending on the behaviour of the agent in slot 4, obtaining both agents in slot 4 (πu1 and
πu2) the same expected average reward. So:
FD4(πu1, πu2,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 2
2
1
1
2
1
2
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)FDi(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
=
1
4
{FD1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ FD3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + FD4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
1
4
{0 + 0 + 0 + 0} = 0
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : FD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, predator-prey has Rightmin = 0 for this property.
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C.4 Strict Total Grading
We arrive to the strict total grading (STG) property. As given in section 4.4.2, we want to know if there exists
a strict ordering between the evaluated agents when interacting in the environment.
To simplify the notation, we use the next table to represent the STO: Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π1, π2]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π2]),
Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π2, π3]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π2, π3]) and Ri(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]) < Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]).
Slot i Slot j
π1 < π2
π2 < π3
π1 < π3
Proposition 58. Generalmin for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to 0 for the predator-prey
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πs1, πs2, πs3} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = {πx} (a πs agent always stays in the same cell20, and a πx agent acts stochastically with a probability of
1/
√
2 to do not reach the upper left corner and a probability of 1− 1/√2 to reach this corner).
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not
symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots. Following definition 28, we can calculate
its STG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, ∗, πx, πx), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 3 (πx) and 4 (πx) have a
probability of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1−1/2 = 1/2
to chase the prey, making for both agents in slots 1 (any πs) and 2 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average
reward (0). So:
20Note that every cell has an action which is blocked by a block or a boundary, therefore an agent performing this action will
stay at its current cell.
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STG1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 1 and 3:
STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, πx, ∗, πx), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,3 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 (πx) and 4 (πx) have a
probability of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1−1/2 = 1/2
to chase the prey, making for both agents in slots 1 (any πs) and 3 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average
reward (0). So:
STG1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 1 and 4:
STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, πx, πx, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,4 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
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Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 (πx) and 3 (πx) have a
probability of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1−1/2 = 1/2
to chase the prey, making for both agents in slots 1 (any πs) and 4 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average
reward (0). So:
STG1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 1:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, ∗, πx, πx), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,1 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 3 (πx) and 4 (πx) have a
probability of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1−1/2 = 1/2
to chase the prey, making for both agents in slots 2 (any πs) and 1 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average
reward (0). So:
STG2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 3:
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STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, ∗, ∗, πx), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,3 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 (any πs) and 3 (any
πs) share rewards (and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 4:
STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, ∗, πx, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,4 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
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But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 (any πs) and 4 (any
πs) share rewards (and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 1:
STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, πx, ∗, πx), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,1 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 (πx) and 4 (πx) have a
probability of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1−1/2 = 1/2
to chase the prey, making for both agents in slots 3 (any πs) and 1 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average
reward (0). So:
STG3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 2:
STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
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STG3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, ∗, ∗, πx), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,2 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 3 (any πs) and 2 (any
πs) share rewards (and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 4:
STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, πx, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,4 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 3 (any πs) and 4 (any
πs) share rewards (and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
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STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 4 and 1:
STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, πx, πx, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,1 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 (πx) and 3 (πx) have a
probability of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1−1/2 = 1/2
to chase the prey, making for both agents in slots 4 (any πs) and 1 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average
reward (0). So:
STG4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 4 and 2:
STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, ∗, πx, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,2 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
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Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 4 (any πs) and 2 (any
πs) share rewards (and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And for slots 4 and 3:
STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= STO4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, πx, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,3 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πs1 < πs2 πs1 < πs3 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs2 πs1 < πs3
πs1 < πs3 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs3
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πs2 < πs3 πs3 < πs1 πs3 < πs2
πs3 < πs1 πs1 < πs2 πs2 < πs1
πs2 < πs1 πs3 < πs2 πs3 < πs1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 4 (any πs) and 3 (any
πs) share rewards (and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
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STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{12× 0} = 0
Since 0 is the lowest possible value for the strict total grading property, therefore predator-prey hasGeneralmin =
0 for this property.
Proposition 59. Generalmax for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to
1
2 for the predator-prey
environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πx, πy, πz} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = {πs} (a πs agent always stays in the same cell21).
πx behaves as shown in figure 21 when playing on each of the 4 slots.
♦ 3 2 1 ⃝ 3
2
1
⃝
6
5
4 3 2
1 ⃝
Figure 21: Behaviour of πx when playing on each of the slots. Numbers represent the position of πx during the
iterations.
πy behaves as shown in figure 22 when playing on each of the 4 slots.
♦
1 2
3 2 1 ⃝ 3
2
1
⃝
6
5
4 3 2
1 ⃝
Figure 22: Behaviour of πy when playing on each of the slots. Numbers represent the position of πy during the
iterations.
πz behaves as shown in figure 23 when playing on each of the 4 slots.
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not
symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots. Following definition 28, we can calculate
its STG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
21Note that every cell has an action which is blocked by a block or a boundary, therefore an agent performing this action will
stay at its current cell.
141
♦
1 2
5 2 1 ⃝
4 3
5
4 3
1 2
⃝
6
5 4
3 2
1 ⃝
Figure 23: Behaviour of πz when playing on each of the slots. Numbers represent the position of πz during the
iterations.
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,2(πx, πy, πz, (∗, ∗, πs, πs), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
It is possible to find a STO for the first permutation. In πx < πy, πx will stay at the upper left corner and
πy will chase it in that cell in the 3rd iteration, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1
respectively. In πy < πz, πy will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell and πz will chase it in that cell in the 3rd
iteration, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In πx < πz, πx will stay
at the upper left corner and πz will chase it in that cell in the 5th iteration, so they will obtain an expected
average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. So:
STG1,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 3:
STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,3(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,3(πx, πy, πz, (∗, πs, ∗, πs), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,3 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
It is possible to find a STO for the first permutation. In πx < πy, πx will stay at the upper left corner and
πy will chase it in that cell in the 3rd iteration, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1
respectively. In πy < πz, πy will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell and πz will chase it in that cell in the 3rd
iteration, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In πx < πz, πx will stay
at the upper left corner and πz will chase it in that cell in the 5th iteration, so they will obtain an expected
average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. So:
STG1,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 4:
STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG1,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,4(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO1,4(πx, πy, πz, (∗, πs, πs, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,4 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
143
It is possible to find a STO for the first permutation. In πx < πy, πx will stay at the upper left corner and
πy will chase it in that cell in the 6th iteration, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1
respectively. In πy < πz, πy will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell and πz will chase it in that cell in the 4th
iteration, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In πx < πz, πx will stay
at the upper left corner and πz will chase it in that cell in the 6th iteration, so they will obtain an expected
average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. So:
STG1,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 1:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG2,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,1(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO2,1(πx, πy, πz, (∗, ∗, πs, πs), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,1 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
It is possible to find a STO for the first permutation. In πx < πy, πy will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell
and πx will never chase it in that cell, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively.
In πy < πz, πz will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell and πy will never chase it in that cell, so they will obtain
an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In πx < πz, πz will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell
and πx will never chase it in that cell, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively.
So:
STG2,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 3:
STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG2,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,3(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO2,3(πx, πy, πz, (πs, ∗, ∗, πs), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,3 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 and 3 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG2,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 4:
STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG2,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,4(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO2,4(πx, πy, πz, (πs, ∗, πs, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,4 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 and 4 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG2,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
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Therefore:
STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 1:
STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG3,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,1(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO3,1(πx, πy, πz, (∗, πs, ∗, πs), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,1 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
It is possible to find a STO for the first permutation. In πx < πy, πy will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell
and πx will never chase it in that cell, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively.
In πy < πz, πz will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell and πy will never chase it in that cell, so they will obtain
an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In πx < πz, πz will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell
and πx will never chase it in that cell, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively.
So:
STG3,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 3 and 2:
STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG3,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,2(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO3,2(πx, πy, πz, (πs, ∗, ∗, πs), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,2 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
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Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 3 and 2 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG3,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 4:
STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG3,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,4(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO3,4(πx, πy, πz, (πs, πs, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,4 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 3 and 4 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG3,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 4 and 1:
STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG4,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,1(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO4,1(πx, πy, πz, (∗, πs, πs, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,1 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
It is possible to find a STO for the first permutation. In πx < πy, πy will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell
and πx will never chase it in that cell, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively.
In πy < πz, πz will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell and πy will never chase it in that cell, so they will obtain
an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. In πx < πz, πz will reach the 2nd row 2nd column cell
and πx will never chase it in that cell, so they will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively.
So:
STG4,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 4 and 2:
STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG4,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,2(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO4,2(πx, πy, πz, (πs, ∗, πs, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,2 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
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But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 4 and 2 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG4,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And for slots 4 and 3:
STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 to calculate
this value:
STG4,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,3(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= STO4,3(πx, πy, πz, (πs, πs, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,3 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πx < πy πx < πz πy < πx
πy < πz πz < πy πx < πz
πx < πz πx < πy πy < πz
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πy < πz πz < πx πz < πy
πz < πx πx < πy πy < πx
πy < πx πz < πy πz < πx
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 4 and 3 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
STG4,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
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STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{6× 1 + 6× 0} = 1
2
Since 12 is the highest possible value that we can obtain for the strict total grading property, therefore
predator-prey has Generalmax =
1
2 for this property.
Approximation 2. Leftmax for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to
1
4 (as a lower approximation)
for the predator-prey environment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πe = {πchase1, πchase2, πchase3} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator) we find
a lower approximation of this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of
slots. Following definition 28, we can calculate its STG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1,2 (Πo) to calculate STO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, ∗, π1, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo):
STO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, ∗, π1, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
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Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
It is possible to find a STO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator, so the
agents in slots 1 and 2 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the choice
of Πo does not affect the result of STO1,2, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 3:
STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1,3 (Πo) to calculate STO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo):
STO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
Again, it is possible to find a STO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 1 and 3 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of STO1,3, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
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Therefore:
STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 4:
STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1,4 (Πo) to calculate STO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo):
STO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
Again, it is possible to find a STO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 1 and 4 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of STO1,4, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 1:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
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STG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−2,1 (Πo) to calculate STO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, ∗, π1, π2) from L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo):
STO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, ∗, π1, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
It is not possible to find a STO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator, so the
agents in slots 2 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the choice
of Πo does not affect the result of STO2,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 3:
STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−2,3 (Πo) to calculate STO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo):
STO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
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Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 and 3 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 4:
STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−2,4 (Πo) to calculate STO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo):
STO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 and 4 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
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STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 1:
STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−3,1 (Πo) to calculate STO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo):
STO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
Again, it is not possible to find a STO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 3 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of STO3,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 2:
STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
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STG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−3,2 (Πo) to calculate STO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo):
STO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 3 and 2 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 4:
STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−3,4 (Πo) to calculate STO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, π2, ∗, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo):
STO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, π2, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
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Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 3 and 4 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 4 and 1:
STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−4,1 (Πo) to calculate STO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo):
STO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
Again, it is not possible to find a STO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 4 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of STO4,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
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Therefore:
STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 4 and 2:
STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−4,2 (Πo) to calculate STO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo):
STO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 4 and 2 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And for slots 4 and 3:
STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
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STG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−4,3 (Πo) to calculate STO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, π2, ∗, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo):
STO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, π2, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 4 and 3 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{3× 1 + 9× 0} = 1
4
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
1
4
Therefore, predator-prey has Leftmax =
1
4 (as a lower approximation) for this property.
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Approximation 3. Rightmin for the strict total grading (STG) property is equal to
1
4 (as a higher approxi-
mation) for the predator-prey environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πchase1, πchase2, πchase3} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator) we find
a higher approximation of this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 29, we obtain the STG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of
slots. Following definition 28, we can calculate its STG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for STGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1,2 (Πo) to calculate STO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, ∗, π1, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo):
STO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, ∗, π1, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
It is possible to find a STO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator, so the
agents in slots 1 and 2 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the choice
of Πo does not affect the result of STO1,2, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 3:
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STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1,3 (Πo) to calculate STO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo):
STO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
Again, it is possible to find a STO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 1 and 3 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of STO1,3, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 4:
STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG1,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
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Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1,4 (Πo) to calculate STO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo):
STO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO1,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
Again, it is possible to find a STO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 1 and 4 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of STO1,4, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 1:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−2,1 (Πo) to calculate STO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, ∗, π1, π2) from L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo):
STO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, ∗, π1, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
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It is not possible to find a STO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator, so the
agents in slots 2 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the choice
of Πo does not affect the result of STO2,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 3:
STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−2,3 (Πo) to calculate STO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo):
STO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 and 3 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 4:
STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG2,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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In this case, we only need to calculate STG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−2,4 (Πo) to calculate STO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo):
STO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO2,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 2 and 4 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 1:
STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−3,1 (Πo) to calculate STO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo):
STO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
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Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
Again, it is not possible to find a STO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 3 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of STO3,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 2:
STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−3,2 (Πo) to calculate STO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo):
STO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 3 and 2 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
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Therefore:
STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 4:
STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG3,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−3,4 (Πo) to calculate STO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, π2, ∗, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo):
STO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, π2, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO3,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 3 and 4 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 4 and 1:
STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
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STG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−4,1 (Πo) to calculate STO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo):
STO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
Again, it is not possible to find a STO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei < πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 4 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of STO4,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
STG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 4 and 2:
STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−4,2 (Πo) to calculate STO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo):
STO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
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Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 4 and 2 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And for slots 4 and 3:
STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)STG4,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
STG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate STG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
to calculate this value:
STG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)STO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−4,3 (Πo) to calculate STO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, π2, ∗, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo):
STO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = STO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, π2, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us STO4,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πchase1 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase1 < πchase3
πchase1 < πchase3 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πchase2 < πchase3 πchase3 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2
πchase3 < πchase1 πchase1 < πchase2 πchase2 < πchase1
πchase2 < πchase1 πchase3 < πchase2 πchase3 < πchase1
But, it is not possible to find a STO, since for every permutation the agents in slots 4 and 3 share rewards
(and expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo
we obtain:
STG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
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STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
And finally, we weight over the slots:
STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)STGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{STG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ STG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + STG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{3× 1 + 9× 0} = 1
4
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : STG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
1
4
Therefore, predator-prey has Rightmin =
1
4 (as a higher approximation) for this property.
C.5 Partial Grading
Now we arrive to the partial grading (PG) property. As given in section 4.4.2, we want to know if there exists
a partial ordering between the evaluated agents when interacting in the environment.
To simplify the notation, we use the next table to represent the PO: Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π1, π2]) ≤ Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π2]),
Ri(µ[l˙
i,j← π2, π3]) ≤ Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π2, π3]) and Ri(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]) ≤ Rj(µ[l˙ i,j← π1, π3]).
Slot i Slot j
π1 ≤ π2
π2 ≤ π3
π1 ≤ π3
Proposition 60. Generalmin for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to
1
2 for the predator-prey envi-
ronment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πx, πy, πz} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = {πs} (a πs agent always stays in the same cell22).
πx behaves as shown in figure 24 when playing on each of the 4 slots.
πy behaves as shown in figure 25 when playing on each of the 4 slots.
πz behaves as shown in figure 26 when playing on each of the 4 slots.
Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not symmet-
ric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots. Following definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate
its PG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
22Note that every cell has an action which is blocked by a block or a boundary, therefore an agent performing this action will
stay at its current cell.
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♦
1 2
2 1 ⃝
4 3
5 1
⃝
4 3 2
1 ⃝
Figure 24: Behaviour of πx when playing on each of the slots. Numbers represent the position of πx during the
iterations.
♦ 5 2 1 ⃝
4 3
5 4
3
1 2
⃝
6
5 4
3 2
1 ⃝
Figure 25: Behaviour of πy when playing on each of the slots. Numbers represent the position of πy during the
iterations.
♦ 1
3 2
4
3 2 1 ⃝ 3
2
1
⃝
6
5
4 3 2
1 ⃝
Figure 26: Behaviour of πz when playing on each of the slots. Numbers represent the position of πz during the
iterations.
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,2(πx, πy, πz, (∗, ∗, πs, πs), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
But, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since πx > πz, πy > πx and πz > πy. So:
PG1,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
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PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 1 and 3:
PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,3(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,3(πx, πy, πz, (∗, πs, ∗, πs), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,3 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
But, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since πx > πz, πy > πx and πz > πy. So:
PG1,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 1 and 4:
PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,4(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,4(πx, πy, πz, (∗, πs, πs, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,4 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
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Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
But, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since πx > πz, πy > πx and πz > πy. So:
PG1,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 1:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG2,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,1(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO2,1(πx, πy, πz, (∗, ∗, πs, πs), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,1 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
But, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since πx > πz, πy > πx and πz > πy. So:
PG2,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 3:
PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG2,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,3(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO2,3(πx, πy, πz, (πs, ∗, ∗, πs), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,3 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 and 3 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG2,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 4:
PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG2,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,4(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO2,4(πx, πy, πz, (πs, ∗, πs, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,4 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 and 4 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG2,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
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Therefore:
PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 3 and 1:
PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG3,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,1(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO3,1(πx, πy, πz, (∗, πs, ∗, πs), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,1 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
But, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since πx > πz, πy > πx and πz > πy. So:
PG3,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 2:
PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG3,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,2(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO3,2(πx, πy, πz, (πs, ∗, ∗, πs), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,2 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
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Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 3 and 2 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG3,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 3 and 4:
PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG3,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,4(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO3,4(πx, πy, πz, (πs, πs, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,4 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 3 and 4 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG3,4(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 4 and 1:
PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG4,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,1(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO4,1(πx, πy, πz, (∗, πs, πs, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,1 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
But, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since πx > πz, πy > πx and πz > πy. So:
PG4,1(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 4 and 2:
PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG4,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,2(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO4,2(πx, πy, πz, (πs, ∗, πs, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,2 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 4 and 2 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG4,2(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
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PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And for slots 4 and 3:
PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG4,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,3(πx, πy, πz, l˙, µ) =
= PO4,3(πx, πy, πz, (πs, πs, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,3 for all the permutations of πx, πy, πz.
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πx ≤ πy πx ≤ πz πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πy πx ≤ πz
πx ≤ πz πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πz
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πy ≤ πz πz ≤ πx πz ≤ πy
πz ≤ πx πx ≤ πy πy ≤ πx
πy ≤ πx πz ≤ πy πz ≤ πx
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 4 and 3 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG4,3(πx, πy, πz,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{6× 1 + 6× 0} = 1
2
Since 12 is the lowest possible value that we can obtain for the partial grading property, therefore predator-
prey has Generalmin =
1
2 for this property.
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Proposition 61. Generalmax for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to 1 for the predator-prey envi-
ronment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πs1, πs2, πs3} with uniform weight for wΠe and
Πo = {πx} (a πs agent always stays in the same cell23, and a πx agent acts stochastically with a probability of
1/
√
2 to do not reach the upper left corner and a probability of 1− 1/√2 to reach this corner).
Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not symmet-
ric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots. Following definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate
its PG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots 1 and 2:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, ∗, πx, πx), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 3 (πx) and 4 (πx) have a probability
of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1− 1/2 = 1/2 to chase
the prey, making for both agents in slots 1 (any πs) and 2 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average reward
(0). So:
PG1,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 3:
PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
23Note that every cell has an action which is blocked by a block or a boundary, therefore an agent performing this action will
stay at its current cell.
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In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, πx, ∗, πx), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,3 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 (πx) and 4 (πx) have a probability
of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1− 1/2 = 1/2 to chase
the prey, making for both agents in slots 1 (any πs) and 3 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average reward
(0). So:
PG1,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 4:
PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, πx, πx, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,4 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
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It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 (πx) and 3 (πx) have a probability
of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1− 1/2 = 1/2 to chase
the prey, making for both agents in slots 1 (any πs) and 4 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average reward
(0). So:
PG1,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 1:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, ∗, πx, πx), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,1 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 3 (πx) and 4 (πx) have a probability
of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1− 1/2 = 1/2 to chase
the prey, making for both agents in slots 2 (any πs) and 1 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average reward
(0). So:
PG2,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 3:
PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
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PG2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, ∗, ∗, πx), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,3 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 and 3 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG2,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 4:
PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, ∗, πx, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,4 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 and 4 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG2,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
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PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 3 and 1:
PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, πx, ∗, πx), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,1 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 (πx) and 4 (πx) have a probability
of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1− 1/2 = 1/2 to chase
the prey, making for both agents in slots 3 (any πs) and 1 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average reward
(0). So:
PG3,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 3 and 2:
PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, ∗, ∗, πx), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,2 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
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Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 3 and 2 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG3,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 3 and 4:
PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, πx, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,4 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 3 and 4 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG3,4(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 4 and 1:
PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3, (∗, πx, πx, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,1 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 (πx) and 3 (πx) have a probability
of (1/
√
2)× (1/√2) = 1/2 to do not chase the prey (any πs) and the same probability 1− 1/2 = 1/2 to chase
the prey, making for both agents in slots 4 (any πs) and 1 (any πs) to obtain the same expected average reward
(0). So:
PG4,1(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 4 and 2:
PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, ∗, πx, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,2 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
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It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 4 and 2 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG4,2(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And for slots 4 and 3:
PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27 (for PG) to
calculate this value:
PG4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, l˙, µ) =
= PO4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3, (πx, πx, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,3 for all the permutations of πs1, πs2, πs3.
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πs1 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs1 ≤ πs3
πs1 ≤ πs3 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs3
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πs2 ≤ πs3 πs3 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2
πs3 ≤ πs1 πs1 ≤ πs2 πs2 ≤ πs1
πs2 ≤ πs1 πs3 ≤ πs2 πs3 ≤ πs1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 4 and 3 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So:
PG4,3(πs1, πs2, πs3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
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PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{12× 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the partial grading property, therefore predator-prey hasGeneralmax =
1 for this property.
Approximation 4. Leftmax for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to
3
4 (as a lower approximation)
for the predator-prey environment.
Proof. To find Leftmax (equation 43), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which maximises the property as much
as possible while Πo minimises it. Using Πe = {πchase1, πchase2, πchase3} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator) we find
a lower approximation of this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of
slots. Following definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate its PG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots
1 and 2:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1,2 (Πo) to calculate PO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, ∗, π1, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo):
PO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, ∗, π1, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
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Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator, so the
agents in slots 1 and 2 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the choice
of Πo does not affect the result of PO1,2, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 3:
PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−1,3 (Πo) to calculate PO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo):
PO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
Again, it is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 1 and 3 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of PO1,3, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
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Therefore:
PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 4:
PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−1,4 (Πo) to calculate PO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo):
PO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
Again, it is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 1 and 4 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of PO1,4, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 1:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
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PG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−2,1 (Πo) to calculate PO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, ∗, π1, π2) from L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo):
PO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, ∗, π1, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator, so the
agents in slots 2 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the choice
of Πo does not affect the result of PO2,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 3:
PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−2,3 (Πo) to calculate PO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo):
PO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
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Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 and 3 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 4:
PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−2,4 (Πo) to calculate PO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo):
PO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 and 4 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
190
PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 3 and 1:
PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−3,1 (Πo) to calculate PO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo):
PO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
Again, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 3 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of PO3,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 0
For slots 3 and 2:
PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
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PG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−3,2 (Πo) to calculate PO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo):
PO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 3 and 2 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 3 and 4:
PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−3,4 (Πo) to calculate PO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, π2, ∗, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo):
PO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, π2, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
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Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 3 and 4 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 4 and 1:
PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−4,1 (Πo) to calculate PO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo):
PO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
Again, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 4 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of PO4,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
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Therefore:
PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 0
For slots 4 and 2:
PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−4,2 (Πo) to calculate PO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo):
PO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 4 and 2 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And for slots 4 and 3:
PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
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PG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−4,3 (Πo) to calculate PO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, π2, ∗, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo):
PO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, π2, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 4 and 3 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{9× 1 + 3× 0} = 3
4
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
3
4
Therefore, predator-prey has Leftmax =
3
4 (as a lower approximation) for this property.
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Approximation 5. Rightmin for the partial grading (PG) property is equal to
3
4 (as a higher approximation)
for the predator-prey environment.
Proof. To find Rightmin (equation 44), we need to find a pair ⟨Πe, wΠe⟩ which minimises the property as much
as possible while Πo maximises it. Using Πe = {πchase1, πchase2, πchase3} with uniform weight for wΠe (a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator) we find
a higher approximation of this situation no matter which Πo we use.
Following definition 30, we obtain the PG value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πo is instantiated with any
permitted value). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of
slots. Following definition 28 (for PG), we can calculate its PG value for each pair of slots. We start with slots
1 and 2:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
Note that we avoided to calculate all the permutations of π1, π2, π3 for PGi,j(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) since they
provide the same result, by calculating only one permutation and multiplying the result by the number of
permutations 6.
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1,2 (Πo) to calculate PO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, ∗, π1, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo):
PO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, ∗, π1, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator, so the
agents in slots 1 and 2 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the choice
of Πo does not affect the result of PO1,2, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG1,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 3:
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PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−1,3 (Πo) to calculate PO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo):
PO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
Again, it is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 1 and 3 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of PO1,3, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG1,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 1 and 4:
PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG1,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
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Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−1,4 (Πo) to calculate PO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo):
PO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO1,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
Again, it is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 1 and 4 will obtain an expected average reward of −1 and 1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of PO1,4, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG1,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 1:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−2,1 (Πo) to calculate PO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, ∗, π1, π2) from L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo):
PO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, ∗, π1, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
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It is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a πchase
agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator, so the
agents in slots 2 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the choice
of Πo does not affect the result of PO2,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG2,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 2 and 3:
PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−2,3 (Πo) to calculate PO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo):
PO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 and 3 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG2,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 2 and 4:
PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG2,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
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In this case, we only need to calculate PG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−2,4 (Πo) to calculate PO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo):
PO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO2,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 2 and 4 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG2,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 3 and 1:
PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−3,1 (Πo) to calculate PO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo):
PO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
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Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1 Slot 3 Slot 1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
Again, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 3 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of PO3,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG3,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 3 and 2:
PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−3,2 (Πo) to calculate PO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, ∗, π2) from L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo):
PO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, ∗, π2), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 2
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 3 and 2 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG3,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
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Therefore:
PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 3 and 4:
PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG3,4(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−3,4 (Πo) to calculate PO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, π2, ∗, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo):
PO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, π2, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO3,4 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 3 and 4 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG3,4(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
For slots 4 and 1:
PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,1(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
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PG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−4,1 (Πo) to calculate PO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π1, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo):
PO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (∗, π1, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,1 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1 Slot 4 Slot 1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
Again, it is not possible to find a PO for any permutation, since we always have πchasei ≤ πchasej , where a
πchase agent always tries to be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as a predator,
so the agents in slots 4 and 1 will obtain an expected average reward of 1 and −1 respectively. Note that the
choice of Πo does not affect the result of PO4,1, so no matter which agents are in Πo we obtain:
PG4,1(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 0
Therefore:
PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 = 0
For slots 4 and 2:
PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,2(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−4,2 (Πo) to calculate PO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, ∗, π2, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo):
PO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, ∗, π2, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,2 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
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Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2 Slot 4 Slot 2
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 4 and 2 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG4,2(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And for slots 4 and 3:
PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = ηΠ3
∑
π1,π2,π3∈Πe|π1 ̸=π2 ̸=π3
wΠe(π1)wΠe(π2)wΠe(π3)PG4,3(π1, π2, π3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
= 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
PG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ)
In this case, we only need to calculate PG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ). We follow definition 27
(for PG) to calculate this value:
PG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)PO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ)
Again, we do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙
from L˙
N(µ)
−4,3 (Πo) to calculate PO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π1, π2, ∗, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo):
PO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, l˙, µ) = PO4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3, (π1, π2, ∗, ∗), µ)
The following table shows us PO4,3 for all the permutations of πchase1, πchase2, πchase3.
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase1 ≤ πchase3
πchase1 ≤ πchase3 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase3
Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 3
πchase2 ≤ πchase3 πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2
πchase3 ≤ πchase1 πchase1 ≤ πchase2 πchase2 ≤ πchase1
πchase2 ≤ πchase1 πchase3 ≤ πchase2 πchase3 ≤ πchase1
It is possible to find a PO for every permutation, since the agents in slots 4 and 3 share rewards (and
expected average rewards as well) due they are in the same team. So no matter which agents are in Πo we
obtain:
PG4,3(πchase1, πchase2, πchase3,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
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PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 6
9
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)PGi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{PG1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ PG4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + PG4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{9× 1 + 3× 0} = 3
4
So, for every Πo we obtain the same result:
∀Πo : PG(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) =
3
4
Therefore, predator-prey has Rightmin =
3
4 (as a higher approximation) for this property.
C.6 Slot Reward Dependency
Next we see the slot reward dependency (SRD) property. As given in section 4.3.2, we want to know how much
competitive or cooperative the environment is.
Proposition 62. General range for the slot reward dependency (SRD) property is equal to [0, 0] for the
predator-prey environment.
Proof. Following definition 20, we obtain the SRD value for any ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ (where Πe, wΠe and Πo are
instantiated with any permitted values). Since the environment is not symmetric, we need to calculate this
property for every pair of slots. Following definition 19, we can calculate its SRD value for each pair of slots.
We start with slots 1 and 2:
SRD1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD1,2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD1,2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD1,2(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 1← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1 (Πo) to calculate corr(R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 1← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π2, π3, π4) from L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo):
corr(R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 1← π1])) = corr(R1(µ[π1, π2, π3, π4]), R2(µ[π1, π2, π3, π4]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 1 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 2 (any π2) obtains −r as reward, and this relation is propagated to expected average
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rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between the expected average rewards, and the agents in
slots 1 and 2 always obtain opposite expected average reward, then the correlation function will always obtain
the same value24 of −1. So:
SRD1,2(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
Therefore:
SRD1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
For slots 1 and 3:
SRD1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD1,3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD1,3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD1,3(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R3(µ[l˙ 1← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1 (Πo) to calculate corr(R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R3(µ[l˙ 1← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π2, π3, π4) from L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo):
corr(R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R3(µ[l˙ 1← π1])) = corr(R1(µ[π1, π2, π3, π4]), R3(µ[π1, π2, π3, π4]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 1 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 3 (any π3) obtains −r as reward, and this relation is propagated to expected average
rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between the expected average rewards, and the agents in
slots 1 and 3 always obtain opposite expected average reward, then the correlation function will always obtain
the same value of −1. So:
SRD1,3(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
Therefore:
SRD1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
For slots 1 and 4:
SRD1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD1,4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD1,4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD1,4(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R4(µ[l˙ 1← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−1 (Πo) to calculate corr(R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R4(µ[l˙ 1← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (∗, π2, π3, π4) from L˙N(µ)−1 (Πo):
corr(R1(µ[l˙
1← π1]), R4(µ[l˙ 1← π1])) = corr(R1(µ[π1, π2, π3, π4]), R4(µ[π1, π2, π3, π4]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 1 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 4 (any π4) obtains −r as reward, and this relation is propagated to expected average
24Provided there is at least one game which is not a tie.
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rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between the expected average rewards, and the agents in
slots 1 and 4 always obtain opposite expected average reward, then the correlation function will always obtain
the same value of −1. So:
SRD1,4(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
Therefore:
SRD1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
For slots 2 and 1:
SRD2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD2,1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD2,1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD2,1(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 2← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−2 (Πo) to calculate corr(R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 2← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π2, ∗, π3, π4) from L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo):
corr(R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 2← π1])) = corr(R2(µ[π2, π1, π3, π4]), R1(µ[π2, π1, π3, π4]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 2 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 1 (any π2) obtains −r as reward, and this relation is propagated to expected average
rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between the expected average rewards, and the agents in
slots 2 and 1 always obtain opposite expected average reward, then the correlation function will always obtain
the same value of −1. So:
SRD2,1(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
Therefore:
SRD2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
For slots 2 and 3:
SRD2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD2,3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD2,3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD2,3(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R3(µ[l˙ 2← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−2 (Πo) to calculate corr(R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R3(µ[l˙ 2← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π2, ∗, π3, π4) from L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo):
corr(R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R3(µ[l˙ 2← π1])) = corr(R2(µ[π2, π1, π3, π4]), R3(µ[π2, π1, π3, π4]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 2 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 3 (any π3) obtains the same value r as reward (since they are in the same team),
and this relation is propagated to expected average rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between
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the expected average rewards, and the agents in slots 2 and 3 always obtain the same expected average reward,
then the correlation function will always obtain the same value of 1. So:
SRD2,3(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
SRD2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
For slots 2 and 4:
SRD2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD2,4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD2,4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD2,4(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R4(µ[l˙ 2← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−2 (Πo) to calculate corr(R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R4(µ[l˙ 2← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π2, ∗, π3, π4) from L˙N(µ)−2 (Πo):
corr(R2(µ[l˙
2← π1]), R4(µ[l˙ 2← π1])) = corr(R2(µ[π2, π1, π3, π4]), R4(µ[π2, π1, π3, π4]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 2 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 4 (any π4) obtains the same value r as reward (since they are in the same team),
and this relation is propagated to expected average rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between
the expected average rewards, and the agents in slots 2 and 4 always obtain the same expected average reward,
then the correlation function will always obtain the same value of 1. So:
SRD2,4(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
SRD2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
For slots 3 and 1:
SRD3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD3,1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD3,1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD3,1(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R3(µ[l˙
3← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 3← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−3 (Πo) to calculate corr(R3(µ[l˙
3← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 3← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π2, π3, ∗, π4) from L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo):
corr(R3(µ[l˙
3← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 3← π1])) = corr(R3(µ[π2, π3, π1, π4]), R1(µ[π2, π3, π1, π4]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 3 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 1 (any π2) obtains −r as reward, and this relation is propagated to expected average
rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between the expected average rewards, and the agents in
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slots 3 and 1 always obtain opposite expected average reward, then the correlation function will always obtain
the same value of −1. So:
SRD3,1(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
Therefore:
SRD3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
For slots 3 and 2:
SRD3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD3,2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD3,2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD3,2(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R3(µ[l˙
3← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 3← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−3 (Πo) to calculate corr(R3(µ[l˙
3← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 3← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π2, π3, ∗, π4) from L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo):
corr(R3(µ[l˙
3← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 3← π1])) = corr(R3(µ[π2, π3, π1, π4]), R2(µ[π2, π3, π1, π4]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 3 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 2 (any π3) obtains the same value r as reward (since they are in the same team),
and this relation is propagated to expected average rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between
the expected average rewards, and the agents in slots 3 and 2 always obtain the same expected average reward,
then the correlation function will always obtain the same value of 1. So:
SRD3,2(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
SRD3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
For slots 3 and 4:
SRD3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD3,4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD3,4(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD3,4(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R3(µ[l˙
3← π1]), R4(µ[l˙ 3← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−3 (Πo) to calculate corr(R3(µ[l˙
3← π1]), R4(µ[l˙ 3← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π2, π3, ∗, π4) from L˙N(µ)−3 (Πo):
corr(R3(µ[l˙
3← π1]), R4(µ[l˙ 3← π1])) = corr(R3(µ[π2, π3, π1, π4]), R4(µ[π2, π3, π1, π4]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 3 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 4 (any π4) obtains the same value r as reward (since they are in the same team),
and this relation is propagated to expected average rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between
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the expected average rewards, and the agents in slots 3 and 4 always obtain the same expected average reward,
then the correlation function will always obtain the same value of 1. So:
SRD3,4(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
SRD3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
For slots 4 and 1:
SRD4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD4,1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD4,1(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD4,1(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R4(µ[l˙
4← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 4← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−4 (Πo) to calculate corr(R4(µ[l˙
4← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 4← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π2, π3, π4, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo):
corr(R4(µ[l˙
4← π1]), R1(µ[l˙ 4← π1])) = corr(R4(µ[π2, π3, π4, π1]), R1(µ[π2, π3, π4, π1]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 4 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 1 (any π2) obtains −r as reward, and this relation is propagated to expected average
rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between the expected average rewards, and the agents in
slots 4 and 1 always obtain opposite expected average reward, then the correlation function will always obtain
the same value of −1. So:
SRD4,1(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
Therefore:
SRD4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = −1
For slots 4 and 2:
SRD4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD4,2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD4,2(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD4,2(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R4(µ[l˙
4← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 4← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−4 (Πo) to calculate corr(R4(µ[l˙
4← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 4← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π2, π3, π4, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo):
corr(R4(µ[l˙
4← π1]), R2(µ[l˙ 4← π1])) = corr(R4(µ[π2, π3, π4, π1]), R2(µ[π2, π3, π4, π1]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 4 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 2 (any π3) obtains the same value r as reward (since they are in the same team),
and this relation is propagated to expected average rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between
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the expected average rewards, and the agents in slots 4 and 2 always obtain the same expected average reward,
then the correlation function will always obtain the same value of 1. So:
SRD4,2(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
SRD4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
And for slots 4 and 3:
SRD4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
π∈Πe
wΠe(π)SRD4,3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ)
We do not know which Πe we have, but we know that we will need to evaluate SRD4,3(π,Πo, wL˙, µ) for all
evaluated agent π ∈ Πe. We follow definition 18 to calculate this value for a figurative evaluated agent π1 from
Πe:
SRD4,3(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = corrl˙∈L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo)
[wL˙(l˙)](R4(µ[l˙
4← π1]), R3(µ[l˙ 4← π1]))
We do not know which Πo we have, but we know that we will need to obtain a line-up pattern l˙ from
L˙
N(µ)
−4 (Πo) to calculate corr(R4(µ[l˙
4← π1]), R3(µ[l˙ 4← π1])). We calculate this value for a figurative line-up
pattern l˙ = (π2, π3, π4, ∗) from L˙N(µ)−4 (Πo):
corr(R4(µ[l˙
4← π1]), R3(µ[l˙ 4← π1])) = corr(R4(µ[π2, π3, π4, π1]), R3(µ[π2, π3, π4, π1]))
From the predator-prey’s payoff matrix (figure 10), we can see that when the agent in slot 4 (any π1) obtains
a reward r the agent in slot 3 (any π4) obtains the same value r as reward (since they are in the same team),
and this relation is propagated to expected average rewards as well. Since we use a correlation function between
the expected average rewards, and the agents in slots 4 and 3 always obtain the same expected average reward,
then the correlation function will always obtain the same value of 1. So:
SRD4,3(π1,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
Therefore:
SRD4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
SRD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS21
N(µ)∑
i=1
wS(i, µ)×
×
i−1∑
j=1
wS(j, µ)SRDi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +
N(µ)∑
j=i+1
wS(j, µ)SRDi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)
 =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{SRD1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + SRD1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ SRD1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + SRD2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ SRD2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + SRD2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ SRD3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + SRD3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ SRD3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + SRD4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ SRD4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) + SRD4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
4
3
1
4
1
4
{6× (−1) + 6× 1} = 0
So, for every trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ we obtain the same result:
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∀Πe, wΠe ,Πo : SRD(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = 0
Therefore, predator-prey has General = [0, 0] for this property.
C.7 Competitive Anticipation
Then, we follow with the competitive anticipation (AComp) property. As given in section 4.5.1, we want to
know how much benefit the evaluated agents obtain when they anticipate competing agents.
Proposition 63. Generalmin for the competitive anticipation (AComp) property is equal to −1 for the
predator-prey environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property
as much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πwin/win′} with wΠe(πwin/win′) = 1 and
Πo = {πwin} (a πwin agent always tries to not be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when
playing as the predator, and a πwin/win′ agent always tries to not be chased when playing as the prey and tries
to chase when playing as the predator but from the fifth iteration stops chasing the prey).
Following definition 33, we obtain the AComp value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not
symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots in different teams. Following definition 32,
we could calculate its AComp value for each pair of slots but, since Πe has only one agent, its weight is equal
to 1 and Πo also has only one agent, it is equivalent to use directly definition 31. We start with slots 1 and 2:
AComp1,2(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R1(µ[l˙
1,2← πwin/win′ , πwin])−R1(µ[l˙ 1,2← πwin/win′ , πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R1(µ[πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin, πwin])−R1(µ[πwin/win′ , πr, πwin, πwin])
)
We know from lemma 3 that three predators correctly coordinating will always chase the prey. In line-up
(πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin, πwin) the agent in slot 1 (πwin/win′) will obtain an expected average reward of −1, while
in line-up (πwin/win′ , πr, πwin, πwin) the agent in slot 1 (πwin/win′), where the prey will almost always be able
to avoid the predators, will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
AComp1,2(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
((−1)− 1) = −1
For slots 1 and 3:
AComp1,3(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R1(µ[l˙
1,3← πwin/win′ , πwin])−R1(µ[l˙ 1,3← πwin/win′ , πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R1(µ[πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin, πwin])−R1(µ[πwin/win′ , πwin, πr, πwin])
)
We know from lemma 3 that three predators correctly coordinating will always chase the prey. In line-up
(πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin, πwin) the agent in slot 1 (πwin/win′) will obtain an expected average reward of −1, while
in line-up (πwin/win′ , πwin, πr, πwin) the agent in slot 1 (πwin/win′), where the prey will almost always be able
to avoid the predators, will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
AComp1,3(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
((−1)− 1) = −1
For slots 1 and 4:
AComp1,4(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R1(µ[l˙
1,4← πwin/win′ , πwin])−R1(µ[l˙ 1,4← πwin/win′ , πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R1(µ[πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin, πwin])−R1(µ[πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin, πr])
)
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We know from lemma 3 that three predators correctly coordinating will always chase the prey. In line-up
(πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin, πwin) the agent in slot 1 (πwin/win′) will obtain an expected average reward of −1, while
in line-up (πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin, πr) the agent in slot 1 (πwin/win′), where the prey will almost always be able
to avoid the predators, will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
AComp1,4(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
((−1)− 1) = −1
For slots 2 and 1:
AComp2,1(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R2(µ[l˙
2,1← πwin/win′ , πwin])−R2(µ[l˙ 2,1← πwin/win′ , πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R2(µ[πwin, πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin])−R2(µ[πr, πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin])
)
We know from lemma 3 that three predators correctly coordinating will always chase the prey. In line-up
(πwin, πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin) the agent in slot 2 (πwin/win′), where they prey will not be chased due to the miss-
coordination of πwin/win′ in the last iterations, will obtain an expected average reward of −1, while in line-up
(πr, πwin/win′ , πwin, πwin) the agent in slot 2 (πwin/win′), where the prey will almost always be chased by the
predators, will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
AComp2,1(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
((−1)− 1) = −1
For slots 3 and 1:
AComp3,1(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R3(µ[l˙
3,1← πwin/win′ , πwin])−R3(µ[l˙ 3,1← πwin/win′ , πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R3(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin/win′ , πwin])−R3(µ[πr, πwin, πwin/win′ , πwin])
)
We know from lemma 3 that three predators correctly coordinating will always chase the prey. In line-up
(πwin, πwin, πwin/win′ , πwin) the agent in slot 3 (πwin/win′), where they prey will not be chased due to the miss-
coordination of πwin/win′ in the last iterations, will obtain an expected average reward of −1, while in line-up
(πr, πwin, πwin/win′ , πwin) the agent in slot 3 (πwin/win′), where the prey will almost always be chased by the
predators, will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
AComp3,1(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
((−1)− 1) = −1
And for slots 4 and 1:
AComp4,1(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R4(µ[l˙
4,1← πwin/win′ , πwin])−R4(µ[l˙ 4,1← πwin/win′ , πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R4(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin/win′ ])−R4(µ[πr, πwin, πwin, πwin/win′ ])
)
We know from lemma 3 that three predators correctly coordinating will always chase the prey. In line-up
(πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin/win′) the agent in slot 4 (πwin/win′), where they prey will not be chased due to the miss-
coordination of πwin/win′ in the last iterations, will obtain an expected average reward of −1, while in line-up
(πr, πwin, πwin, πwin/win′) the agent in slot 4 (πwin/win′), where the prey will almost always be chased by the
predators, will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
AComp4,1(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
((−1)− 1) = −1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
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AComp(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS22
∑
t1,t2∈τ |t1 ̸=t2
∑
i∈t1
wS(i, µ)
∑
j∈t2
wS(j, µ)ACompi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{AComp1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AComp1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AComp3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{AComp1,2(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp1,3(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AComp1,4(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp2,1(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AComp3,1(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp4,1(πwin/win′ , πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{6× (−1)} = −1
Since −1 is the lowest possible value for the competitive anticipation property, therefore predator-prey has
Generalmin = −1 for this property.
Proposition 64. Generalmax for the competitive anticipation (AComp) property is equal to
1
2 for the predator-
prey environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πtl/br} with wΠe(πtl/br) = 1 and Πo = {πbr}
(a πtl/br agent always stays in the top left corner when playing as the prey and always goes to the bottom right
corner when playing as a predator, and a πbr agent always goes to the bottom right corner).
Following definition 33, we obtain the AComp value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not
symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of slots in different teams. Following definition 32,
we could calculate its AComp value for each pair of slots but, since Πe has only one agent, its weight is equal
to 1 and Πo also has only one agent, it is equivalent to use directly definition 31. We start with slots 1 and 2:
AComp1,2(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R1(µ[l˙
1,2← πtl/br, πbr])−R1(µ[l˙ 1,2← πtl/br, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R1(µ[πtl/br, πbr, πbr, πbr])−R1(µ[πtl/br, πr, πbr, πbr])
)
In line-up (πtl/br, πbr, πbr, πbr) the agent in slot 1 (πtl/br) will obtain an expected average reward of 1, while
in line-up (πtl/br, πr, πbr, πbr) the agent in slot 1 (πtl/br), where the prey will almost always be able to avoid the
predators, will almost obtain an expected average reward of 125. So:
AComp1,2(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
(1− 1) = 0
For slots 1 and 3:
AComp1,3(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R1(µ[l˙
1,3← πtl/br, πbr])−R1(µ[l˙ 1,3← πtl/br, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R1(µ[πtl/br, πbr, πbr, πbr])−R1(µ[πtl/br, πbr, πr, πbr])
)
In line-up (πtl/br, πbr, πbr, πbr) the agent in slot 1 (πtl/br) will obtain an expected average reward of 1, while
in line-up (πtl/br, πbr, πr, πbr) the agent in slot 1 (πtl/br), where the prey will almost always be able to avoid the
predators, will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
25It is arguably that some behaviours for the prey could try to be chased by the random agent, providing a greater value for this
property, but this probability of been chased will still remain too low, which would not increase too much the value.
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AComp1,3(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
(1− 1) = 0
For slots 1 and 4:
AComp1,4(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−1,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R1(µ[l˙
1,4← πtl/br, πbr])−R1(µ[l˙ 1,4← πtl/br, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R1(µ[πtl/br, πbr, πbr, πbr])−R1(µ[πtl/br, πbr, πbr, πr])
)
In line-up (πtl/br, πbr, πbr, πbr) the agent in slot 1 (πtl/br) will obtain an expected average reward of 1, while
in line-up (πtl/br, πbr, πbr, πr) the agent in slot 1 (πtl/br), where the prey will almost always be able to avoid the
predators, will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
AComp1,4(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
(1− 1) = 0
For slots 2 and 1:
AComp2,1(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R2(µ[l˙
2,1← πtl/br, πbr])−R2(µ[l˙ 2,1← πtl/br, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R2(µ[πbr, πtl/br, πbr, πbr])−R2(µ[πr, πtl/br, πbr, πbr])
)
In line-up (πbr, πtl/br, πbr, πbr), where πtl/br and πbr will always go to the bottom right corner, the agent
in slot 2 (πtl/br) will obtain an expected average reward of 1, since the prey will always be chased. In line-up
(πr, πtl/br, πbr, πbr), where πtl/br and πbr will always go to the bottom right corner and πr will act randomly,
the agent in slot 2 (πtl/br) will obtain an expected average reward of −1, since the prey will rarely be chased.
So:
AComp2,1(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
(1− (−1)) = 1
For slots 3 and 1:
AComp3,1(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R3(µ[l˙
3,1← πtl/br, πbr])−R3(µ[l˙ 3,1← πtl/br, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R3(µ[πbr, πbr, πtl/br, πbr])−R3(µ[πr, πbr, πtl/br, πbr])
)
In line-up (πbr, πbr, πtl/br, πbr), where πtl/br and πbr will always go to the bottom right corner, the agent
in slot 3 (πtl/br) will obtain an expected average reward of 1, since the prey will always be chased. In line-up
(πr, πbr, πtl/br, πbr), where πtl/br and πbr will always go to the bottom right corner and πr will act randomly,
the agent in slot 3 (πtl/br) will obtain an expected average reward of −1, since the prey will rarely be chased.
So:
AComp3,1(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
(1− (−1)) = 1
And for slots 4 and 1:
AComp4,1(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,1 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
2
(
R4(µ[l˙
4,1← πtl/br, πbr])−R4(µ[l˙ 4,1← πtl/br, πr])
)
=
=
1
2
(
R4(µ[πbr, πbr, πbr, πtl/br])−R4(µ[πr, πbr, πbr, πtl/br])
)
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In line-up (πbr, πbr, πbr, πtl/br), where πtl/br and πbr will always go to the bottom right corner, the agent
in slot 4 (πtl/br) will obtain an expected average reward of 1, since the prey will always be chased. In line-up
(πr, πbr, πbr, πtl/br), where πtl/br and πbr will always go to the bottom right corner and πr will act randomly,
the agent in slot 4 (πtl/br) will obtain an expected average reward of −1, since the prey will rarely be chased.
So:
AComp4,1(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
2
(1− (−1)) = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
AComp(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS22
∑
t1,t2∈τ |t1 ̸=t2
∑
i∈t1
wS(i, µ)
∑
j∈t2
wS(j, µ)ACompi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{AComp1,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp1,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AComp1,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp2,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AComp3,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp4,1(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{AComp1,2(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp1,3(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AComp1,4(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp2,1(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+AComp3,1(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ) +AComp4,1(πtl/br, πbr,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{3× 0 + 3× 1} = 1
2
Since 12 is the highest possible value that we can obtain for the competitive anticipation property, therefore
predator-prey has Generalmax =
1
2 for this property.
C.8 Cooperative Anticipation
Finally, we follow with the cooperative anticipation (ACoop) property. As given in section 4.5.2, we want to
know how much benefit the evaluated agents obtain when they anticipate cooperating agents.
Proposition 65. Generalmin for the cooperative anticipation (ACoop) property is equal to −1 for the predator-
prey environment.
Proof. To find Generalmin (equation 40), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which minimises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πbr′} with wΠe(πbr′) = 1 and Πo = {π33/br′} (a
πbr′ agent always goes to the bottom right corner, but if it notices that not all the predators are going directly
to this corner, then it will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, and a π33/br′ agent always goes to the
cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column when playing as the prey and will go directly to the bottom right corner
when playing as a predator, but if it notices that not all the predators are going directly to this corner, then it
will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column).
Following definition 36, we obtain the ACoop value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not
symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of different slots in the same team. Following
definition 35, we could calculate its ACoop value for each pair of slots but, since Πe has only one agent, its
weight is equal to 1 and Πo also has only one agent, it is equivalent to use directly definition 34. We start with
slots 2 and 3:
ACoop2,3(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R2(µ[l˙
2,3← πbr′ , π33/br′ ]) +R3(µ[l˙ 2,3← πbr′ , π33/br′ ])−R2(µ[l˙ 2,3← πbr′ , πr])−R3(µ[l˙ 2,3← πr, π33/br′ ])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R2(µ[π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ ]) +R3(µ[π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ ])−
−R2(µ[π33/br′ , πbr′ , πr, π33/br′ ])−R3(µ[π33/br′ , πr, π33/br′ , π33/br′ ])
)
216
In both line-ups (π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′), where the predators will go directly to the bottom right cell
and the prey will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agents in slot 2 (πbr′) and slot 3 (π33/br′) will
both obtain an expected average reward of −1. In line-up (π33/br′ , πbr′ , πr, π33/br′), where πr will act randomly
so the predators will almost always notice this random movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd
row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 2 (πbr′) will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. In line-up
(π33/br′ , πr, π33/br′ , π33/br′), where πr will act randomly so the predators will almost always notice this random
movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 3 (π33/br′) will
almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
ACoop2,3(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
((−1) + (−1)− 1− 1) = −1
For slots 2 and 4:
ACoop2,4(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R2(µ[l˙
2,4← πbr′ , π33/br′ ]) +R4(µ[l˙ 2,4← πbr′ , π33/br′ ])−R2(µ[l˙ 2,4← πbr′ , πr])−R4(µ[l˙ 2,4← πr, π33/br′ ])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R2(µ[π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ ]) +R4(µ[π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ ])−
−R2(µ[π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ , πr])−R4(µ[π33/br′ , πr, π33/br′ , π33/br′ ])
)
In both line-ups (π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′), where the predators will go directly to the bottom right cell
and the prey will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agents in slot 2 (πbr′) and slot 4 (π33/br′) will
both obtain an expected average reward of −1. In line-up (π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ , πr), where πr will act randomly
so the predators will almost always notice this random movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd
row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 2 (πbr′) will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. In line-up
(π33/br′ , πr, π33/br′ , π33/br′), where πr will act randomly so the predators will almost always notice this random
movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 4 (π33/br′) will
almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
ACoop2,4(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
((−1) + (−1)− 1− 1) = −1
For slots 3 and 2:
ACoop3,2(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R3(µ[l˙
3,2← πbr′ , π33/br′ ]) +R2(µ[l˙ 3,2← πbr′ , π33/br′ ])−R3(µ[l˙ 3,2← πbr′ , πr])−R2(µ[l˙ 3,2← πr, π33/br′ ])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R3(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ ]) +R2(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ ])−
−R3(µ[π33/br′ , πr, πbr′ , π33/br′ ])−R2(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πr, π33/br′ ])
)
In both line-ups (π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′), where the predators will go directly to the bottom right cell
and the prey will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agents in slot 3 (πbr′) and slot 2 (π33/br′) will
both obtain an expected average reward of −1. In line-up (π33/br′ , πr, πbr′ , π33/br′), where πr will act randomly
so the predators will almost always notice this random movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd
row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 3 (πbr′) will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. In line-up
(π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πr, π33/br′), where πr will act randomly so the predators will almost always notice this random
movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 2 (π33/br′) will
almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
ACoop3,2(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
((−1) + (−1)− 1− 1) = −1
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For slots 3 and 4:
ACoop3,4(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R3(µ[l˙
3,4← πbr′ , π33/br′ ]) +R4(µ[l˙ 3,4← πbr′ , π33/br′ ])−R3(µ[l˙ 3,4← πbr′ , πr])−R4(µ[l˙ 3,4← πr, π33/br′ ])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R3(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ ]) +R4(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′ ])−
−R3(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ , πr])−R4(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πr, π33/br′ ])
)
In both line-ups (π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ , π33/br′), where the predators will go directly to the bottom right cell
and the prey will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agents in slot 3 (πbr′) and slot 4 (π33/br′) will
both obtain an expected average reward of −1. In line-up (π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ , πr), where πr will act randomly
so the predators will almost always notice this random movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd
row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 3 (πbr′) will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. In line-up
(π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πr, π33/br′), where πr will act randomly so the predators will almost always notice this random
movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 4 (π33/br′) will
almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
ACoop3,4(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
((−1) + (−1)− 1− 1) = −1
For slots 4 and 2:
ACoop4,2(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R4(µ[l˙
4,2← πbr′ , π33/br′ ]) +R2(µ[l˙ 4,2← πbr′ , π33/br′ ])−R4(µ[l˙ 4,2← πbr′ , πr])−R2(µ[l˙ 4,2← πr, π33/br′ ])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R4(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ ]) +R2(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ ])−
−R4(µ[π33/br′ , πr, π33/br′ , πbr′ ])−R2(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πr])
)
In both line-ups (π33/br′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′), where the predators will go directly to the bottom right cell
and the prey will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agents in slot 4 (πbr′) and slot 2 (π33/br′) will
both obtain an expected average reward of −1. In line-up (π33/br′ , πr, π33/br′ , πbr′), where πr will act randomly
so the predators will almost always notice this random movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd
row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 4 (πbr′) will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. In line-up
(π33/br′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πr), where πr will act randomly so the predators will almost always notice this random
movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 2 (π33/br′) will
almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
ACoop4,2(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
((−1) + (−1)− 1− 1) = −1
And for slots 4 and 3:
ACoop4,3(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R4(µ[l˙
4,3← πbr′ , π33/br′ ]) +R3(µ[l˙ 4,3← πbr′ , π33/br′ ])−R4(µ[l˙ 4,3← πbr′ , πr])−R3(µ[l˙ 4,3← πr, π33/br′ ])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R4(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ ]) +R3(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′ ])−
−R4(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πr, πbr′ ])−R3(µ[π33/br′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πr])
)
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In both line-ups (π33/br′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πbr′), where the predators will go directly to the bottom right cell
and the prey will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agents in slot 4 (πbr′) and slot 3 (π33/br′) will
both obtain an expected average reward of −1. In line-up (π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πr, πbr′), where πr will act randomly
so the predators will almost always notice this random movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd
row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 4 (πbr′) will almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. In line-up
(π33/br′ , π33/br′ , π33/br′ , πr), where πr will act randomly so the predators will almost always notice this random
movement and then they will go to the cell in the 3rd row and 3rd column, the agent in slot 3 (π33/br′) will
almost obtain an expected average reward of 1. So:
ACoop4,3(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
((−1) + (−1)− 1− 1) = −1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
ACoop(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS23
∑
t∈τ
∑
i,j∈t|i̸=j
wS(i, µ)wS(j, µ)ACoopi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+
∑
t1,t2,t3∈τ |t1 ̸=t2 ̸=t3
∑
i∈t1
wS(i, µ)
∑
j∈t2
wS(j, µ)ACoopi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{ACoop2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ACoop3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ACoop4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{ACoop2,3(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop2,4(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ACoop3,2(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop3,4(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ACoop4,2(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop4,3(πbr′ , π33/br′ ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{6× (−1)} = −1
Since −1 is the lowest possible value for the cooperative anticipation property, therefore predator-prey has
Generalmin = −1 for this property.
Proposition 66. Generalmax for the cooperative anticipation (ACoop) property is equal to 1 for the predator-
prey environment.
Proof. To find Generalmax (equation 41), we need to find a trio ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩ which maximises the property as
much as possible. We can have this situation by selecting Πe = {πwin} with wΠe(πwin) = 1 and Πo = {πwin}
(a πwin agent always tries to not be chased when playing as the prey and tries to chase when playing as the
predator).
Following definition 36, we obtain the ACoop value for this ⟨Πe, wΠe ,Πo⟩. Since the environment is not
symmetric, we need to calculate this property for every pair of different slots in the same team. Following
definition 35, we could calculate its ACoop value for each pair of slots but, since Πe has only one agent, its
weight is equal to 1 and Πo also has only one agent, it is equivalent to use directly definition 34. We start with
slots 2 and 3:
ACoop2,3(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R2(µ[l˙
2,3← πwin, πwin]) +R3(µ[l˙ 2,3← πwin, πwin])−R2(µ[l˙ 2,3← πwin, πr])−R3(µ[l˙ 2,3← πr, πwin])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R2(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin]) +R3(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin])−
−R2(µ[πwin, πwin, πr, πwin])−R3(µ[πwin, πr, πwin, πwin])
)
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In both line-ups (πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin), where the predators will coordinate to always chase the prey as
seen in lemma 3, the agents in slot 2 (πwin) and slot 3 (πwin) will both obtain an expected average reward of 1.
In line-up (πwin, πwin, πr, πwin), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other predators
so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 2 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected average reward
of −1. In line-up (πwin, πr, πwin, πwin), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other
predators so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 3 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected
average reward of −1. So:
ACoop2,3(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
(1 + 1− (−1)− (−1)) = 1
For slots 2 and 4:
ACoop2,4(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−2,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R2(µ[l˙
2,4← πwin, πwin]) +R4(µ[l˙ 2,4← πwin, πwin])−R2(µ[l˙ 2,4← πwin, πr])−R4(µ[l˙ 2,4← πr, πwin])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R2(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin]) +R4(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin])−
−R2(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πr])−R4(µ[πwin, πr, πwin, πwin])
)
In both line-ups (πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin), where the predators will coordinate to always chase the prey as
seen in lemma 3, the agents in slot 2 (πwin) and slot 4 (πwin) will both obtain an expected average reward of 1.
In line-up (πwin, πwin, πwin, πr), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other predators
so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 2 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected average reward
of −1. In line-up (πwin, πr, πwin, πwin), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other
predators so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 4 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected
average reward of −1. So:
ACoop2,4(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
(1 + 1− (−1)− (−1)) = 1
For slots 3 and 2:
ACoop3,2(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R3(µ[l˙
3,2← πwin, πwin]) +R2(µ[l˙ 3,2← πwin, πwin])−R3(µ[l˙ 3,2← πwin, πr])−R2(µ[l˙ 3,2← πr, πwin])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R3(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin]) +R2(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin])−
−R3(µ[πwin, πr, πwin, πwin])−R2(µ[πwin, πwin, πr, πwin])
)
In both line-ups (πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin), where the predators will coordinate to always chase the prey as
seen in lemma 3, the agents in slot 3 (πwin) and slot 2 (πwin) will both obtain an expected average reward of 1.
In line-up (πwin, πr, πwin, πwin), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other predators
so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 3 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected average reward
of −1. In line-up (πwin, πwin, πr, πwin), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other
predators so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 2 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected
average reward of −1. So:
ACoop3,2(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
(1 + 1− (−1)− (−1)) = 1
For slots 3 and 4:
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ACoop3,4(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−3,4 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R3(µ[l˙
3,4← πwin, πwin]) +R4(µ[l˙ 3,4← πwin, πwin])−R3(µ[l˙ 3,4← πwin, πr])−R4(µ[l˙ 3,4← πr, πwin])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R3(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin]) +R4(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin])−
−R3(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πr])−R4(µ[πwin, πwin, πr, πwin])
)
In both line-ups (πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin), where the predators will coordinate to always chase the prey as
seen in lemma 3, the agents in slot 3 (πwin) and slot 4 (πwin) will both obtain an expected average reward of 1.
In line-up (πwin, πwin, πwin, πr), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other predators
so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 3 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected average reward
of −1. In line-up (πwin, πwin, πr, πwin), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other
predators so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 4 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected
average reward of −1. So:
ACoop3,4(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
(1 + 1− (−1)− (−1)) = 1
For slots 4 and 2:
ACoop4,2(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,2 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R4(µ[l˙
4,2← πwin, πwin]) +R2(µ[l˙ 4,2← πwin, πwin])−R4(µ[l˙ 4,2← πwin, πr])−R2(µ[l˙ 4,2← πr, πwin])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R4(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin]) +R2(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin])−
−R4(µ[πwin, πr, πwin, πwin])−R2(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πr])
)
In both line-ups (πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin), where the predators will coordinate to always chase the prey as
seen in lemma 3, the agents in slot 4 (πwin) and slot 2 (πwin) will both obtain an expected average reward of 1.
In line-up (πwin, πr, πwin, πwin), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other predators
so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 4 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected average reward
of −1. In line-up (πwin, πwin, πwin, πr), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other
predators so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 2 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected
average reward of −1. So:
ACoop4,2(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
(1 + 1− (−1)− (−1)) = 1
And for slots 4 and 3:
ACoop4,3(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
∑
l˙∈L˙N(µ)−4,3 (Πo)
wL˙(l˙)
1
4
×
×
(
R4(µ[l˙
4,3← πwin, πwin]) +R3(µ[l˙ 4,3← πwin, πwin])−R4(µ[l˙ 4,3← πwin, πr])−R3(µ[l˙ 4,3← πr, πwin])
)
=
=
1
4
(
R4(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin]) +R3(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin])−
−R4(µ[πwin, πwin, πr, πwin])−R3(µ[πwin, πwin, πwin, πr])
)
In both line-ups (πwin, πwin, πwin, πwin), where the predators will coordinate to always chase the prey as
seen in lemma 3, the agents in slot 4 (πwin) and slot 3 (πwin) will both obtain an expected average reward of 1.
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In line-up (πwin, πwin, πwin, πr), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other predators
so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 4 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected average reward
of −1. In line-up (πwin, πwin, πr, πwin), where the random agent will almost never coordinate with the other
predators so the prey will almost always survive, the agent in slot 3 (πwin) will almost obtain an expected
average reward of −1. So:
ACoop4,3(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
1
4
(1 + 1− (−1)− (−1)) = 1
And finally, we weight over the slots:
ACoop(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ, wS) = ηS23
∑
t∈τ
∑
i,j∈t|i ̸=j
wS(i, µ)wS(j, µ)ACoopi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+
∑
t1,t2,t3∈τ |t1 ̸=t2 ̸=t3
∑
i∈t1
wS(i, µ)
∑
j∈t2
wS(j, µ)ACoopi,j(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{ACoop2,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop2,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ACoop3,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop3,4(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ACoop4,2(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop4,3(Πe, wΠe ,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{ACoop2,3(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop2,4(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ACoop3,2(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop3,4(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ)+
+ACoop4,2(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ) +ACoop4,3(πwin, πwin,Πo, wL˙, µ)} =
=
8
3
1
4
1
4
{6× 1} = 1
Since 1 is the highest possible value for the cooperative anticipation property, therefore predator-prey has
Generalmax = 1 for this property.
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